On May 18, 2012, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion in Ponce v. Billington. One key litigated issue was whether the district court correctly instructed the jury that the plaintiff must prove unlawful discrimination was the "sole reason" for the employer's adverse employment action.

Jorge Ponce, a Cuban American man, applied for a job as Director of the Library of Congress's Office of Workplace Diversity, but lost the position to Deborah Hayes, an African American woman. Hayes had received the highest interview scores for the position but lacked some of Ponce's credentials, including experience working as a librarian and a master's degree in library science. Ponce sued the Library of Congress's librarian under Title VII, claiming the Library had discriminated against him on the bases of race, sex and national origin.

The district court's jury instructions stated Ponce must prove illegal discrimination was the "sole reason for his non selection," meaning Ponce must prove that "but for" his race, national origin or sex the Library would have hired him. Ponce objected to these jury instructions and asked the court to strike the "sole reason" language. The court refused, relying on the DC Circuit's use of that language in Ginger v. District of Columbia, but suggested the losing party appeal the jury instructions to clear up the confusion between "sole reason" and "but for" language.

The jury found in favor of the Library and Ponce appealed, claiming the jury instructions were erroneous. Ponce also argued that the district court erred by refusing to admit into evidence a portion of an administrative report that recommended the Library find Ponce was discriminated against.

The DC Circuit took the opportunity to clarify the Title VII burden of proof standards while holding that the district court had not committed any reversible errors.

The court noted that under the single-motive or pretext theory of Title VII discrimination, a plaintiff can establish liability by proving a protected characteristic, such as race or sex, was a but-for cause of the relevant adverse employment action. In Ginger, the court used the term "sole reason" as shorthand for but-for cause, stating in a single-motive case a plaintiff argues that the protected characteristic "was the sole reason for an adverse employment action." The court admitted the language was confusing, as in this case the jury could find that Hayes was hired for both her interview scores and her race. If the jury focused on but-for cause, it could find for Ponce, but if the jury took the "sole" language literally, it would find for the Library, as racial discrimination was not the "sole" reason Ponce was not hired.

The court clarified that Title VII did not require a plaintiff to show illegal discrimination was the sole cause of an adverse employment action. However, because the district court's jury instructions had adequately defined "sole reason" as but-for cause, the DC Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the jury instructions.

The court also held the district court did not err by:

This decision clarifies the standard for proving single-motive discrimination under Title VII and the language to use in jury instructions in single-motive discrimination cases. Employers should be aware, however, that jury instructions with confusing language on Title VII liability may be upheld where the instructions ultimately clearly define the but-for legal standard.

For more information on Title VII, see Practice Note, Discrimination under Title VII: Basics.