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Direct Appellate Review of Final Agency Action Requires Specific Facts: Sixth Circuit
Practical Law Legal Update 2-605-4972 (Approx. 3 pages)
Direct Appellate Review of Final Agency Action Requires Specific Facts: Sixth Circuit
by Practical Law Litigation
| Published on 20 Mar 2015 • USA (National/Federal) |
In Sierra Club v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a petitioner seeking direct appellate review of a final agency action carries a burden of production similar to that required at summary judgment.
On March 18, 2015, in Sierra Club v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a petitioner seeking direct appellate review of a final agency action carries a burden of production similar to that required at summary judgment (Nos. 12-3169, 3182, 3420, (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2015)).
In 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") determined that the Cincinnati-Hamilton metropolitan area had attained national air quality standards for particulate matter and redesignated the area to "attainment" status. However, the three states that administer Cincinnati's pollution controls (Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky) had never implemented particular provisions, known as "reasonably available control measures," applicable to nonattainment areas. Sierra Club, an environmental protection organization, filed a petition for direct appellate review of the EPA's decision with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the EPA had acted illegally with respect to both actions. The EPA disputed Sierra Club's Article III standing to challenge the agency action.
The court began its analysis by reiterating the three conditions the US Supreme Court mandated for how an organization like Sierra Club could establish standing when suing on behalf of its members:
- Its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.
- The interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose.
- Neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
The court found no dispute as to the second requirement, as Sierra Club's organizational purpose is to protect the environment and promote responsible use of ecosystems and resources. Likewise, the court found the third requirement to be met since there was no reason for any individual members to participate in the claim or relief requested. Turning to the first requirement, the court stated that a Sierra Club member would have standing to sue in her own right if she could demonstrate:
- An injury in fact.
- A causal connection between the alleged injury and the defendants' conduct, meaning that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.
- Redressability, meaning that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.
Here, the court faced an issue of first impression in deciding the manner and degree of evidence necessary to prove standing upon direct review. The court held that the party invoking federal jurisdiction carried a burden of production similar to that required at summary judgment, in which she must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts supporting each element of standing, rather than that required at the pleading stage in a motion to dismiss, in which general factual allegations of injury resulting from defendants' conduct would suffice. In so ruling, the Sixth Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The court ultimately held that Sierra Club had demonstrated Article III standing by virtue of its appended declarations to its opening brief, and vacated the EPA's redesignation of the Ohio and Indiana portions of the Cincinnati area.