In its August 16, 2013 opinion in Lindley v. FDIC, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that when the FDIC is a party to a civil suit and removes that case to federal court, the district court has jurisdiction over claims against non-FDIC defendants, even if the FDIC is later dismissed from the case.

The plaintiffs leased or purchased space in the Drayton Tower in Savannah, Georgia. Although an executive employed by Darby Bank & Trust assured the lessors that adequate funding would be available, it was not. The tenants sued Darby Bank and several developers and contractors in Georgia state court for negligent misrepresentation, fraud, breach of contract and breach of warranty.

In 2010, the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance closed Darby Bank and appointed the FDIC as receiver, and the agency was substituted as a party for Darby Bank in the lawsuits. The FDIC removed the cases to federal court. The plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that the FDIC did not have removal authority in this case. The district court agreed with the FDIC, denying the motions to remand and dismissing all claims against the FDIC. The court assumed that it lacked jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims against the remaining contractors and developers, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed those claims as well.

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's denial of the motions to remand. Though there is an exception to the FDIC's removal power, it did not apply in this case. The court also upheld the grant of summary judgment to the FDIC, but it reversed the district court's dismissal of the state law claims against the remaining defendants. The plaintiffs argued that because the US Code provides that any suit in which the FDIC "is a party" is deemed to "arise under" the laws of the United States, federal courts have original jurisdiction even after the FDIC leaves the case and only state law claims remain (12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A)).

The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs. Though the language of the statute is ambiguous about whether the FDIC needs to be a party throughout the lawsuit to confer jurisdiction, under the "time of filing" doctrine of statutory construction, the jurisdictional issues depend on the circumstances of the case when the action is brought and cannot be changed. Allowing jurisdiction to remain despite the departure of the FDIC also serves the purpose of Section 1819(b)(2), which is to strengthen civil enforcement of laws protecting depositors.

The Eleventh Circuit joined the US Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth and Eighth Circuits in holding that district courts have original jurisdiction over actions in which the FDIC was a party, even if it was later dismissed from the lawsuit. Given these considerations of statutory interpretation, the purpose of the law and the persuasive authority in other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court improperly dismissed the remaining state law claims against the non-FDIC defendant.