On March 31, 2015, in vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a federal court may abstain from deciding an action that seeks both declaratory and nondeclaratory relief only in exceptional circumstances, as articulated in the Colorado River abstention doctrine (No. 14-1122, (4th Cir. Mar. 31, 2015)).

The case involves a dispute between two clergymen, each believing himself to be the proper leader of The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Carolina. Bishop Charles G. vonRosenberg brought this action against Bishop Mark J. Lawrence, alleging Lanham Act violations and seeking declaratory and nondeclaratory relief. In response, Lawrence asked the district court to abstain and stay this action pending resolution of a related state court case filed by a faction of Lawrence’s supporters. The district court, guided by its broad discretion to stay declaratory judgment actions under the abstention doctrine articulated in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942) and Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995), granted Lawrence’s motion to abstain.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit explicitly held for the first time that Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), which permits a federal court to abstain from exercising federal jurisdiction only in exceptional circumstances, properly governs the abstention decision in an action seeking both declaratory and nondeclaratory relief. The court vacated the stay and remanded the case for a determination as to whether exceptional circumstances exist to justify abstention.

In its decision, the Fourth Circuit explained that Colorado River permits a court to abstain only in the rare circumstance in which the needs of judicial administration are so pressing as to supersede the court’s otherwise “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise its jurisdiction over that federal action. The abstention doctrine outlined in Brillhart/Wilton, by contrast, flows from the broad discretion afforded courts to entertain actions and award declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The court found that the Brillhart/Wilton standard is a poor fit for claims requesting nondeclaratory relief over which a federal court generally must exercise jurisdiction. For those claims, exceptional circumstances must exist to surrender jurisdiction.

Practitioners in the Fourth Circuit must be aware that the Colorado River standard applies to all mixed claims, even when the claims for injunctive relief are ancillary to a party’s request for declaratory relief. The only potential exception to this general rule arises when a party’s request for injunctive relief is either frivolous or is made solely to avoid application of the Brillhart/Wilton standard.