Eighth Circuit: Party May Seek Both Prospective and Retrospective Relief under FRCP 60(b) | Practical Law

Eighth Circuit: Party May Seek Both Prospective and Retrospective Relief under FRCP 60(b) | Practical Law

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in City of Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa that an agency determination may constitute a change of law for the purposes of relief under FRCP 60(b). The court also held that a claim may be raised for both prospective relief under FRCP 60(b)(5) and retrospective relief under FRCP 60(b)(6).

Eighth Circuit: Party May Seek Both Prospective and Retrospective Relief under FRCP 60(b)

by PLC Litigation
Published on 15 Jan 2013USA (National/Federal)
The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in City of Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa that an agency determination may constitute a change of law for the purposes of relief under FRCP 60(b). The court also held that a claim may be raised for both prospective relief under FRCP 60(b)(5) and retrospective relief under FRCP 60(b)(6).
The parties in City of Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa entered into a consent decree in 1994 which required the defendant to make rent payments to the City of Duluth. The defendant stopped making these payments, and the City sued for breach of contract.
The defendant filed a counterclaim seeking dissolution of the consent decree, arguing that it should be granted prospective relief from its obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 60(b)(5) and retrospective relief from its obligations under FRCP 60(b)(6) because an agency determination had made illegal the actions the consent decree was intended to enforce. The district court granted the defendant prospective relief under FRCP 60(b)(5) but denied retrospective relief under FRCP 60(b)(6).
In a decision dated January 14, 2013, the US Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit held that a binding determination by a federal agency, which has been tasked with interpreting and enforcing a statute enacted by Congress, represents a change in law for the purposes of FRCP 60(b). The Eighth Circuit therefore agreed with the district court that prospective relief should be granted from the continued enforcement of the consent decree under FRCP 60(b)(5) because a decision by the National Indian Gaming Commission had rendered the obligations of the parties' consent decree impermissible under federal law.
The defendant also sought retrospective relief under FRCP 60(b)(6), which permits relief from a prior order for "any other reason that justifies relief." The district court rejected the defendant's argument because the grounds asserted for relief under FRCP 60(b)(6) were similar to those asserted for relief under FRCP 60(b)(5), and granting retrospective relief could undermine the limitation to prospective relief found in FRCP 60(b)(5). The Eighth Circuit disagreed, holding that FRCP 60(b) does not categorically prevent claims from being raised for both prospective relief under FRCP 60(b)(5) and retrospective relief under FRCP 60(b)(6).
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of prospective relief and remanded the case for the district court to consider whether retrospective relief is appropriate.
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