US Bank Regulators Accommodate Stay on Early Termination of Derivatives Contracts | Practical Law

US Bank Regulators Accommodate Stay on Early Termination of Derivatives Contracts | Practical Law

The FRB and OCC released an interim final rule (IFR) addressing regulatory capital, lending limits and liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) issues related to the changes to bank derivatives contracts made by the ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol and related non-US bank resolution regimes.

US Bank Regulators Accommodate Stay on Early Termination of Derivatives Contracts

Practical Law Legal Update 1-592-9705 (Approx. 3 pages)

US Bank Regulators Accommodate Stay on Early Termination of Derivatives Contracts

by Practical Law Finance
Published on 17 Dec 2014International, USA (National/Federal)
The FRB and OCC released an interim final rule (IFR) addressing regulatory capital, lending limits and liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) issues related to the changes to bank derivatives contracts made by the ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol and related non-US bank resolution regimes.
On December 16, 2014, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued and requested public comment on an interim final rule (IFR) that permits a stay on early termination of derivatives contracts with a distressed bank by clarifying that existing requirements for bank capital and liquidity, as well as lending limits, are not affected by the changes to the derivatives contracts of banks that have adhered to the ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol (see Legal Update, ISDA: Major Banks Agree to Stay on Swap Agreement Termination Rights in Event of Failure).
The IFR:
  • Clarifies that the treatment of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, eligible market loans and repo-style transactions under the FRB and OCC's regulatory capital and liquidity coverage ratio rules would not be affected by implementation of certain foreign special resolution regimes for financial companies (such as the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which prescribes aspects of a special resolution regime that EU member nations should implement) or by the adherence of a banking organization to ISDA's Resolution Stay Protocol. For example, under the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), a master netting agreement (MNA) under which default rights may be stayed or that incorporates the amendments of the ISDA Protocol would no longer qualify as a qualifying MNA under federal bank regulatory capital, liquidity and lending limits rules. Through these revisions, the IFR maintains the existing treatment for these contracts for purposes of the regulatory capital, liquidity or, for national banks and federal savings associations, lending limits rules, while recognizing the recent changes contemplated by the BRRD and the ISDA Protocol.
  • Clarifies that there is no change to the lending limits of affected national banks and federal savings associations as a result of implementation of certain foreign special resolution regimes for financial companies (such as the EU's BRRD) or by the adherence of a banking organization to ISDA's Resolution Stay Protocol.
  • Revises certain other definitions of the regulatory capital rules to make various conforming changes designed to ensure that a banking organization may continue to recognize the risk mitigating effects of financial collateral received in a secured lending transaction, repo-style transaction or eligible margin loan for purposes of federal bank regulatory capital, liquidity and lending limits rules, while recognizing the recent changes contemplated by the BRRD and banking organizations that have adhered to the ISDA Protocol. Specifically, the IFR revises the definitions of "collateral agreement," "eligible margin loan" and "repo-style transaction" in federal bank regulatory capital rules to provide that counterparty default rights may be stayed under a foreign special resolution regime or, if applicable, under a special resolution regime incorporated by contract.
A temporary stay of early termination rights under these contracts provides regulators with additional time to work out a rescue plan for a large bank if necessary and will help avoid a market crash such as that which occurred in 2008. Generally, under the ISDA Master Agreement a party may terminate the contract as soon as its counterparty hits certain insolvency triggers (see Practice Notes, Understanding the ISDA Master Agreement and Schedule: Section 5(a)(vii): Bankruptcy and The ISDA Master Agreement: Early Termination).
The IFR becomes effective on January 1, 2015. Public comment must be received on or before March 3, 2015.