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Title VII Statutory Scheme Trumps Six-year Statute of Limitations for Suits Against US: DC Circuit
Practical Law Legal Update 2-595-7905 (Approx. 5 pages)
Title VII Statutory Scheme Trumps Six-year Statute of Limitations for Suits Against US: DC Circuit
by Practical Law Labor & Employment
| Published on 15 Jan 2015 • USA (National/Federal) |
In Howard v. Pritzker, the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of race discrimination complaints brought against the Department of Commerce and held that the six-year statute of limitations in lawsuits against the US does not apply to claims filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).
On January 6, 2015, in Howard v. Pritzer, the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of race discrimination complaints brought against the Department of Commerce and held that the six-year statute of limitations in lawsuits against the US does not apply to claims filed under Title VII (No. 12-5370, (D.C. Cir. Jan. 6, 2015)).
Background
In February 1995, Janet Howard and Joyce Megginson, employees of the Department of Commerce, were among the employees who filed an administrative class complaint alleging race discrimination through the EEOC's federal sector complaint process. After a decade of administrative processing and appeals to the EEOC, the plaintiffs requested that the EEOC dismiss the matter in September 2005. In October 2005, Howard and Megginson, with other representatives of the class, filed a federal lawsuit against the Commerce Department. Several amended complaints and individual complaints on the matter followed.
The general statute of limitations for filing non-tort lawsuits against the United States is six years (28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)). Title VII claims have a set administrative and judicial scheme that requires a complainant to attempt resolution of her federal employment discrimination matter administratively before being allowed to file a lawsuit (29 C.F.R. Part 1614). Title VII also gives a complainant the option of filing a lawsuit anytime after 180 days have elapsed since she filed the administrative complaint (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)).
The Commerce Department, an agency of the US, argued that the general six-year statute of limitations should apply to claims made under Title VII, since the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) state that it applies to every non-tort civil action against the US. The district court agreed with the Commerce Department's arguments and dismissed the complaints. Howard and Megginson appealed the district court's decision.
Outcome
The DC Circuit:
- Reversed the decision by the district court.
- Held that the six-year statute of limitations in lawsuits against the US does not apply to employment discrimination claims filed under Title VII.
In reaching this conclusion, the DC Circuit noted that Congress:
- Enacted the Title VII administrative and judicial scheme as the exclusive method of resolving federal employment discrimination matters.
- Chose to emphasize administrative resolution of employment discrimination cases over judicial involvement.
- Set a requirement that employment discrimination complainants must exhaust their administrative remedies, but did not set a deadline in which the administrative resolution must be reached.
- Created specific time limits under Title VII stating that an employee may file a lawsuit:
- within 90 days of receiving notice of the resolution of her administrative action; or
- after 180 days have passed since the initial administrative charge was filed.
The DC Circuit noted that:
- Imposing a six-year statute of limitations on claims filed under to Title VII would create irreconcilable conflict with the limitations periods intended by Congress.
- An administrative agency process of resolving a charge can take more than six years (particularly in class action matters). If required to meet such a statutory deadline, a complainant who properly pursues relief for Title VII violations through the administrative process would have to either:
- surrender her ability to file a lawsuit by continuing the administrative process to its closure; or
- abandon her administrative matter before it is resolved in order to file a lawsuit in a timely fashion.
- Congress did not intend for the complainant to have to elect which remedy to pursue in resolution of her matter. The Supreme Court previously recognized that allowing employees immediate access to civil courts under more general statutes would make Title VII's rigorous administrative requirements and time limitations irrelevant (Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976)).
- When an irreconcilable conflict exists between two statutes (including statutes of limitations), a specific statutory construction will govern over a general statute (Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)).
- Given the irreconcilable conflict between the statutes of limitations in Title VII and 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), Title VII's specific scheme for employment discrimination cases trumps the general limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).
Practical Implications
In Howard, the DC Circuit confirmed (by reversing the district court) that the statutory scheme of Title VII, which requires an employee to attempt administrative resolution of an employment discrimination claim before bringing a lawsuit, was Congress's intent and takes precedence over the statute of limitations created in more general statutes. Federal sector complainants may choose to abandon the administrative process after 180 days have passed since filing an administrative complaint, but cannot be forced to file suit in court before the administrative process concludes. In some cases (especially complex class actions), this may expose the US government to liability for employment discrimination claims for many years after the claims first accrued. However, Congress deliberately provided an administrative and judicial scheme that gives these options to complainants.