On August 14, 2012, the US District Court for the Northern District of Ohio issued an opinion denying an employer's motion for summary judgment against the claims of a former employee who alleged that he was terminated for changing his name due to his same sex marriage and because of his AIDS diagnosis. A key issue in the case was whether an employee can sustain a claim for gender discrimination under Title VII on the basis of mistreatment related to non-conformance with gender stereotypes.

Jason Koren worked for The Ohio Bell Telephone Company for six years under the name Jason Cabot. During this time, Koren's co-workers, including fellow manager Kim Miceli, were aware that he was homosexual. In 2008, two years after leaving Ohio Bell, Koren got married and took the name of his husband. He was rehired by Ohio Bell in 2009 in a limited term sales position. He legally changed his name soon after.

Shortly after changing his name, Koren alleged that his superiors began to treat him unfairly after learning of his marriage. Miceli allegedly called him Cabot, telling him that she refused to recognize his marriage or name change. Koren filed a union grievance over Miceli's behavior, but alleged that Miceli continued to call him Cabot, despite having agreed to settle the grievance. Koren also produced medical notes to Miceli to excuse the frequent bathroom breaks that might occur due to Koren's AIDS medication.

In September 2009, Koren's father died, and Koren missed nine days of work as a result. During his time off, Koren kept in touch with his union representative, who informed him that the time off would be excused. However, on review of Ohio Bell's collective bargaining agreement (CBA), Miceli determined that Koren was not employed long enough to be entitled to bereavement leave, but ultimately decided Koren was entitled to two unpaid bereavement days. Koren was assessed with seven unexcused absences and placed on written warning.

In October 2009, Ohio Bell informed the employee union that it would convert certain employees, including employees in limited term positions, to full time employees. Ohio Bell would terminate limited term employees who did not have satisfactory performance or attendance records. General Manager Scott Willis determined, after conferring with Ohio Bell's labor and human resources departments, that the cutoff for satisfactory attendance would be four unexcused absences. Due to his seven absences, Koren was not converted to a full-time position and was terminated.

Koren filed suit against Ohio Bell in district court, alleging:

Ohio Bell moved for summary judgment on all claims.

The district court denied Ohio Bell's motion for summary judgment in its entirety, holding that Koren had stated claims for both gender and disability discrimination.

The court rejected Ohio Bell's argument that Koren was merely attempting to present a claim for sexual orientation discrimination, which is not recognized by Title VII, as a gender discrimination claim. Instead, the court held that employers who discriminate against employees because they fail to conform with gender stereotypes are engaging in sex discrimination, since the mistreatment would not occur except for the victim's sex.

Here, the court found that Koren made out a discrimination claim for sex stereotyping by alleging that:

The court found that, under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard, Koren alleged sufficient facts to support his argument that Ohio Bell's decision to fire him for his unexcused absences was simply a pretext for gender discrimination, including that:

The court also held that Koren had sufficiently alleged his disability discrimination claim. Although Ohio Bell argued that Koren's supervisors had no knowledge of Koren's AIDS diagnosis, the court noted that Koren's allegations that he advised his coworkers of the diagnosis during his initial term of employment and Miceli's requirement that Koren produce medical notes for his bathroom breaks suggested that Miceli was aware of his condition.

The decision illustrates that some courts will construe Title VII's gender discrimination provisions to encompass claims that involve mistreatment due to a person's non-conformance with traditional gender stereotypes, in spite of the fact that Title VII does not explicitly recognize claims for discrimination based on sexual orientation.