DNJ Judge Adopts Three-step Threshold Test for Valuing Reverse Payments in Pay for Delay Cases | Practical Law

DNJ Judge Adopts Three-step Threshold Test for Valuing Reverse Payments in Pay for Delay Cases | Practical Law

Judge Peter G. Sheridan of the US District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ pay-for-delay claims in In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation. The judge adopted a three-step test for valuing reverse payments and elaborated on the factual allegations needed to plausibly allege the value of non-cash payments.

DNJ Judge Adopts Three-step Threshold Test for Valuing Reverse Payments in Pay for Delay Cases

by Practical Law Antitrust
Published on 10 Oct 2014USA (National/Federal)
Judge Peter G. Sheridan of the US District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ pay-for-delay claims in In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation. The judge adopted a three-step test for valuing reverse payments and elaborated on the factual allegations needed to plausibly allege the value of non-cash payments.
On October 6, 2014, Judge Peter G. Sheridan of the US District Court for the District of New Jersey adopted in In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation a three-step test for valuing reverse payments in reverse payment settlements, also known as pay-for-delay agreements, and held that plaintiffs failed to plead enough reliable facts to sustain a claim ( (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014)). Plaintiffs, a proposed class of direct purchasers of the antidepressant Effexor XR, alleged that Wyeth LLC and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. entered into a reverse payment settlement in which Teva agreed to delay selling a generic version of Effexor XR in exchange for commitments from Wyeth worth over $500 million. The judge dismissed the reverse payment settlement claims for plaintiffs’ failure to show a reliable value for the alleged reverse payment under a three-step test that the court derived from the US Supreme Court’s analysis in FTC v. Actavis.
Under the 2005 settlement agreement, Teva agreed to refrain from selling generic Effexor XR until two years after the principal patent covering the drug expired. In exchange, Wyeth agreed to:
  • License Teva to sell a generic version of the instant release version of Effexor, called Effexor IR, before the drug’s patent expired.
  • Refrain from selling its own generic version of Effexor IR for eighteen months after Teva began selling it.
  • Refrain from selling its own generic version of Effexor XR, the extended release formulation, for 180 days after Teva began selling it.
Wyeth’s commitments not to introduce its own generic versions of Effexor are known as no-authorized-generic or no-AG agreements and, according to plaintiffs, allowed Teva to be the exclusive seller of generic Effexor IR and generic Effexor XR while the no-AG agreements were in effect. Plaintiffs alleged that the no-AG agreements and the Effexor IR license amounted to a reverse payment by Wyeth of over $500 million in exchange for Teva’s agreement not to compete in the Effexor XR market.
The fundamental holdings of Judge Sheridan’s opinion match those in his September opinion dismissing claims in In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, including that:
  • Actavis applies to non-cash reverse payments.
  • Plaintiffs must plead sufficient facts to demonstrate a reliable value for a reverse payment, including the parties’ avoided litigation costs.
  • Settlements involving non-cash reverse payments require significantly more detailed factual allegations than those involving cash reverse payments.
However, Judge Sheridan expanded on his earlier conclusions in Lipitor and adopted a three-step threshold test for establishing a reverse payment under Actavis, requiring plaintiffs to:
  • Value any consideration paid from the patent-holder to the generic firm, including payments made over time or in forms other than cash.
  • Deduct the patent holder’s avoided litigation costs.
  • Deduct the value of any goods, services or other consideration provided by the generic firm as part of the same transaction or a related transaction.
The resulting net payment is the reverse payment.
To establish each step of this test, the court held that plaintiffs must plead facts that have a reliable foundation, such as third-party studies or the knowledge of businesspeople in the pharmaceutical industry. The court also noted that it was not sufficient to analogize values from data concerning other drugs. Ultimately, the court found that the plaintiffs did not plead a reliable foundation for:
  • The $100 million estimated value of the sales of Effexor IR.
  • The $500 million estimated value of the Effexor XR no-AG agreement.
  • Wyeth’s avoided litigation costs.
Without sufficient facts to calculate each step of the test, the court found that it was unable to determine the three key factors of the Actavis analysis:
  • The value of the payment.
  • Whether it was a reverse payment (that is, a net payment from Wyeth to Teva).
  • Whether the payment was large.
Recognizing that Actavis did not provide detailed guidance about how large a payment must be to lead to antitrust liability, the court also held that the payment must be large from the point of view of the patent-holder. The court suggested that one test could be whether the value of the payment represented a large portion of the annual sales of the drug at issue.
The court also held that the FTC’s failure to object to the settlement agreement before it became effective suggested that Wyeth and Teva did not have anticompetitive intent. Under the terms of a pre-existing FTC consent agreement, the reviewing court ordered the FTC to review the settlement agreement for antitrust concerns before entering it as a consent judgment. The FTC did not object to the agreement. Judge Sheridan held that the FTC’s failure to object indicated that:
  • Wyeth and Teva did not have anticompetitive intent because they were willing to submit it to the FTC for approval.
  • The agreement did not raise antitrust concerns similar to the agreement at issue in Actavis, where the FTC was a plaintiff.
Although it dismissed the pay-for-delay claims, the court upheld separate claims by the plaintiffs that Wyeth engaged in fraud and sham litigation in order to extend Effexor XR’s patent protection.
This opinion is part of a growing body of district court opinions addressing Actavis. The court’s adoption of a detailed three-step test for valuing a reverse payment is likely to provide welcome guidance to litigants while also setting a difficult standard for plaintiffs at the pleading stage. For more information on prior decisions concerning Actavis, see Legal Updates, Supreme Court Issues Decision in Pay-for-Delay Case FTC v. Actavis, District of New Jersey Holds that Actavis Applies Only to Monetary Reverse Payment Settlements, Federal Judge Holds that Actavis Is Not Limited to Cash Payment Settlements, Cash Only: Federal Judge Holds that Actavis is Limited to Monetary Settlement Payments, EDPA Judge Holds that Patent Law is Not Necessary to Resolve Pay-for-delay Claims and Remands Case to State Court and Federal Judge Holds that Pay for Delay Plaintiffs Must Allege Value of Non-cash Reverse Payment Settlement.
For more information on reverse settlements see Practice Note, Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements.