Merger control in Mexico: overview

A Q&A guide to merger control in Mexico.

The Q&A gives a high level overview of merger control, regulatory framework and regulatory authorities, relevant triggering events and thresholds in Mexico. It also covers notification requirements, procedures and timetables, publicity and confidentiality, third party rights, substantive test, remedies, penalties, appeals, joint ventures and proposals for reform.

For information on restraints of trade, monopolies and abuses of market power in Mexico, visit Restraints of trade and dominance in Mexico: overview.

This Q&A is part of the global guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Restraints of Trade and Dominance Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/restraintsoftrade-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Merger Control Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/mergercontrol-mjg.

For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As, which provide a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg.

Contents

Regulatory framework

1. What (if any) merger control rules apply to mergers and acquisitions in your jurisdiction? What is the regulatory authority?

Regulatory framework

Merger control is provided for under the Federal Economic Competition Law that was enacted on 23 May 2014 and that became effective on 7 July 2014 (Competition Act) and by the Regulations to the Competition Act (Disposiciones Regulatorias), that were issued on 10 November 2014 and became effective on 11 November 2014.

The Competition Act implemented the reform to Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution that was published on 11 June 2013 in the Federal Official Journal (Diario Oficial de la Federación).

The constitutional amendment to Article 28 transformed the competition and telecommunications landscape in Mexico. In summary, the reform:

  • Created two constitutional and autonomous agencies specialised in economic competition, the Federal Economic Competition Commission (Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica) (Cofece), and in telecommunications matters, the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones) (IFT).

  • Set out that the investigative authority (Autoridad Investigadora), in both Cofece and the IFT must be separated from the decision-making bodies.

  • Granted incremental powers to both Cofece and the IFT to divest assets, determine essential facilities and eliminate barriers to entry in the markets.

  • Set out that the only remedy against a final decision rendered by Cofece or the IFT is the amparo proceeding.

  • Ordered the implementation of specialised district judges and collegiate circuit courts for amparo proceedings against the final decisions of Cofece and the IFT.

  • Determined that there would not be any means of challenge against any intermediate decision after the statement of objections until the final decision.

  • Barred the stay of decisions in amparo proceedings, except for final decisions rendered by Cofece that fined or divested companies (divestiture of assets).

  • Set out a very specific procedure for the appointment of commissioners of both Cofece and the IFT that provides for a test, the selection of the highest grades and the intervention of the President of Mexico and the ratification of the Mexican Senate.

Regulatory authority

Cofece is the constitutional autonomous entity responsible for all competition matters in Mexico, except for those areas reserved to the IFT, which are the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors. Both Cofece and the IFT as decision-making bodies are each comprised of seven federal commissioners, including their corresponding chairman/chairwoman.

Within the competition authorities, merger control procedure is conducted before the authority's Technical Secretary (Secretario Técnico) and resolved by the full panel of commissioners of Cofece or the IFT, depending on the jurisdiction. The General Mergers Bureau that depends on the Technical Secretary is in charge of:

  • Analysing the notification and transaction.

  • Proposing remedies to reduce or prevent anti-competitive effects.

  • Incorporating protective measures that promote and secure positive effects of competition.

Merger control can be carried out on a voluntary basis or by mandatory filing (Competition Act). However, approved transactions can also be subject to investigation when:

  • They were approved based on false information.

  • The authority conditioned it to specific remedies and the involved parties did not comply with these remedies.

In these cases, the authority's prosecutor, the Investigative Authority, can commence an investigation against the involved parties with the purpose of imposing a sanction against them.

 

Triggering events/thresholds

2. What are the relevant jurisdictional triggering events/thresholds?

Triggering events

A concentration is any type of merger, acquisition of control or any type of act (transaction) between companies, associations, shares, stock capital, trust funds or the combination of any type of assets among economic agents (Article 61, Competition Act).

An economic agent is any person or company, with or without business purposes, entities and/or governmental bodies, associations, business chambers, professional associations, trust funds or any other that participates in the economy (Article 3, section I, Competition Act).

All types of transactions and operations that fall under the requirements provided by the Competition Act are subject to merger control and must be authorised by the competition authority.

Thresholds

All pre-clearance procedures (concentration or notification procedures) end up with a resolution issued by the competition authority that:

  • Plainly authorises the transaction or conditions the authorisation to the successful implementation of remedies.

  • Rejects the transaction.

However, a favourable resolution issued by the competition authority can be subject to subsequent investigation, when the approval was based on false information or the resolution and/or the involved parties fail to fulfil the imposed conditions by the authority.

Even if a concentration does not require prior notification to Cofece or the IFT, because the thresholds are not satisfied, it remains subject to investigation for one year from completion of the merger (Article 65, Competition Act).

When concentrations reach any of the three following thresholds, they are subject to prior approval from Cofece or the IFT (Article 86, Competition Act):

  • Value of the transaction. Transactions that involve an act (or a series of acts) worth the equivalent of 18 million times the General Minimum Wage in force for the Federal District (GMW) that have a direct or indirect economic effect within Mexican territory, regardless of where the transaction is executed (about MX$1,211 million).

  • Size of the acquired company. All transactions that involve an act (or a series of acts) that result in an accumulation of at least 35% of the assets or capital stock of a company whose assets in Mexico or annual sales in Mexico exceed the equivalent of 18 million times the GMW (about MX$1,211 million).

  • Size of the parties involved in the transaction and accumulated assets in Mexico. When a transaction involves both of the following:

    • when an act (or series of acts) results in the accumulation of assets or capital stock within the Mexican territory higher than 8.4 million times the GMW (about MX$579 million); and

    • when two or more companies that participate in the operation whose assets, or worldwide annual sales, jointly or separately, exceed 48 million times the GMW within the national territory (about MX$3,342 million).

GMW is published yearly by a special commission for minimum wages and remains valid for a year. Currently (2014), the GMW is set at MXN$67.29 (about US$5).

Article 15 from the Regulations to the Competition Act provides specific rules for the calculation method to trigger the relevant thresholds:

  • If based on assets, the parties must take into consideration the higher figure from the total value of the assets stated in the balance sheet, and their commercial value.

  • The parties should consider the minimum wage that is valid on the day before the filing. However, if the transaction was agreed in US Dollars, the applicable exchange rate will be the one set out by the Official Mexican Bank considering the lowest rate published during the five days before the filing.

 

Notification

3. What are the notification requirements for mergers?

Mandatory or voluntary

Companies must seek prior authorisation or approval from Cofece or the IFT for concentrations that meet the statutory thresholds set out in Article 86 of the Competition Act (see Question 2), and that have an effect in Mexico. However, the Competition Act does not forbid companies from making voluntary filings to request authorisations or approval for concentrations.

There are provisions that provide for the "effects test", such as Article 86-III of the Competition Act.

Timing

Cofece or the IFT must clear or authorise a concentration before any of the following events (Article 87, Competition Act):

  • The transaction is fully executed or completed or prior to the satisfaction of the conditions precedent.

  • Legal or de facto acquisition of control, assets, participation in trusts, shares and equity.

  • Execution of a merger agreement.

  • A series of events that when completed will eventually reach any of the statutory thresholds. This includes companies that carry out a concentration abroad and have an effect in Mexico (and triggers the relevant thresholds).

Formal/informal guidance

A company may voluntarily seek a prior authorisation and legal certainty in cases that are close to the thresholds and to avoid any possible subsequent ex-officio investigations. The purpose of this is to assure the company that Cofece or the IFT will approve the operation and will not investigate the concentration during the first year after the transaction is completed.

Cofece or the IFT's webpage will provide guidance on (see The regulatory authorities):

  • How Cofece or the IFT interprets statutory provisions.

  • The relevant information and documents usually requested by Cofece or the IFT.

Prior to seeking a pre-merger clearance or authorisation, it is possible for a party to seek informal and non-binding guidance (consultation) from the staff of Cofece or the IFT regarding a concentration.

Responsibility for notification

As a general rule, parties involved in a transaction reaching any of the mandatory thresholds must seek a pre-merger clearance or authorisation from Cofece or the IFT (joint filing). If for legal or factual reasons accepted by Cofece or the IFT an economic entity participating in the transaction cannot make the notification (that is, a hostile takeover), the merging/acquiring entity must perform the filing.

Relevant authority

Notifications for clearance should be made to Cofece or the IFT (see box, The regulatory authorities).

Form of notification

There is no standard notification form. The relevant requirements for pre-merger clearance or authorisation are provided for in Article 89 of the Competition Act.

Cofece or the IFT's filing office (in their respective jurisdiction) must receive the filing.

The filing should be made in writing and comply with the following requirements:

  • Name, denomination or corporate name of the economic agent (see Question 2) who is filing the pre-merger clearance, as well as from others who directly or indirectly participate.

  • Name of the legal representative or attorney-in-fact and document to evidence such authority, as well as the address to receive and hear notifications and the authorised persons.

  • Description of the merger, type of transaction and draft of the legal documents/contracts and the draft of non-competition clauses.

  • Information and documentation explaining the purpose of the merger.

  • Bye-laws as well as amendments of the economic agents participating in the merger.

  • Financial statements for the immediately preceding year of the economic agents involved.

  • Capital stock structure of the economic agents involved in the merger, whether they are Mexican or foreign companies. This requirement also includes the identification of every shareholder participating directly or indirectly, before or after the merger, and the persons who have or will have the control.

  • Description of the economic agents involved directly or indirectly in the capital stock, in the administration or in any activity of other economic agents whose commercialised goods and services are identical, similar or substantially related to the goods and services of the economic agents who participate in the merger.

  • The participation in the market of economic agents involved and of their competitors.

  • Location of the establishments and main distribution centres of the economic agents.

  • Description of the main goods and services produced by each economic agent involved, explaining the use in the relevant market and a list of similar goods or services as well as the main economic agents who produce, distribute or commercialise them in the National Territory.

  • Additional information that the economic agents deem important for the pre-merger clearance.

Filing fee

Currently, there are no filing fees.

Obligation to suspend

There is an obligation not to carry out the transaction until previously approved (authorised) by either Cofece or the IFT in their respective jurisdictions.

 

Procedure and timetable

4. What are the applicable procedures and timetable?

Cofece or the IFT is the relevant authority for prior authorisation. It will:

  • Review the filings.

  • Make requests for information.

  • Prepare a draft resolution.

Once the above has been carried out, Cofece or the IFT in a plenary session will discuss and resolve to do one of the following:

  • Approve the transaction.

  • Establish conditions (remedies) for the transaction.

  • Block the transaction.

Prior to the case being resolved by the decision-making bodies of Cofece/IFT, the General Mergers Bureau and staff will communicate to the applicants whether remedies will be necessary. Therefore, the parties are able to present proposed remedies to be assessed and analysed up to one day after the case is formally listed to be resolved. This presentation "interrupts" the legal term to resolve the case.

However, the Competition Act provides a fast-track procedure when it is obvious that the concentration will not generate anti-competitive effects. This is the case only if the involved parties satisfy the following requirements and provide supporting information:

  • When the Buyer does not participate, directly or indirectly, in the relevant market where the concentration will take place.

  • When the Buyer is not an actual or future-potential competitor of the Seller.

  • When the concentration will not grant market power to the Buyer.

  • When the concentration only increases the Buyer's participation in stock capital already owned.

  • Other cases provided by Cofece or the IFT Internal Regulations (Estatuto Orgánico de la Cofece). The actual Internal Regulations do not provide additional ones to Cofece's regulations.

The involved parties need to expressly request the fast-track procedure from the competition authority. The authority then has a 15-day term to resolve it. If the competition authority determines that the requirements are not fulfilled, the procedure will be conducted under the normal timetable.

Normal or ordinary proceedings take the following path, according to Articles 86, 89 and 90 of the Competition Act:

  • Concentrations are subject to pre-clearance from Cofece or the IFT if they reach any of the thresholds under Article 86 of the Competition Act.

  • Pre-clearance application.

  • Request for Basic Information within the next ten business days.

  • Response to the Request for Basic Information within the next ten business days, subject to a duly justified request for an extension.

  • If there is no timely and complete response, Cofece has ten business days to issue an administrative ruling indicating no pre-merger filing took place.

  • Request for Substantive Information to applicants and third parties within the next 15 business days.

  • Response to the Request for Substantive Information that must be provided within 15 business days, subject to a justified extension.

  • Failure to provide such information will be deemed as if no pre-merger filing took place.

  • The 60-business day term to render a decision starts to run after full response to the Request for Substantive Information.

  • Ten business days prior to the decision, Cofece will inform whether there is a need to offer remedies.

  • Exceptionally, complex cases could merit extending the legal term to resolve the case for an additional 40-business day term.

For an overview of the notification process, see flowchart, Mexico: merger notifications.

 

Publicity and confidentiality

5. How much information is made publicly available concerning merger inquiries? Is any information made automatically confidential and is confidentiality available on request?

Publicity

Cofece has a transparency policy that includes a webpage listing merger cases that have been completed. However, confidential information is not included in the publication of these cases. Upon deciding a case, Cofece shares a public version of the decision on its website. Although the Mexican Constitution indicates that discussions of cases must be public, Cofece only publishes its audio of the discussions several weeks later. Due to the entry into force of the Competition Act, Cofece and the IFT must provide a transcript of their discussions and make them available to the general public (with confidential material taken out).

The above means that none of the confidential information provided by the parties is made public when the parties involved request it remains confidential. In cases where the parties do not request it, Cofece or the IFT classify the information as confidential or not taking into account the nature of the information. The information available in a public version aims to provide transparency as to the reasoning of the approval but without impairing confidentiality.

Automatic confidentiality

The Competition Act provides no automatic confidentiality provisions.

Confidentiality on request

The parties must request that specific information is kept confidential and they must provide both:

  • Sufficient grounds justifying confidentiality.

  • Depending on the nature of the information, a public summary of the information that can be used instead of disclosing all of the information. A public summary must always be provided or a reason justifying the inability to do so, except in those cases where the information is impossible to summarise (for example, charts with numbers, amounts and similar information) (Article 125, Competition Act).

 

Rights of third parties

6. What rights (if any) do third parties have to make representations, access documents or be heard during the course of an investigation?

Representations

During the procedure, Cofece and the IFT can issue Requests for Information to third parties with investigative purposes. Likewise, third parties can volunteer and provide information to Cofece and the IFT.

However, this fact does not give third parties any type of right to appear, be heard or be taken into consideration when a concentration is cleared. Therefore, there is no possible representation of third parties during the proceeding.

Document access

Third parties have no access to the documents during the process. Only the notifying parties have access to the docket except for confidential information. Notifying parties do not have access to confidential information, which is kept on different dockets where only the authority or the supplier of the information has access to it. The notifying parties must also abstain from exchanging information that could violate the Competition Act.

Be heard

The Competition Act does not provide the right to be heard to third parties during the review process.

 

Substantive test

7. What is the substantive test?

Cofece or the IFT will challenge, investigate and will not approve concentrations whose purpose or effect is to diminish or damage competition and that could ease the commission of monopolistic practices by creating or enhancing market power.

When applying the above tests to a concentration, Cofece or the IFT will identify:

  • The relevant markets involved (both product and geographic markets).

  • The main economic agents in the respective market and analyse their market power and concentration.

  • The effects of the concentration in related markets.

  • The participation of both the parties involved in the merger as well as other economic agents involved in the transaction.

  • Potential efficiencies.

  • Other analytical tools and criteria established in the regulations and technical criteria.

Cofece or the IFT will consider as evidence of an illegal merger that the merger could:

  • Create or enhance substantial market power whose purpose or effect is to diminish or damage competition.

  • Create or raise barriers to entry.

  • Facilitate the commission of monopolistic practices.

 
8. What, if any, arguments can be used to counter competition issues (efficiencies, customer benefits)?

Concentration cases allow scope for the parties to raise economic efficiency arguments. The Competition Act requires that efficiencies are passed to consumers and not only remain as productive efficiencies.

 
9. Is it possible for the merging parties to raise a failing firm defence?

It is possible to raise a failing firm defence. Cofece determined such a possibility for, but not limited to, horizontal mergers.

 

Remedies, penalties and appeal

10. What remedies (commitments or undertakings) can be imposed as conditions of clearance to address competition concerns? At what stage of the procedure can they be offered and accepted?

Cofece or the IFT can impose conditions on a transaction, which can be behavioural or structural (such as divestments). Cofece or the IFT will likely prefer structural remedies because they:

  • Are easier for the company to comply with.

  • Do not require significant follow-up actions.

The parties to the transaction can propose remedies during the review process. Once Cofece or the IFT accepts such remedies, the parties must provide an implementation plan that includes a time frame to comply with them (Article 90, Competition Act). As there is no longer an appeal process before the competition authorities, the possibility to offer remedies arises shortly before the case is set for discussion before either Cofece or the IFT.

Article 21 of the Regulations to the Competition Act states the procedure needed for the Technical Secretary of Cofece to issue a ruling to meet with the parties to explain to them the negative effects that have been identified. Following this meeting, the filing parties can then formally submit their modified or amended proposals.

 
11. What are the penalties for failing to comply with the merger control rules?

Failure to notify correctly

Cofece or the IFT can impose a fine from 5,000 times the minimum wage in the Federal District (GMW) (about MX$336,450) and up to 5% of the company's annual income when a timely notification did not take place.

If the transaction is cleared subject to remedies and they are not fulfilled, Cofece or the IFT can impose an additional fine of up to 10% of the economic agent's (the company in this case) annual income. Cofece and the IFT can also order the divestiture of assets (Article 127, section IX, Competition Act).

Those who on behalf of legal entities participate directly or indirectly in illegal mergers can be disqualified by Cofece or the IFT to act or practice as directors, managers, officers, representatives or agents of legal entities for five years and receive fines of up to the equivalent of 200,000 times the GMW (about MXN$13.5 million) (Article 127, section X, Competition Act).

Cofece or the IFT can impose fines up to 180,000 times the GMW (about MXN$12.1 million) to public notaries upon intervention of a non-authorised merger.

Implementation before approval or after prohibition

Cofece or the IFT can impose a fine of up to 8% of the company's income for an illegal concentration (that is, closed before Cofece or the IFT reaches its decision). In the event of a prohibited concentration, Cofece or the IFT can also order the total or partial winding up of the entity created as a result of the concentration (Article 127, section II, Competition Act).

Failure to observe

Companies. If Cofece or the IFT imposes conditions on a concentration, and the corresponding company fails to comply, Cofece or the IFT can impose:

  • Fines of up to 10% of the company's annual income (Article 127, section IX, Competition Act).

  • The total or partial winding up of the entity created as a result of the concentration (Article 127, section II, Competition Act).

Individuals. Individuals can also be subject to fines. These fines may be:

  • Up to 200,000 times the GMW (about MXN$13.5 million) for those directly participating in an illegal concentration.

  • Up to 180,000 times the GMW (about MXN$12.1 million) for assisting an illegal concentration.

  • Up to 175,000 times the GMW (about MXN$11.7 million) for providing false information.

 
12. Is there a right of appeal against the regulator's decision and what is the applicable procedure? Are rights of appeal available to third parties or only the parties to the decision?

Rights of appeal

All decisions by Cofece or the IFT can only be challenged by a constitutional appeal (amparo indirecto). This proceeding is heard by one of the two specialised Federal Courts in competition, telecommunications and broadcasting matters that belong to the first circuit but with jurisdiction in the entire national territory. Federal appeals (recursos de revisión) are also heard by one of the two specialised collegiate circuit courts against the final resolution of the constitutional challenge. Due to the creation of Cofece and the IFT and as a consequence of the June 2013 Constitutional reform, the internal appeal (recurso de reconsideración) (whereby the authority heard an initial appeal against its decisions) has disappeared.

The only opportunity that economic agents will have to propose different conditions to a merger is before Cofece or the IFT issues its decision.

Exceptionally, courts have granted third parties the right to be heard in concentration proceedings. The reason for this is that third parties' constitutional rights are impaired and that they have legitimate interests for their views to be carefully considered in connection to a concentration that may harm the competition process.

Procedure

If the involved parties appeal the authority's decision, they will have a 15-business day term after the decision is notified to file a constitutional lawsuit or indirect amparo. One out of the only two specialised District courts will hear the case. The judgment of the specialised district court can be subject to a federal appeal (recurso de revision) before one of the two specialised collegiate circuit courts.

Third party rights of appeal

The Competition Act does not grant standing to third parties in pre-merger clearances to participate in the proceedings or to appeal Cofece and the IFT's decisions.

However, parties who believe that the result of the concentration could harm them have the right to challenge the concentration before a Federal Court (this is a fundamental human right to a hearing before the rendering of an adverse resolution). This has occurred in a few cases, but it is unlikely that the Competition Act or Cofece or the IFT's policy will change in the near future as a result of this human rights law aspect.

In addition, third parties can bring claims to challenge concentrations (Article 67, Competition Act), or Cofece or the IFT can commence an ex-officio investigation (Articles 65 and 66, Competition Act), where:

  • An approval is granted to a concentration based on false information provided during the review process.

  • The applicant fails to comply with the conditions so imposed.

  • The parties omitted to file a pre-merger clearance of a concentration (Article 8, Emergency Internal Regulation).

 

Automatic clearance of restrictive provisions

13. If a merger is cleared, are any restrictive provisions in the agreements automatically cleared? If they are not automatically cleared, how are they regulated?

When assessing a concentration, Cofece or the IFT will analyse provisions, such as non-compete covenants, before approving them. To be approved by Cofece or the IFT, non-compete covenants must generally:

  • Have duration of no more than three years (although Cofece or the IFT can exceptionally approve non-compete provisions for up to five years).

  • Be limited to specific individuals and specify the scope of the products.

  • Be limited to the territory in which the provision can be effective to the operations of the target company. If Cofece or the IFT considers these provisions to be restrictive, it will request that the parties either remove or modify them.

 

Regulation of specific industries

14. What industries (if any) are specifically regulated?

The IFT is exclusively responsible for all telecommunications and broadcasting economic activity while Cofece is responsible for all economic activity in all other sectors. Certain sectors within the Mexican economy require specific regulation for competition matters. These sectors include industries such as energy, telecommunications and transport.

These sectors generally require a favourable opinion from Cofece or the IFT to execute the following tasks:

  • Participate in public bids.

  • Establish rules for the regulation of tariffs.

  • Transfer or assign permits and government concessions.

  • Acquire government concessions or permits.

 

Joint ventures

15. How are joint ventures analysed under competition law?

Cofece or the IFT can treat joint ventures as concentrations (see Questions 1 to 12). However, in some cases, Cofece or the IFT will consider that joint venture concentrations are in fact, monopolistic practices, as they can be used as vehicles for collusion.

 

Proposals for reform

16. Are there any proposals for reform concerning merger control?

There are currently no proposals for reform as the Competition Act became effective on 7 July 2014. On 10 November 2015, Cofece issued the Regulations to the Competition Act, which became effective the following day. These Regulations detail the relevant provisions of the Competition Act and provide additional supplementary rules to the information that pre-merger filings must contain, and specific requirements (translations).

Additionally, on 8 July 2014 Cofece's internal regulations (Estatuto Orgánico y Disposiciones Regulatorias de la Ley Federal de Competencia Económica) and the IFT's internal regulations of 11 and 28 July 2014 (Estatuto Orgánico y Disposiciones Regulatorias de la Ley Federal de Competencia Económica para los sectores de telecomunicaciones y radiodifusión) were all launched to become effective on the day following their publication. These regulations provide for the structure and authority of the officers and staff of both Cofece and the IFT in connection with merger control, market intelligence, monopolistic practices and so on.

 

Online resources

Federal Economic Competition Commission (Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica) (Cofece)

W www.cfc.gob.mx

Description. This is the website of Cofece, which is the regulatory authority responsible for protecting competition.

Federal Telecommunications Institute (Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones) (IFT)

W www.ift.org.mx

Description. This is the website of the IFT, which is the authority in economic competition matters for the broadcasting and telecommunications sectors.



The regulatory authorities

Federal Economic Competition Commission (Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica) (Cofece)

Chairwoman. Alejandra Palacios Prieto
Merger Director. José Luis Ambriz Villalpa
Technical Secretary. Roberto Villarreal Gonda
Contact details. Av Santa Fe 505, piso 24Col Cruz Manca Delegación Cuajimalpa México, DFCP 05349
T +52 55 2789 6500
+52 55 2789 6501
+52 55 1800 2000 068
F +52 55 2789 6672
E apalacios@cofece.mx
jambriz@cofece.mx
rvillareal@cofece.mx
W www.cfc.gob.mx/cofece/index.php/cofece
www.cfc.gob.mx/cofece/index.php/contacto/puntos-de-contacto

Outline structure. Cofece is responsible for protecting competition.

Responsibilities. The Merger Director is responsible for analysing mergers.

Procedure for obtaining documents. Parties with legal standing can request copies or documents from Cofece's files (within adversarial procedures) except for confidential information. Any party can have access to closed cases.

Federal Telecommunications Institute (Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones) (IFT)

Head. Gabriel Oswaldo Contreras Saldívar
Technical Secretary. Juan José Crispín Borbola
Economic Competition Unit. Georgina Kary Santiago Gatica
(The General Direction of Concentrations and Concessions is subordinated to the Economic Competition unit's office).
Contact details. Insurgentes Sur #1143 Col Noche Buena - Delegación Benito Juárez, CP 03720 DF
T +52 55 5015 4145
+52 55 5015 4000
+52 55 1800 2000 120
E gabriel.contreras@ift.org.mx
juan.crispin@ift.com.mx
georgina.santiago@ift.com.mx
W www.ift.org.mx/iftweb/informacion-general/pleno/gabriel-contreras-saldivar
www.ift.org.mx/iftweb

Outline structure. The IFT is the authority in economic competition matters for the broadcasting and telecommunications sectors. The IFT is in charge of the regulation, promotion and supervision of the radio spectrum, networks, provision of broadcasting and telecommunications services and access to active and passive infrastructure and other essential facilities.

Procedure for obtaining documents. Parties with legal standing in the procedure can request copies or documents from the IFT's files (within procedures, not for investigations) except for confidential information.



Contributor profiles

Luis Omar Guerrero Rodríguez, Partner

Hogan Lovells BSTL

T +52 55 5091 0162
F +52 55 5091 0123
E omar.guerrero@hoganlovells.com
W www.hoganlovells.com/mexico-city

Professional qualifications. Mexico, Lawyer, 1993

Areas of practice. Competition/anti-trust; litigation (mainly commercial and administrative); commercial arbitration; reorganisation and bankruptcy.

Non-professional qualifications. LLM, London School of Economics, UK, 1997

Recent transactions

  • Investigation and administrative procedures for horizontal investigations related to the poultry, LCD, ODD, Compressors and CRT industries and vertical agreements in cases related to predatory pricing and exclusivities.
  • Cases related to constitutional complaints before the Supreme Court and Federal Courts.

Languages. English, Spanish

Professional associations/memberships. Former head of the Anti-trust Section of the Mexican Bar Association and lecturing master-level anti-trust law at the Universidad Iberoamericana and Universidad Panamericana.

Publications

  • Cartel criminalization: a new old story, William E. Kovacic. An Antitrust Tribute. Liber Amicorum – Volume II, Institute of Competition Law.
  • Papers published by e-Competitions: The Mexican Congress amends telecom legislation introducing significant changes in competition law, June 2013-II.
  • The June 2013 landmark Constitutional Amendments to competition and telecom law in Mexico, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, August 2013.
  • Private Competition Actions for Damages Under Mexican Law, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, April 2013 (1).
  • Mexican Competition Law aligned incentives for effective cartel enforcement, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, December 2012.
  • The 2013 New Competition Regime in Mexico: Fixing competition problems right there at the Constitution, China Institute of International Antitrust and Investment, 2013.
  • Pursuit of effective antitrust enforcement: Mexico's case. International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2012.
  • "Límites a la Autonomía Judicial en Materia de Competencia Económica: comentarios en relación con la interpretación judicial en materia de Responsabilidad Civil" en PAUTA. Competencia Económica. Boletín Informativo del Capítulo Mexicano de la Cámara Internacional de Comercio, número 62, noviembre de 2010, p. 44.
  • Mexico's Congress Approves Major Competition Law Overhaul, The Mexico Update, US- Mexico Bar Association, Rev. 27 (Summer/Fall 2006).
  • Reformas pendientes al marco regulatorio de competencia económica, Seguridad Jurídica: Diagnóstico y Propuestas, Colección Foro de la Barra Mexicana, No. 12, Themis, Mexico, 2006.

Ricardo Arturo Pons Mestre, Partner

Hogan Lovells BSTL

T +52 55 5091 0166
F +52 55 5091 0123
E ricardo.pons@hoganlovells.com
W www.hoganlovells.com/mexico-city

Professional qualifications. Mexico, Lawyer, 1993

Areas of practice. Competition anti-trust law; corporate law; foreign investments; mergers and acquisitions; mining.

Non-professional qualifications. LLM, London School of Economics, UK, 1997

Recent transactions

  • Investigation and administrative procedures before the Mexican Competition Authorities.
  • Merger notices regarding, Pfizer-Wyeth (pharmaceutical), Mexichem-Cydsa (petrochemical), Compaq-HewlettPackard (IT), GM-Delphi (Automotive), GE Plastics-SABIC (Industrial), General Electric-Vetco Gray (oil industry), Textron-Beech (aeronautical), ACE-Fianzas Monterrey (insurance), among others.

Languages. English, Spanish

Professional associations/memberships. Member of the Mexican Bar Association and professor of anti-trust law at the Universidad Panamericana.

Publications. Several publications in books, magazines and articles regarding anti-trust matters.

Alan Tirzo Ramírez Casazza, Associate

Hogan Lovells BSTL

T +52 55 5091 0164
F +52 55 5091 0123
E alan.ramirez@hoganlovells.com
W www.hoganlovells.com/mexico-city

Professional qualifications. Mexico, Lawyer, 2011

Areas of practice. Competition/anti-trust law; litigation (mainly commercial and administrative); administrative and constitutional law.

Recent transactions

  • Investigation and administrative procedures before the Mexican Competition Commission in horizontal and vertical restraints for the following markets: poultry, CRTs, ODDs, LCDs and soft drinks.
  • Constitutional complaints before the Supreme Court and Anti-trust Specialised Federal Courts.

Languages. English, Spanish

Publications

Co-author with Omar Guerrero of the following papers:

  • Cartel criminalization: a new old story, William E. Kovacic. An Antitrust Tribute. Liber Amicorum – Volume II, Institute of Competition Law (in press 2014).
  • The 2013 New Competition Regime in Mexico: Fixing competition problems right there at the Constitution, China Institute of International Antitrust and Investment, 2013.
  • Pursuit of effective antitrust enforcement: Mexico's case. International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2012.

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