Restraints of trade and dominance in Argentina: overview

A Q&A guide to restraints of trade and dominance in Argentina.

The Q&A gives a succinct overview of restraints of trade, monopolies and abuses of market power in Argentina. In particular, it covers the regulatory authorities and the regulatory framework, the scope of rules, exemptions, exclusions, statutes of limitation, notification, investigations, penalties and enforcement, third party damages claims, EU law, joint ventures and proposals for reform.

For information on merger control, regulatory framework and regulatory authorities, relevant triggering events and thresholds in Argentina, visit Merger control in Argentina: overview.

This Q&A is part of the global guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Restraints of Trade and Dominance Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/restraintsoftrade-guide. For a full list of jurisdictional Merger Control Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/mergercontrol-guide.

For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As, which provide a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-guide.

Contents

Restraints of trade

Scope of rules

1. Are restrictive agreements and practices regulated? If so, what are the substantive provisions and regulatory authority?

Regulatory framework

The principal legislation comprises:

  • Competition Act No. 25,156 as amended by Law 26,993 of September 2014.

  • Decree 89/2001 (issued by the Executive Power).

  • Civil and Commercial Code (section 11: abuse of dominant position).

The Competition Act broadly prohibits any act or conduct relating to the production and exchange of goods and services, which limits, restricts, falsifies or distorts competition or market access, or which constitutes an abuse of market dominant position in a way that may damage the general public interest.

The Competition Act provides for a non-exhaustive list of prohibited practices such as:

  • Fixing, manipulating or concerting, whether directly or indirectly, the resale price, or the purchase of goods or services in the market, as well as exchanging information with such purpose.

  • Agreeing on the obligation to manufacture, process, distribute, acquire or market only certain restricted quantities of goods or produce only certain units or volumes, or under certain frequency of services.

  • Horizontally distributing areas, markets, customers or sources of supply.

  • Bid-rigging.

  • Limiting or controlling the technical development or investments devoted to manufacturing or marketing of goods and services.

  • Preventing or limiting third parties from entering into a market or excluding them from it.

  • Fixing or engaging in practices that fix prices and conditions for the purchase or sale of goods or services.

  • Subordinating the sale of goods to the acquisition of other goods or making the supply of a service conditional on the use of another service or the acquisition of goods.

  • Making an acquisition of goods or services conditional to not using, acquiring, selling or supplying goods or services manufactured, processed, distributed or marketed by a third party.

  • Imposing discriminatory conditions for the purchase or sale of goods or supply of services without justified grounds or generally accepted commercial practices.

  • Denying specific requests for goods or services without reasonable justification, taking account of the prevailing conditions of the relevant market.

  • Suspending the supply of services provided by a dominant market player.

  • Sale of goods or services at prices below their cost without justified grounds or not consistent with generally accepted commercial practices.

The above practices are generally not punishable unless they limit, restrict, falsify or distort competition or market access, or constitute an abuse of a market dominant position in a way that may result in damage to the general public interest.

Section 11 of the new Civil and Commercial Code (in force from 1 August 2015) sets out that the provisions sanctioning the abusive exercise of rights (section 10) apply in cases of abuse of market position. This provision does not alter the remedies provided in specific competition law regulations (the Competition Act) and does not expand the principles of law that pre-existed the implementation of section 11.

The newly enacted provisions on the abusive exercise of rights expressly grant judges the broad power to grant remedies that:

  • Restore the situation to its previous condition.

  • Compensate damage.

In addition, the Ley de Abastecimiento No. 20,680 (as recently amended by law No. 26,991) provides several administrative sanctions to those who:

  • Artificially or disproportionately increase the price of goods.

  • Destroy goods or create obstacles in relation to the provision of services, or perform actions which are intended to generate a shortage in their production, sale or transportation.

  • Unreasonably refuse to sell goods.

The sanctions for such conduct include fines, suspension of business or decommission of goods, among others.

Price-fixing is a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment from six months to two years (section 300(1), Criminal Code). However, this provision has almost never been enforced in Argentina.

Regulatory authority

Law 26,993 creates a new regulatory authority (Autoridad de Aplicación) (AOA) to replace the old National Competition Tribunal (whose members were never appointed). However, until now, the AOA has not been put in operation by the Executive Power (PEN) and its functions are currently performed by the SECOM, which is assisted by the National Competition Commission (Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia) (CNDC).

Therefore, until the new members of the authority are designated by the PEN, SECOM (acting as the AOA) and the CNDC are primary regulatory authorities on all competition law matters. For purposes of this Guide, reference to the SECOM will imply reference to the AOA and vice versa.

Both the CNDC and SECOM report to the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance (Ministro de Economía y Finanzas Públicas) and while the CNDC issues recommendations to the SECOM, the SECOM is the authority that ultimately decides the cases and imposes sanctions and fines in accordance with the provisions of the Competition Act.

See box, The regulatory authorities.

 
2. Do the regulations only apply to formal agreements or can they apply to informal practices?

The Competition Act applies not only to formal agreements but also to informal practices.

 
3. Are there any exemptions? If so, what are the criteria for individual exemption and any applicable block exemptions?

There are no exemptions applicable to restrictive agreements and practices, including block exemptions.

 
4. Are there any exclusions? Are there statutes of limitation associated with restrictive agreements and practices?

Exclusions

The Competition Act does not contain any de minimis provisions excluding small agreements. However, in exercising its discretion when assessing concentrations and anti-competitive conduct, the CNDC certainly considers the significance of practices and the parties.

Statutes of limitation

The statute of limitation is five years from the date on which the anti-competitive practice takes place. The statute of limitation is suspended by filling a complaint with the CNDC.

 

Notification

5. What are the notification requirements for restrictive agreements and practices?

Notification

The Competition Act does not provide for mandatory or voluntary notification of restrictive agreements or practices and it is not common to notify them.

Informal guidance/opinion

Advisory opinions are only contemplated for economic concentrations.

Responsibility for notification

Not applicable.

Relevant authority

Not applicable.

Form of notification

Not applicable.

Filing fee

Not applicable.

 

Investigations

6. Who can start an investigation into a restrictive agreement or practice?

Regulators

Investigations into a restrictive agreement or practice are started by the CNDC on its own initiative or as a result of a private complaint or request from a government authority.

Third parties

See above, Regulators.

 
7. What rights (if any) does a complainant or other third party have to make representations, access documents or be heard during the course of an investigation?

Representations

As a general rule, complainants do not have the right to make representations or to access documents in the course of proceedings. However, considering citizens' constitutional right to be heard by the authorities, complainants should be afforded the right to present their case before the CNDC and SECOM whether in writing or by meetings with the authorities (who are not required to make them part of the proceedings).

The CNDC can request consumer and business associations, local governments, or any other third parties with a legitimate interest to submit reports or testimonies during the course of an investigation.

Document access

As a general rule, only the parties have access to documents in the case file.

Be heard

Both the complainant and the defendant have the right to be heard during the course of an investigation. As a general rule, hearings must be notified to all parties involved in the proceeding 20 days before the hearing date. The CNDC can open a hearing to the public whenever it considers it appropriate.

 
8. What are the stages of the investigation and timetable?

Once the CNDC decides to initiate an investigation, it must notify the accused parties. The parties have ten days to respond (section 29, Competition Act).

Upon examination of the facts and initial pleadings of the parties, one of the following occurs:

  • The complaint is dismissed, in which case the investigation is concluded.

  • The investigation is substantiated, in which case the CNDC can request the parties to explain further their position and to provide evidence to support it.

The parties have 90 days to produce evidence, following which they have six days to submit their arguments on the evidence produced. The CNDC must issue a recommendation to SECOM, and SECOM must make a decision within 60 days after the expiration of the six-day term.

 

Publicity and confidentiality

9. How much information is made publicly available concerning investigations into potentially restrictive agreements or practices? Is any information made automatically confidential and is confidentiality available on request?

Publicity

The CNDC usually publishes final decisions on its official website.

As a general rule documents and information relating to an investigation are not publicly available.

Automatic confidentiality

No information is automatically kept confidential by the CNDC.

Confidentiality on request

The parties can request confidential treatment of all or part of the information submitted whenever public disclosure could adversely affect their interests. The request must be motivated and, if it is granted by SECOM, the requesting party must submit a non-confidential summary of the information.

 
10. What are the powers (if any) that the relevant regulator has to investigate potentially restrictive agreements or practices?

The CNDC and SECOM can investigate and request information concerning any potentially restrictive agreement or practice. However, they need the consent of the relevant parties or court warrants to inspect the premises, books and records of the persons being investigated.

 

Settlements

11. Can the parties reach settlements with regulators to bring an early resolution to an investigation? If so, what are the circumstances for doing so and the applicable procedure?

The Competition Act does not expressly contemplate the possibility of reaching settlement agreements with the parties prior to making an infringement decision. However, parties to an investigation can request suspension of any investigation proceedings by agreeing on an immediate or gradual cessation or modification of any unlawful conduct or practice challenged by the CNDC.

Suspension of proceedings requires approval of SECOM because proceedings involve public order (proper functioning of the internal market).

 
12. Can the regulator accept remedies (commitments) from the parties to address competition concerns without reaching an infringement decision? If so, what are the circumstances for doing so and the applicable procedure?

The Competition Act contemplates the possibility for the regulator to accept commitments proposed by the parties without reaching an infringement decision (section 36, Competition Act).

Until an infringement decision is issued, the parties to the investigation (whether jointly with the complainant, or with the competition and consumer defence secretary (Secretaría de Defensa de la Competencia y del Consumidor) (SDCC)) can request a suspension of any investigation proceedings by agreeing an immediate or gradual cessation or modification of any unlawful conduct or practice challenged by the CNDC. If the request is only made by the offending party (or parties), the complainant and the SDCC should be heard before the SECOM accepts or denies the commitment(s).

As a matter of practice, suspensions are usually only granted in relation to minor offences that cause no damage to general economic interest. Suspension is denied in case of accomplished or irreversible facts.

Suspension of proceedings requires approval of SECOM because proceedings involve public order (proper functioning of the internal market).

After three years from the fulfilment of the commitment(s), the case is filed if no other infraction is committed by the party (or parties) during such time.

 

Penalties and enforcement

13. What are the regulator's enforcement powers in relation to a prohibited restrictive agreement or practice?

Orders

The SECOM may adopt interim measures to stop or prevent the alleged anti-competitive conducts (section 35, Competition Act). The SECOM can order a broad variety of interim measures, which can also apply as final decisions, including:

  • Prohibition to exercise call options.

  • Suspension of price increases.

  • Prohibition to exercise voting rights.

  • Suspension or revocation of decisions adopted in shareholders meetings.

In addition, the Competition Act authorises the adoption of the necessary measures to stop the anti-competitive conduct and reverse any existing effects (section 46).

Fines

SECOM can impose fines from ARS10,000 to ARS150 million (see Question 27). In practice, SECOM generally follows the CNDC's recommendations in relation to infringement and the fines to be imposed.

Price-fixing is punishable with imprisonment (section 300(1), Criminal Code).

Personal liability

Company directors or managers, statutory auditors, agents or legal representatives are jointly and severally liable for fines imposed pursuant under the Competition Act, provided that they have contributed, encouraged or allowed the infringement.

Additionally, individuals may be disqualified from performing any business activities for a period ranging from one to ten years.

Immunity/leniency

The Competition Act does not expressly provide for leniency. Parties to an investigation can request suspension of any investigation proceedings by agreeing on an immediate or gradual cessation or modification of any unlawful conduct or practice challenged by the CNDC. In such case, proceeding may be suspended (section 36, Competition Act). However, as a matter of practice, suspension has been granted only in relation to minor offences that cause no damage to general economic interest.

Impact on agreements

The applicable legislation is silent on this point. However, there is no obvious reason why the authorities would void the entire agreement, and not only its anti-competitive provisions (provided it is possible in the circumstances).

 

Third party damages claims and appeals

14. Can third parties claim damages for losses suffered as a result of a prohibited restrictive agreement or practice? If so, what special procedures or rules (if any) apply? Are collective/class actions possible?

Third party damages

Third parties are generally entitled to recover losses suffered as a result of anti-competitive conduct. Since neither the CNDC nor SECOM have the power to award damages, any claim must be filed with the competent court.

Special procedures/rules

The Competition Act does not provide any special procedure. Procedural rules applicable to claims for damages would apply.

Collective/class actions

The Competition Act does not provide a class action mechanism as known in the US. However, the Supreme Court accepted the possibility of collective actions in re Halabi, Ernesto c/ P.E.N. - ley 25.873 - dto. 1563/04 s/ amparo ley 16.986.

 
15. Is there a right of appeal against any decision of the regulator? If so, which decisions, to which body and within which time limits? Are rights of appeal available to third parties, or only to the parties to the agreement or practice?

Rights of appeal and procedure

Decisions concerning competition infractions (that is, restrictive agreements or practices) can be challenged by the parties by submitting a motion before the competent court of appeals.

The motion must be submitted to SECOM within ten business days from receiving notice of the decision. SECOM must refer the case to the competent court of appeals.

The competent court is the national court of appeals with jurisdiction over consumer relations (Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en las Relaciones del Consumo) (CNARC), which is yet to be implemented. Until its actual implementation, the appeals are to be submitted before the court of appeals currently used to resolve these matters, which is the national court of appeals with jurisdiction over economic and business crimes (Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Penal Económico).

Despite the fact that the Competition Act states that the CNARC is competent to review the imposition of fines, a reasonable interpretation of the actual scope of the Competition Act makes the CNARC competent to review the below referenced decisions as well.

A motion can be filed before the CNARC to challenge the following decisions (section 52, Competition Act):

  • Imposition of fines.

  • Imposition of a restriction or cessation of a conduct.

  • Rejections of complaints.

Filling a motion to challenge the above decisions does not suspend its effects and, in the case of decisions imposing fines, in order to file such motion, the corresponding fine must be paid (solve et repete).

Third party rights of appeal

General rights of appeal are not available to third parties. However, third parties may challenge decisions if they may cause irreparable damage. To date, there is no case law in relation to claims brought by third parties.

In addition, third parties can request SECOM to review a decision if it believes that the decision was based on false or incomplete information (section 15, Competition Act).

 

Monopolies and abuses of market power

Scope of rules

16. Are monopolies and abuses of market power regulated under administrative and/or criminal law? If so, what are the substantive provisions and regulatory authority?

Abuses of market power are dealt by a body of law separate from criminal law.

Regulatory framework

The main legislation regarding monopolies and abuses of market power comprises:

  • Competition Act No. 25,156 as amended by Law 26,993 of September 2014 (Competition Act).

  • Decree 89/2001 (issued by the Executive Power).

  • Civil and Commercial Code (section 11: abuse of dominant position)

The Competition Act prohibits any conduct, relating to the production and exchange of goods and services, which limits, restricts, falsifies or distorts competition or market access, or which constitutes an abuse of a market dominant position in a way that may result in damage to the general public interest.

In relation to other industry-specific regulations, the new law regulating the media, which includes newspapers, radios, internet and cable providers and so on (Ley de Medios de Comunicación Audiovisual No. 26,522) (Media Law) contains several horizontal and vertical prohibitions. In addition, the regulatory framework applicable to the electricity and gas services (laws No. 24,065 and 24,076, respectively) provides several prohibitions to the vertical concentration of suppliers.

Regulatory authority

Law 26,993 creates a new regulatory authority (Autoridad de Aplicación) (AOA) to replace the old National Competition Tribunal (whose members were never appointed). However, until now, the AOA has not been put in operation by the Executive Power (PEN) and its functions are currently performed by the SECOM, which is assisted by the National Competition Commission (Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia) (CNDC).

Therefore, until the new members of the authority are designated by the PEN, SECOM (acting as the AOA) and the CNDC are primary regulatory authorities on all competition law matters. For purposes of this Guide, reference to the SECOM will imply reference to the AOA and vice versa.

Both the CNDC and SECOM report to the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance (Ministro de Economía y Finanzas Públicas) and while the CNDC issues recommendations to the SECOM, the SECOM is the authority that ultimately decides the cases and imposes sanctions and fines in accordance with the provisions of the Competition Act.

 
17. How is dominance/market power determined?

According to the Competition Act, a dominant position exists whenever (the list in not exhaustive):

  • One or more companies or individuals are the sole suppliers or buyers of a product or service on the market.

  • One or more companies or individuals are not subject to substantial competition, even if they are not the sole supplier or buyer.

  • Through horizontal or vertical agreements, such companies or individuals are in a position to determine the extent of market participation of any competitor, with adverse effects on the market.

The Competition Act requires due consideration be given to:

  • The existence of other goods or services that can substitute effectively the goods or services provided by the party (or parties) being investigated or assessed for merger control purposes as well as the time that may be necessary for that substitution to occur.

  • The degree to which regulatory restrictions limit the access of products, suppliers and buyers to the relevant market.

  • The degree of influence that the operator presumably responsible for the investigated practice has in respect of price determination, volumes supplied and demanded and the extent to which competitors may revert the effect of the investigated practice.

 
18. Are there any broad categories of behaviour that may constitute abusive conduct?

The Competition Act does not define abuse. However, the following types of conduct have been held to be abusive by legal experts and case law:

  • Conduct that cannot be justified on usual and generally accepted commercial practice grounds and whose main objective is the exclusion of one or more competitors.

  • Exercise of market power to impose excessive prices, offer products or services of poor quality, diminish innovation or implement discriminatory practices against consumers.

 

Exemptions and exclusions

19. Are there any exemptions or exclusions?

There are no exceptions or exclusions.

 

Notification

20. Is it necessary (or, if not necessary, possible/advisable) to notify the conduct to obtain clearance or (formal or informal) guidance from the regulator? If so, what is the applicable procedure?

The legislation does not provide a notification procedure.

 

Investigations

21. What (if any) procedural differences are there between investigations into monopolies and abuses of market power and investigations into restrictive agreements and practices?

There are no substantial procedural differences from investigations into restrictive agreements (see Questions 6 to 9 and Question 11).

 
22. What are the regulator's powers of investigation?
 

Penalties and enforcement

23. What are the penalties for abuse of market power and what orders can the regulator make?

The SECOM may impose measures aimed at neutralising the effects of abusive conduct or request the competent courts to order the dissolution, liquidation, division or unwinding of the economic entity that enjoys dominant position (see Question 13).

Currently, SECOM imposes such measures when the continuation of the conduct may cause a serious damage to competition.

 

Third party damages claims

24. Can third parties claim damages for losses suffered as a result of abuse of market power? If so, what special procedures or rules (if any) apply? Are collective/class actions possible?

Third party damages

See Question 14, Third party damages.

Special procedures/rules

See Question 14, Special procedures/rules.

Collective/class actions

See Question 14, Collective/class actions.

 

EU law

25. Are there any differences between the powers of the national regulatory authority(ies) and courts in relation to cases dealt with under Article 101 and/or Article 102 of the TFEU, and those dealt with only under national law?

Not applicable.

 

Joint ventures

26. How are joint ventures analysed under competition law?

The Competition Act does not reserve a special treatment for joint ventures.

 

Inter-agency co-operation

27. Does the regulatory authority in your jurisdiction co-operate with regulatory authorities in other jurisdictions in relation to infringements of competition law? If so, what is the legal basis for and extent of co-operation (in particular, in relation to the exchange of information)?

The Competition Act does not contain rules providing for international co-operation in the field of information exchange and remedies/settlements. However, informal international co-operation could be expected on cross border concentrations and as a result of specific institutional initiatives.

A Co-operation Agreement entered between Argentina and Brazil on 16 October 2003 (ratified by Law 26,622 and in force from 2 October 2010) provides the co-operation between the competition regulatory authorities of both countries, including the exchange of information, consultation and meetings to exchange information.

Also a Protocol for the Defence of Competition and an Agreement for the Defence of Competition within the MERCOSUR were approved in December 1996 and in December 2010, but have not yet entered into force. The Protocol and Agreement contain specific provisions regarding co-operation between regulatory authorities.

 

Recent cases

28. What are the recent developments, trends or notable recent cases concerning abuse of market power?

Section 11 of the new Civil and Commercial Code (in force as of 1 August 2015) contemplates that provisions on the abusive exercise of rights (section 10) apply in cases where abuse of market position exists. See Question 1, Regulatory framework.

 

Proposals for reform

29. Are there any proposals for reform concerning restrictive agreements and market dominance?

The Competition Act has been recently amended by Competition Act 26,993. However, other proposed amendments to the Competition Act were submitted to Congress in 2014 and 2015 (at the time of writing, none have been debated). One of these proposals seeks to increase fines for participating in an anti-competitive practice.

 

Online resources

National Competition Commission (Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia) (CNDC)

W www.cndc.gov.ar

Description. The CNDC's official website. Most rulings, reports and updated information on the CNDC's activities are available in Spanish.

Ministry of Economy

Description. The official website of the Ministry of Economy. Laws, rules and regulations are available in Spanish.

W www.infoleg.gov.ar

Supreme Court

W www.csjn.gov.ar

Description. The official website of the Supreme Court. Court decisions are available in Spanish.

Official Court

W www.boletinoficial.gov.ar/Inicio/Index.castle

Description. The official website of the Official Gazette.



The regulatory authorities

National Competition Commission (Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia) (CNDC)

Head. Ricardo A. Napolitani (President)
Contact details. Av. Julio A. Roca 651, 4th Floor – Zip Code 1322 - Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires - Argentina
T +54 11 43493 480
+54 11 4097 4349 4104/4107
F +54 11 4349 4125
E cndc@secind.mecon.ar
W www.cndc.gov.ar/

Outline structure. The CNDC is managed by a board comprising five members, one of which is appointed as President.

Responsibilities. The CNDC is empowered to:

  • Provide recommendations and opinions on business concentrations and on anti-competitive conduct (infringements).
  • Provide recommendations and opinions on sanctions and fines to be applied under the Competition Act.
  • Interpret the provisions of the Competition Act.
  • Adopt internal rules, procedures and policies.
  • Issue non-binding opinions on competition law matters.
  • Enter into agreements with consumers' associations.

Procedure for obtaining documents. The most substantive recommendations and decisions made by the CNDC are available on its website. The website also contains relevant laws, regulations and general information on the CNDC.

Authority of Application (Autoridad de Aplicación (AOA)). Nowadays entrusted to the Interior Commerce Secretary (Secretario de Comercio Interior del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas) (SECOM)

Head. Augusto Costa (President)
Contact details. Av. Julio A. Roca 651, 4th Floor – Zip Code 1086 - Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires - Argentina
T
+54 11 4349 3000
F
+54 11 4349 4125
E cndc@secind.mecon.ar
W
www.mecon.gov.ar/comerciointerior/

Responsibilities. The SECOM is empowered to (among others):

  • Impose the sanctions established in the Competition Act.
  • Arrange the performance of market studies.
  • Hold hearings with the involved parties.
  • Instruct experts to gather evidence relevant for any investigation.
  • Control the stock, check the origins and costs of raw materials and other goods.
  • Promote research and investigation on competition matters.
  • Encourage solutions mutually agreed by the parties.

Procedure for obtaining documents. The most substantive recommendations and decisions made by the CNDC are available on its website. The website also contains relevant laws, regulations and general information on the CNDC.



Contributor profiles

Cristian J.P. Mitrani, Partner

Mitrani Caballero Ojam & Ruiz Moreno

T +54 11 4590 8605
F +54 11 4590 8606
E cristian.mitrani@mcolex.com
W www.mcolex.com

Professional qualifications. Argentina, lawyer, 1978

Areas of practice. Competition law; administrative law & business regulation; corporate law; corporate compliance and white collar crime.

Languages. Spanish, English, French, Italian

Professional associations/memberships. Member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), the International Bar Association (IBA), and associate member of the American Bar Association (ABA).

María Teresa Recondo, Partner

Mitrani Caballero Ojam & Ruiz Moreno

T +54 11 4590 8631
F +54 11 4590 8601
E maria.recondo@mcolex.com
W www.mcolex.com

Professional qualifications. Argentina, lawyer, 1995

Areas of practice. Corporate law (cross-border transactions) and competition law.

Languages. Spanish, English

Soledad Vallejos Meana, Senior Associate

Mitrani Caballero Ojam & Ruiz Moreno

T +54 11 4590 8636
F +54 11 4590 8601
E soledad.vallejos.meana@mcolex.com
W www.mcolex.com

Professional qualifications. Argentina, lawyer, 2001

Areas of practice. Administrative and business regulation; competition law; white collar crime and international arbitration.

Languages. Spanish, English, French

María Paula Díaz, Senior Associate

Mitrani Caballero Ojam & Ruiz Moreno

T +54 11 4590 8617
F +54 11 4590 8601
E maria.paula.diaz@mcolex.com
W www.mcolex.com

Professional qualifications. Argentina, lawyer, 2005

Areas of practice.Corporate law (cross-border transactions); competition law; corporate compliance and white collar crime.

Languages. Spanish, English


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