The key issues in Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis were whether:

The defendant Victor Willis is the original lead singer of the Village People. In the late 1970s, the plaintiffs, including a music publisher Scorpio Music S.A. (Scorpio) and two of its subsidiaries, allegedly hired Willis to translate or write new lyrics for musical compositions owned by Scorpio. By agreement, Willis transferred his copyright interests in 33 musical compositions to the subsidiary Can't Stop Music, which then assigned its rights to Scorpio. The agreement specified that Willis was to receive a set percentage between 12% to 20% of gross receipts for the exploitation of each composition. The copyright registrations for the compositions credit Willis as one of several authors.

In 2011, Willis served a notice of termination, under Section 203(a)(1) of the Copyright Act, on the plaintiffs concerning his interests in the 33 works. Section 203 governs Willis's transfers because they occurred after January 1, 1978. That statute generally permits an author or his statutory successors who serves notice under certain conditions to effectuate the termination of a transfer or license of a copyright at any time during a five-year period beginning after 35 years from the execution of the grant (17 U.S.C. § 203).

The plaintiffs responded to Willis's notice by bringing a claim for a declaratory judgment that:

While the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Willis had no interest in the works because they were works made for hire, this claim was withdrawn during oral arguments and therefore not before the court.

In its order, the court granted Willis's motion to dismiss and held that under Section 203 of the Copyright Act a joint author who separately transfers his copyright interest may unilaterally terminate that grant.

The plaintiffs argued that Willis's notice of termination was not valid because he was a co-author, but the other co-authors did not join in serving the notice. The plaintiffs argued that Section 203(a)(1) requires a majority of all of the authors who transferred their copyright interests in a joint work, whether in one transfer or in separate transfers, to join in a termination for it to be valid. Instead, focusing on the plain meaning of the statute, the court found that because Willis was the only person who executed the grants of his copyright interests in the works, he had the ability to terminate those grants. Under the court's reading of Section 203(a)(1):

In support of this interpretation, the court noted that it would be inconsistent to require the participation of all of the authors because:

The court also rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that Willis's ownership interest should be limited to the percentage of his compensation in each composition under the original transfer agreement. It found no basis for this position under the statute, which specifies that "all rights under the [Copyright Act] that were covered by the terminated grants revert to the author" (17 U.S.C § 203(b)). Absent an agreement of the authors, the court held each joint author shares equally in the ownership of work and may therefore recover that interest in full.

The court did not rule on the termination of any licenses issued or derivative works authorized before the termination because Willis did not challenge their status.

This case may have far-reaching implications for the music and other entertainment industries, particularly if the court's reasoning is adopted by other courts analyzing termination rights under Section 203(a)(1).

For more on the termination and recapture provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976 and related best practices for companies that commission and acquire copyrighted works, see Article: Expert Q&A on Copyright Statutory Termination of Transfers and Licenses.