Sixth Circuit Dismisses Campus Spiritual Director's Discrimination Case Based on Ministerial Exemption | Practical Law

Sixth Circuit Dismisses Campus Spiritual Director's Discrimination Case Based on Ministerial Exemption | Practical Law

In Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the First Amendment’s ministerial exception to employment laws applied to a gender discrimination claim by a spiritual director and that the ministerial exception cannot be waived as a matter of law. As a result, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all of the employee’s claims.

Sixth Circuit Dismisses Campus Spiritual Director's Discrimination Case Based on Ministerial Exemption

by Practical Law Labor & Employment
Published on 10 Feb 2015 • USA (National/Federal)
In Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the First Amendment’s ministerial exception to employment laws applied to a gender discrimination claim by a spiritual director and that the ministerial exception cannot be waived as a matter of law. As a result, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all of the employee’s claims.
On February 5, 2015, in Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the First Amendment’s ministerial exception to employment laws applied to a gender discrimination claim by a spiritual director, and that the ministerial exception cannot be waived as a matter of law. As a result, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all of the employee’s claims. (No. 14-1549, (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 2015).)

Background

The plaintiff, Alyce Conlon, worked for the defendant, the InterVersity Christian Fellowship/USA (IVCF) as a spiritual director providing counseling and prayer-related services. IVCF is an evangelical Christian organization that services students and faculty at colleges and universities. Conlon worked for IVCF for 25 years, becoming a spiritual director in 2004. In March 2011, Conlon informed IVCF that she was considering getting divorced, and she was put on first paid, then unpaid, leave to afford her the opportunity to try to repair her marriage. IVCF denied Conlon’s repeated requests to return to work purportedly because IVCF believed she was not committed to saving her marriage. IVCF ultimately terminated her employment in December 2011.
In 2012, Conlon filed a complaint with the EEOC and the Michigan Division of Civil Rights. Conlon alleged she was terminated because she had failed to reconcile with her spouse (they divorced shortly after her termination), while two male employees who had divorced their spouses during their employment with IVCF had not been terminated. In 2013, after obtaining a right to sue letter, Conlon sued IVCF in federal district court, alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Act. IVCF moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense. The district court granted the motion based on the ministerial exception and dismissed all of Conlon’s claims.
The ministerial exception, grounded in an interpretation of the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment, essentially means that employment laws such as Title VII will generally not be applied to claims involving the employment relationship between a church and its ministers. The Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC validated the use of this affirmative defense in applicable circumstances (132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)). This case was the Sixth Circuit's first opportunity since Hosanna-Tabor to address the scope of the ministerial exception.

Outcome

The main issues in Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship were whether the ministerial exception applied, and whether it had been waived by IVCF. The Sixth Circuit held that:
  • Conlon’s Title VII and state discrimination law claims were barred by the ministerial exception.
  • The ministerial exception cannot be waived as a matter of law. It is a structural limit on the government’s authority derived from the First Amendment’s free exercise and establishment clauses. For that reason, an employer is basically incapable of waiving it as a defense.
  • The state law claims were nullified by the ministerial exception first because Michigan law recognizes the exception and also because the First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even though IVCF is not a church and Conlon did not have the title of "minister," the Sixth Circuit found that the ministerial exception applied. The Sixth Circuit asserted that:
  • IVCF was a Christian organization geared to advancing the Christian religious faith.
  • An employer need not be a traditional religious organization like a church to invoke the exception. Being a “religiously affiliated entity” was enough. Here the court relied on its prior ministerial exception opinion in Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc. (474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Examining whether Conlon was a ministerial employee of IVCF, the Court applied the four-part test used by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor, finding:
  • Conlon’s title of spiritual director sufficed for meeting the first factor of the test – whether the employee’s formal title reflects that the employee is like a minister.
  • Conlon’s responsibilities of teaching the Bible and helping others grow as Christians were sufficient to meet the fourth factor of the test – whether the employee’s functions are religious in nature.
  • The fact that the second and third factors of the test (the requirements to earn Conlon’s title and the degree to which she exercised leadership akin to a minister) were not satisfied did not defeat the exception. The Court declined to address whether only one factor would be sufficient, but held that the exception clearly applies if the first and fourth factors are present.
The Court recognized that but for the ministerial exception applying in this case, Conlon’s claims for gender discrimination would have been plausible. Here, however, the Court recognized the importance of the government (including the judiciary) not dictating who a religious organization should hire or fire.

Practical Implications

This case is the Sixth Circuit's first application of the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor and uses the ministerial exception to avoid addressing the plaintiff's claims that she was treated differently than other men in the organization. The Sixth Circuit reiterates that even non-church "religious organizations" can benefit from the ministerial exception. What remains an open question in the Sixth Circuit, and perhaps elsewhere, is whether an employee can defeat the defense when only one (or none) of the four factors in the Supreme Court’s Hosanna-Tabor test apply.