EEOC Can Pursue Pattern-or-practice Claim under Section 706 of Title VII | Practical Law

EEOC Can Pursue Pattern-or-practice Claim under Section 706 of Title VII | Practical Law

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court's ruling for the employer in Serrano and EEOC v. Cintas Corp., holding that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) can pursue a pattern-or-practice claim under Section 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).

EEOC Can Pursue Pattern-or-practice Claim under Section 706 of Title VII

Practical Law Legal Update 2-522-3966 (Approx. 5 pages)

EEOC Can Pursue Pattern-or-practice Claim under Section 706 of Title VII

by PLC Labor & Employment
Published on 13 Nov 2012USA (National/Federal)
The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court's ruling for the employer in Serrano and EEOC v. Cintas Corp., holding that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) can pursue a pattern-or-practice claim under Section 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).

Key Litigated Issue

In Serrano and EEOC v. Cintas Corp., the key litigated issue was whether, in a class action claiming sex discrimination, the EEOC can pursue a pattern-or-practice claim under Section 706 of Title VII.

Background

Cintas is the largest supplier of uniforms to businesses throughout North America.
Mirna Serrano, a female, unsuccessfully applied "numerous" times for a position as a Service Sales Representative (SSR) at Cintas's Michigan Westland location. Cintas's SSRs, who are constantly out in the field servicing customers, are the public face of Cintas. They are required to have:
  • Communication and sales skills.
  • The physical capacity to drive trucks and make deliveries.
  • A high school diploma or GED.
  • A driver's license.
In April 2000 Serrano filed a charge with the EEOC alleging sex discrimination. In July 2002, after investigating Serrano's claims and expanding the investigation to include Cintas's state-wide female hiring practices, the EEOC issued a reasonable-cause determination that Serrano's allegations were true, and that Cintas discriminated against females as a class.
The EEOC's proposed conciliation agreement to Cintas sought relief for:
  • Serrano.
  • 111 other specified women.
  • An unspecified number of other similarly situated females.
Cintas did not respond or present a counteroffer for settlement, and in April 2005, the EEOC notified Cintas that it was terminating conciliation efforts.
In May 2004, Serrano filed a Title VII class-action complaint against Cintas in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Shortly after conciliation terminated at the end of 2005, the EEOC intervened in the Serrano action. In July 2006, the Serrano case was consolidated for pretrial purposes with a related case. In June 2008, the private plaintiffs jointly moved for nationwide class certification. In March 2009, the district court denied this motion. By April 2010, the remaining named parties (except Serrano), had their cases either dismissed, settled, or otherwise resolved.
In recognition of the denial of nationwide class certification for the private plaintiffs, the EEOC filed an amended complaint in August 2009, limiting its allegations to "a class of women in the State of Michigan" rather than to females nationwide. On October 21, 2009, Cintas moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the EEOC could assert a claim of pattern-or-practice discrimination only pursuant to the EEOC's authority under Section 707 of Title VII, and not under Section 706. The district court granted Cintas's motion on February 9, 2010 and denied the EEOC's request to certify the issue for interlocutory appeal.
With two discovery motions still outstanding, the EEOC moved to file a second amended complaint, adding Section 707 as a basis for its claims. The district court denied the discovery motions. In June 2010, after the close of the discovery period, the district court denied the EEOC's motion to file a second amended complaint.
The next day, the magistrate judge held a hearing on Cintas's motion for a protective order, and then issued an order granting the motion. The district court did not rule on the EEOC's objections. In June 2010, Cintas moved for summary judgment alleging that the EEOC failed to satisfy the administrative prerequisites to suit under Section 706. In July 2010, Cintas moved for summary judgment on the merits of each of the individual claimants' claims. In September 2010, the district court granted judgment in Cintas's favor on each of the individual summary judgment motions. The district court then granted Cintas's omnibus motion alleging administrative default in September 2010. The district court entered judgment in October 2010. The EEOC filed a timely notice of appeal. Cintas moved, as the prevailing party, for attorney fees and costs, and the district court granted the motion in August 2011. The district court entered judgment in August 2011. The EEOC filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging, among other things, the district court's holding that the EEOC could not pursue a pattern-or-practice claim under Section 706.

Outcome

On November 9, 2012, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion vacating the judgments of the district court and remanding the case for further proceedings. In its 2-1 ruling, the Sixth Circuit held, among other things, that the district court erred in concluding that the EEOC may not pursue a claim under the Teamsters pattern-or-practice framework, pursuant to its authority vested in Section 706.
In its analysis, the court noted that the most salient issue in the case was the disagreement among the parties of whether the EEOC is limited to proving its allegations of discrimination pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, or whether it may employ the pattern-or-practice framework announced by the Supreme Court in Teamsters.
While conceding that Cintas is correct that Section 706 does not contain the same explicit authorization as Section 707 for suits under a pattern-or-practice theory, the court noted that:
  • Relevant Supreme Court precedent does not suggest that the exclusion of pattern-or-practice language from Section 706 means that the EEOC can utilize a pattern-or-practice theory only when bringing suit under Section 707. Instead, precedent suggests that the inclusion of the language in Section 707 simply means that the scope of the EEOC's authority to bring suit is more limited under Section 707.
  • The Teamsters opinion, although seemingly specific to suits that the EEOC brings under Section 707, in no way indicated an intent to tie the pattern-or-practice framework exclusively to the EEOC's enforcement authority under Section 707.
  • There appear to be no Sixth Circuit decisions to date holding that Teamsters may not be applied in the Section 706 context.
Cintas argued that allowing the EEOC to pursue Title VII claims under the Teamsters framework under Section 706 would render Section 707 superfluous and that Congress could not have intended this result. The court conceded that reading Section 706 to permit Teamsters-style claims creates some overlap with Section 707. However, the court found an important distinction in that Section 707 permits the EEOC to initiate suit without first receiving a charge filed by an aggrieved individual, as it must when initiating suit under Section 706. Cintas also suggests that allowing the EEOC to pursue the pattern-or-practice method for Section 706 claims will allow the EEOC to "have its cake and eat it too" because:
  • The Teamsters framework provides a more generous standard of proof.
  • Section 706 affords greater remedies.
However, the court held that this argument is based on a mistaken premise, stating that:
  • The Teamsters framework is not an inherently easier standard of proof; it is simply a different standard of proof.
  • Under Teamsters, the plaintiff's initial burden to make out a prima facie case is heightened.

Practical Implications

This case is significant because there is currently a circuit split about various issues arising under Sections 706 and 707 of Title VII. In this case, the Sixth Circuit ruled for the EEOC. However, in EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled for the employer. For more information about issues for employers to consider when responding to an EEOC subpoena or other request for information, see Article, EEOC Systemic Investigations and Litigation: Expert Q&A.