Beneficial Ownership Reporting: Getting It Right in the Era of "Broken Windows" Enforcement | Practical Law

Beneficial Ownership Reporting: Getting It Right in the Era of "Broken Windows" Enforcement | Practical Law

An overview of recent SEC charges brought against reporting companies and associated persons for violations of, and relating to, the beneficial ownership reporting requirements under Sections 16 and 13(d) of the Exchange Act. This resource also identifies Practical Law resources that can assist companies and corporate insiders and their counsel in understanding these reporting requirements and in implementing effective reporting programs.

Beneficial Ownership Reporting: Getting It Right in the Era of "Broken Windows" Enforcement

by Practical Law Corporate & Securities
Published on 03 Oct 2014USA (National/Federal)
An overview of recent SEC charges brought against reporting companies and associated persons for violations of, and relating to, the beneficial ownership reporting requirements under Sections 16 and 13(d) of the Exchange Act. This resource also identifies Practical Law resources that can assist companies and corporate insiders and their counsel in understanding these reporting requirements and in implementing effective reporting programs.
This September, the SEC announced it had brought charges against 28 directors, officers and major stockholders of reporting companies for alleged violations of the beneficial ownership reporting requirements under Sections 16 and 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act. The SEC also brought charges against several reporting companies for alleged violations related to their insiders' failure to file timely reports (see SEC Announces Charges Against Corporate Insiders for Violating Laws Requiring Prompt Reporting of Transactions and Holdings and SEC Announces Fraud Charges Against Biotech Company and Former Executive Who Failed to Report Insider Stock Sales). The announcements came as a surprise to many, because the SEC has not historically taken enforcement action against delinquent Section 16 filers or related companies, let alone in large numbers in a short period.
The enforcement initiative appears to be driven by a new enforcement philosophy articulated by SEC Chair Mary Jo White in an October 2013 address (see Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum). In that address, Chair White stated that, while she recognizes that the SEC has finite resources, she plans to devote a portion of those resources to identifying and pursuing minor violations of the securities laws. The thinking behind this is that authorities tend to "foster a culture where laws are increasingly treated as toothless guidelines" when they allow minor infractions to routinely go unpunished. This culture, in turn, encourages more substantial violations of the law. Chair White suggested that this new enforcement philosophy was inspired by former New York City mayor Rudolf Guliani's "broken windows" policy in the 1990s of focusing police attention on minor infractions, such as subway turnstile-jumping, to "avoid an environment of disorder that would encourage more serious crimes to flourish." Broken windows theory posits that by attending to details, including by fixing broken windows, a community sends a message to would-be offenders that disorder of any kind will not be tolerated.
In this new era of "broken windows" enforcement, reporting companies, their insiders and other large stockholders and their counsel may want to review their Section 16 and 13(d) reporting practices and compliance with fresh eyes. With this in mind, this resource:
  • Discusses the recent Section 16 and 13(d) enforcement activity.
  • Identifies Practical Law resources that can help reporting companies, their insiders and other large stockholders get Section 16 and 13(d) reporting right.

Recent Enforcement Activity

Section 16(a) and related SEC rules require the officers, directors, and 10% or greater beneficial stockholders (referred to collectively as insiders) of companies that have a class of equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act to file certain reports disclosing information about their ownership of, and transaction in, the company's equity securities. The purposes of this reporting regime include to:
  • Deter insiders from trading on inside information by making their trading activities transparent to the public.
  • Give the public information that they may use to interpret the insiders' assessment of the company's prospects.
An insider's failure to file a required Section 16 report is a violation of the securities laws, regardless of whether it was intentional or negligent. Section 16 is a strict liability provision with no state of mind requirement. An inadvertent failure to file is a violation.
A reporting company is required to disclose in its annual meeting proxy statement or Form 10-K if any of the company's insiders failed to timely file a Section 16 report (that is, Form 3, Form 4 and Form 5). The company's disclosure must be based on a review of the Forms 3, 4 and 5 filed for the most recent year. Companies have a limited obligation to research or make inquiries about completely missed filings. If any forms were filed late or the company knows a required filing was not made, the company must identify the delinquent filer and state the number of forms that were late or not filed and what transactions were not reported on time (Item 7(b), Schedule 14A, referring to Item 405, Regulation S-K). It is a violation of Section 13(a) of, and Rule 13a-1 under, the Exchange Act for a company to make inaccurate or incomplete disclosure in response to Item 405 of Regulation S-K. These provisions require reporting companies to file complete and accurate reports with the SEC.
To assist their insiders and to lessen the chance the company will need to make this adverse disclosure, many reporting companies have set up internal compliance programs under which company employees assist company officers and directors in satisfying their Section 16 reporting obligations. While nothing requires a company to set up this kind of compliance program, the SEC encourages companies to assist their insiders in making timely Section 16 filings (see SEC Release No. 34-47809 (May 7, 2003)). In the recent charges against reporting companies, the SEC has emphasized that companies that voluntarily accept certain responsibilities on behalf of their insiders and then act negligently in performing them may be liable as a cause of Section 16(a) violations by those insiders (see SEC Release No. 34-73051 (September 10, 2014)).
Section 13(d) and related SEC rules require any person or group that directly or indirectly owns or acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a class of equity securities registered under Section 12 to file a report with the SEC disclosing certain information about itself and its holdings of and intentions regarding the reporting company. Filings made under Section 13(d) also must be amended under certain circumstances. Covered persons must file reports on Schedule 13D or, if they are eligible, the short-form Schedule 13G.The purpose of these filing requirements is to give other stockholders and the securities markets notice of significant acquisitions or potential changes in control of reporting companies. A covered person's failure to file a required Section 13(d) report is a violation of the securities laws, regardless of whether it was intentional or negligent. Like Section 16(a), Section 13(d) is a strict liability provision with no state of mind requirement. An inadvertent failure to file is a violation. In addition, the filing requirement is triggered by the person reaching the 5% beneficial ownership threshold, and is not dependent on the stockholder's intentions regarding the reporting company.

Charges against Reporting Companies

Recent charges against reporting companies allege the companies violated Section 13(a) and Rule 13a-1 by:
  • Failing to disclose in their proxy statements or Form 10-Ks, as required by Item 405 of Regulation S-K, their insiders' failure to file timely Section 16 reports. The SEC's orders associated with the charges imply that, in these particular circumstances, the companies could have detected that insiders filed late by conducting the review of insiders' public Section 16 filings required by Item 405.
  • Misstating in their proxy statements or Form 10-Ks that all required Section 16 reports had been timely filed when, in fact, they had not.
Charges against reporting companies also allege that the companies caused their insiders' failure to file required reports by negligently performing responsibilities the companies had agreed to perform on the insiders' behalf. For example, according to one SEC order, the company being charged:
  • Agreed to file Section 16(a) reports on behalf of its officers and directors but repeatedly failed to do that on a timely basis.
  • Acted negligently insofar as its procedures for carrying out the tasks it had voluntarily agreed to perform resulted in recurrent failures to meet filing deadlines.
In one specific case, charges against a biotech company allege that the company failed to properly disclose its CEO and chairman's multiple missed or late Section 16(a) filings in its Forms 10-K and proxy statements. The charges allege that the company's failure to disclose the CEO and chairman's multiple failures to comply with Section 16 was a material omission from its proxy statement disclosure in violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, which prohibits the use of proxy statements with material misstatements or omissions. According to the charges, disclosure about the CEO's late and missed Section 16 reports would have had significant importance to a reasonable investor, given:
  • His position as the company's CEO.
  • The frequency with which he was selling company stock.
  • His failures to comply with reporting requirements.
The biotech company was the only company to be charged with violating Section 14(a) based on inaccurate disclosure about its insiders' Section 16 filing compliance. The biotech company's case was also notable because related charges against the CEO and chairman allege that he was negligent in signing the company's proxy statements and Forms 10-K containing this deficient and materially misleading disclosure (see SEC Release No. 34-73067 (September 10, 2014)).
The SEC accepted a settlement offer made by each of the charged reporting companies, with each company agreeing to pay a monetary penalty. In most cases, the SEC considered that the companies had implemented remedial actions in deciding to accept their settlement offers. The biotech company agreed to comply with specific remedial undertakings, including hiring an independent compliance consultant to conduct a comprehensive review of the company's compliance policies and procedures.

Charges against Section 16 Insiders and Greater than 5% Beneficial Shareholders

Recent charges against reporting company insiders and greater than 5% beneficial shareholders included charges against both individuals and investment firms. Examples of these recent charges allege that:
  • Individuals serving as officers of reporting companies repeatedly failed to timely file required Section 16(a) reports. Among the transactions not properly reported were sales made under Rule 10b5-1 plans and receipt of restricted stock grants (see SEC Release No. 34-73061 (September 10, 2014) and SEC Release No. 34-73059 (September 10, 2014)). The SEC's orders associated with the charges against reporting company officers state that an officer's reliance on company personnel to make Section 16(a) filings on the officer's behalf does not absolve the officer of any violation resulting from company personnel's failure to make accurate and timely filings on the officer's behalf.
  • An individual large stockholder failed to make required filings under both Sections 16(a) and 13(d) regarding his holdings in several reporting companies, including by failing to file a Schedule 13D when he was no longer eligible to report on Schedule 13G, and by failing to file required amendments on Schedule 13D (see SEC Release No. 34-73044 (September 10, 2014)).
  • A custodial bank failed to make required filings under both Sections 16(a) and 13(d) regarding its holdings of, and transactions in, equity securities of two reporting companies (see SEC Release No. 34-73047 (September 10, 2014)).
The SEC accepted a settlement offer made by most of the persons mentioned in its September 10, 2014 press release. These persons agreed to pay monetary penalties and institute remedial actions.

Featured Beneficial Ownership Compliance Resources

In light of this recent enforcement activity, Practical Law is featuring the following resources that can help reporting companies, their insiders and other large stockholders and their counsel in understanding the beneficial ownership reporting requirements of Sections 16 and 13(d), implementing effective reporting programs or reviewing the effectiveness of existing practices.

Section 16 Reporting Resources

  • Practice Note, Section 16 Reporting: Why, How and When to Do It discusses the reporting requirements under Section 16(a). In particular, this Note:
    • reviews the requirements of Form 3, Form 4 and Form 5, including when each form is appropriate and what information must be included;
    • discusses the process of preparing Section 16 reports, including the role of corporate compliance programs; and
    • describes how and when each form is filed with the SEC and otherwise disclosed, and when a filer's obligation to file Form 4 or Form 5 terminates.
  • Standard Document, Memorandum: Understanding Obligations under Section 16 of the Exchange Act is a form of memorandum to be delivered to reporting company directors and officers that is designed to:
    • educate them on their obligation to file certain reports and avoid generating short-swing profits from short-term trading in the company's securities; and
    • inform them of company programs that can assist them with their obligations.
  • Standard Documents, Board Resolutions: Designating Section 16 Officers are standard forms of resolutions for the board of directors (or compensation committee, if applicable) or similar governing body of a reporting company designating executive officers for purposes of Section 16 reporting.
  • Form 4 Filing Checklist summarizes some of the most common events that trigger the requirement to file a Form 4.
  • Standard Document, Limited Power of Attorney for Section 16 Reporting Obligations is a standard form limited power of attorney in which a director or officer of a reporting company authorizes certain company personnel to complete and file Section 16 reports on his or her behalf.

Section 13(d) Reporting Resources