Restraints of trade and dominance in Brazil: overview

A Q&A guide to restraints of trade and dominance in Brazil.

The Q&A gives a succinct overview of restraints of trade, monopolies and abuses of market power in Brazil. In particular, it covers the regulatory authorities and the regulatory framework, the scope of rules, exemptions, exclusions, statutes of limitation, notification, investigations, penalties and enforcement, third party damages claims, EU law, joint ventures and proposals for reform.

For information on merger control, regulatory framework and regulatory authorities, relevant triggering events and thresholds in Brazil, visit, Merger control in Brazil: overview.

This Q&A is part of the global guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Restraints of Trade and Dominance Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/restraintsoftrade-guide. For a full list of jurisdictional Merger Control Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/mergercontrol-guide.

For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As, which provide a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-guide.

Leonardo Canabrava, Lucas E.F.A. Spadano, Bruno Herwig Rocha Augustin and Bruno Alves Delpupo, Campos, Fialho, Canabrava, Borja, Andrade, Salles Advogados
Contents

Restraints of trade

Scope of rules

1. Are restrictive agreements and practices regulated? If so, what are the substantive provisions and regulatory authority?

Regulatory framework

Restrictive agreements and practices are regulated by Law 12.529/2011, which also encompasses conduct involving foreign companies if their acts have or may have an effect in Brazil.

The law provides a non-exhaustive list of practices that can be considered illegal, but in essence the practices are the same as those considered as an abuse of dominant position in EU jurisdictions.

These conducts constitute illegal restraints, regardless of (Article 36, Law 12.529/2011):

  • The agent's intent.

  • Whether they are achieved.

  • The actual damage to competition (potential harm is also punishable).

Under the regulatory framework, the analysis of restrictive agreements and practices is guided by a rule of reason, with the sole exception of hard core cartels that have been considered per se illegal by the Anti-Trust Authority's jurisprudence.

Individuals involved in cartels are also subject to criminal prosecution under Law 8.137/1990.

Regulatory authority

The Administrative Council for Economic Defence ( Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica) (CADE) is the anti-trust authority. It consists of three independent bodies:

  • The Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence.

  • The General Superintendence.

  • The Department of Economic Studies.

The General Superintendence is the investigatory body in charge of performing investigations on practices that may harm competition.

The Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence is the decision-making body and the final unappealable authority of the executive branch.

However, decisions of the anti-trust authority can be disputed before the federal courts.

See box, The regulatory authority.

 
2. Do the regulations only apply to formal agreements or can they apply to informal practices?

Law 12.529/2011 applies to any agreements that violate or may constitute a violation of the economic order, regardless of its form.

Exemptions

3. Are there any exemptions? If so, what are the criteria for individual exemption and any applicable block exemptions?

There are no individual or block exemptions.

Exclusions and statutes of limitation

4. Are there any exclusions? Are there statutes of limitation associated with restrictive agreements and practices?

Exclusions

An associative agreement is not notifiable if its term is shorter than two years. However, even if its term is longer than two years such an agreement is not notifiable, if:

  • In horizontal relationships, it does not create a horizontal overlap that leads to 20% or more of market share.

  • In vertical relationships, none of the parties involved have at least 30% of the relevant market.

  • The parties do not reach the threshold of gross revenue in Brazil.

However, the Anti-Trust Authority can assess an agreement or conduct regardless of whether it is notifiable or not.

Statutes of limitation

The limitation period for violations to the economic order is five years from the date of the violation, or, in the event of a permanent or continued violation, when the practice ceased.

A limitation period also applies when, within three years, no ruling or any other decision is held in an investigatory procedure before the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica) (CADE).

The limitation period for investigations on anti-competitive conducts that are also considered a criminal offence is governed by criminal law (for cartels the limitation period is 12 years).

Notification

5. What are the notification requirements for restrictive agreements and practices?

Notification

According to the Administrative Council for Economic Defence's (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica) (CADE) Resolution 10/2014, associative agreements must be notified:

  • When at least one of the economic groups involved reach the threshold of BRL750 million of gross revenue in Brazil, and the other economic group reaches at least BRL75 million of gross income in Brazil.

  • When the contract is for more than two years.

  • When the horizontal agreement creates a horizontal overlap of more than 20% of the relevant market.

  • In a vertical agreement, when at least one of the parties has more than 30% of market share and the vertical restraint imposes:

    • exclusivity; or

    • the sharing of profits or losses.

Informal guidance/opinion

Parties can request (formal) consultations with the Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence to obtain guidance on the lawfulness of acts, contracts, business strategies or conducts that it has carried out or plans to do so.

The opinion remains binding for five years. However, the binding nature of the opinion does not preclude the Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence from subsequently reconsidering its understanding on the consulted matter.

CADE also encourages the use of informal guidance to help parties decide whether the transaction is notifiable or not. However, this guidance is not binding.

Responsibility for notification

Any or both of the parties can give notification of an associative agreement.

Relevant authority

The notification must be made before the General Superintendence.

Form of notification

CADE's Resolution 2/2012 provides for two notification forms:

  • A form for non-fast-track cases.

  • A form for fast-track cases.

Filing fee

The current fee is BRL45,000. From 1 January 2016, the filling fee will be increased to BLR85,000.

Investigations

6. Who can start an investigation into a restrictive agreement or practice?

Regulators

The General Superintendence is the competent body to decide whether to start an investigation or summarily dismiss a request for investigation. It is also responsible for monitoring market and commercial practices to prevent violations of the economic order.

Decisions on summary termination of the cases by the General Superintendence must be reassessed by the Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence.

An investigation can be initiated either on the General Superintendence's own initiative or at any interested parties' request (for example, individuals, companies, competitors, clients and government bodies).

Representations filed by the Commission or any of the houses of the National Congress, the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring (SEAE), regulatory agencies and the Administrative Council for Economic Defence's (CADE) General Attorney must be immediately commenced by the General Superintendence, regardless of preparatory procedures.

Third parties

Investigations can also be started by a complaint of a third party. This complaint must be filed with CADE and be accompanied by the relevant documentation as well as a clear, precise and coherent description of the facts and the additional elements to be considered in the investigation. However, it is at the discretion of the General Superintendence to decide whether these complaints prompt an investigation.

 
7. What rights (if any) does a complainant or other third party have to make representations, access documents or be heard during the course of an investigation?

The party that lodged a complaint can request any measure in the procedure.

However, the complainant is not part of the procedure, and has limited access to the files.

It is at the discretion of the General Superintendence to decide whether this measure is granted or denied.

Representations

Representations must be accompanied by the relevant documentation as well as a clear, precise and coherent description of the facts and the additional elements to be considered in the investigation. From 20 July 2015, complaints against restrictive agreements and concerted practices can be filed online by any interested party.

Document access

Interested parties can usually have full access to non-confidential documents, which are kept in public files. Access to confidential information and documents is restricted to those involved in the investigation proceedings, as well as other public authorities.

Be heard

Anyone (including the complainant) whose rights may be affected by the decision and other legitimate public entities can present written statements and request meetings and hearings in the course of the administrative procedure. The anti-trust authority often hears consumers, clients, suppliers, non-government organisations and competitors that may be affected by the case.

 
8. What are the stages of the investigation and timetable?

In practice, the General Superintendence starts the investigations with a preliminary assessment of the restrictive agreement or practice. The timetable for this preliminary stage is 180 days, extendable by 60 days. Once concluded, the General Superintendence has ten business days to decide whether the preliminary investigations reveal substantial grounds to initiate an administrative process or to dismiss it. Third parties can appeal against a dismissal decision.

During the discovery phase of the administrative procedure, defendants can produce any evidence to confront the preliminary assessments of the General Superintendence. The defence must be filed within 30 days, which is extendable by ten days, as of the notice of commencement of the administrative procedure.

At the end of this stage, the General Superintendence must notify the defendants to present, new arguments within five days,. Following the submission of the defendants' arguments, the General Superintendence has fifteen days to report to the President of the Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence its conclusions and opinions on the case.

The President of the Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence then assigns the case to a Reporting Commissioner. This Commissioner can at his discretion determine other measures and request the opinion of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Attorney General on the case. Defendants have 15 days to present their closing arguments before the case is sent to trial.

There is no timetable for the decision of the Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence on the existence of a restrictive practice or agreement. However, statutes of limitation may apply (see Question 4). Defendants with different legal representatives are also granted duplicated terms to participate in the proceedings.

Publicity and confidentiality

 
9. How much information is made publicly available concerning investigations into potentially restrictive agreements or practices? Is any information made automatically confidential and is confidentiality available on request?

Publicity

The Administrative Council for Economic Defence's (CADE) practice shows that how much publicity is given depends on several factors, such as the:

  • Nature of the information.

  • Interest of the parties at stake.

Confidentiality can be granted at the discretion of the General Superintendence or CADE's Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence or at the request of the interested party. Normally, CADE keeps confidential any information, documents and data that is deemed necessary to clarify the facts of the case as well as information that by law or due to their nature (sensitive business information) must be kept confidential.

Publicity is usually given to information that:

  • Is deemed public by virtue of law.

  • Is in the public domain.

  • May be considered necessary to grant due process to the other investigated parties.

  • Is related, among other things, to non-sensitive information of the parties involved.

Preparatory proceedings to the investigation and proposals for settlements are kept confidential.

At the end of the proceedings, the Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence must release a public version of its decision. Expert reports, petitions and other documents can be made public at the discretion of CADE's President, provided that confidential data is omitted. The request for restricted or privileged access to information that is clearly public can also lead to the application of penalties on the requesting party.

Automatic confidentiality

Leniency settlement proposals and the proponent's identity are considered automatically confidential until the Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence's final decision.

Confidentiality on request

Parties can request that certain information be kept confidential at any time in the proceedings. Usually, these are core and sensitive information of the parties, such as:

  • Trade secrets.

  • Revenue.

  • Amount and volume of sales.

  • List of clients.

 
10. What are the powers (if any) that the relevant regulator has to investigate potentially restrictive agreements or practices?

The General Superintendence has broad and comprehensive powers to conduct searches and request information not only from the parties involved in the investigations but also from third parties. Examples of such powers include:

  • Requesting information and data of any person or entity.

  • Conducting oral hearings.

  • Conducting inspections and being allowed to extract or copy any relevant document or electronic data.

  • Requesting preventive judicial measures.

Settlements

11. Can the parties reach settlements with regulators to bring an early resolution to an investigation? If so, what are the circumstances for doing so and the applicable procedure?

Parties involved in restrictive agreements and concerted practices investigations can reach settlements with regulators, commonly referred to as cease-and-desist settlement (TCC) and leniency settlement (in cartel cases).

A party can at any time reach a TCC. The settlement is legally effective only after approval by the Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence. Second-in, third-in and subsequent settlements are also possible. For TCCs related to collusive conducts among competitors, parties must also pay a pecuniary contribution to the Fund for the Defence of Collective Rights and admit participation in the illegal conduct.

A party can also settle a leniency agreement with the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica) (CADE) in return for anti-trust administrative and criminal exemption or reduced penalties in cartel cases. To do so, a party must:

  • Be the first party to report the illegal practice.

  • Fully co-operate with the regulator.

  • Admit participation in the concerted practice.

  • Commit to cease it.

 
12. Can the regulator accept remedies (commitments) from the parties to address competition concerns without reaching an infringement decision? If so, what are the circumstances for doing so and the applicable procedure?

In relation to restrictive agreements and practices, commitments addressing competition concerns (compliance) are accepted, provided that they are formalised under a settlement.

Penalties and enforcement

 
13. What are the regulator's enforcement powers in relation to a prohibited restrictive agreement or practice?

Orders

The Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence has a wide range of powers to order any measure with a view to securing the termination of the violation. Its decision must indicate the measures that the parties must adopt to cease the practice.

Among many things, the Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence can impose:

  • A split of the company, transfer of shares, sale of assets or partial cessation of activity.

  • Compulsory licences of patents and other intellectual property rights.

  • Any other measure deemed necessary to enforce the decision.

Before a final decision is reached, the Reporting Commissioner or the General Superintendent can determine that the parties immediately cease any restrictive agreements or concerted practices (preventive measure), when there are sufficient grounds to believe that the practice is causing or may cause damages to the market.

Fines

Companies are subject to a fine up to 20% of their gross revenue in the line of business being investigated.

Other participant entities or individuals (such as associations, trade unions or professional association) are subject to a fine up to BRL2 billion.

Personal liability

Penalties applicable to individuals involved in restrictive practices and agreements are the same as those applicable to abuse of market power (see Question 23).

Managers are subject to a fine of 1% to 20% of the fine imposed on the company.

Individuals involved in cartel practices can also be prosecuted under criminal law and are subject to two to five years of imprisonment and/or a fine.

Immunity/leniency

A leniency settlement can grant the party total or partial immunity in relation to administrative and criminal penalties, including fines.

Impact on agreements

Normally, only restrictive provisions are set aside.

Third party damages claims and appeals

 
14. Can third parties claim damages for losses suffered as a result of a prohibited restrictive agreement or practice? If so, what special procedures or rules (if any) apply? Are collective/class actions possible?

Third party damages

Individuals can take follow-on or stand-alone actions with a view to claiming compensation for losses and damages suffered as result of restrictive agreements and practices, as well as seeking the cessation of such conducts. Entities that are responsible for the protection of consumers' rights can also take such legal actions under the Code of Consumer Protection.

Special procedures/rules

Third parties losses claims can be brought regardless of the investigation or administrative proceedings (that are not suspended where such claims are filed). The rules applicable to both follow-on and stand-alone damages actions are set out in the Brazilian Civil Procedure Code.

The limitation period is three years from the moment the violation occurs, and the regulator's decisions can be used by third parties in their cases as evidence of the illegal practice.

Collective/class actions

Collective or class actions can be brought by legal entities that are responsible for the protection of consumers' rights (Public Prosecutors' Office) according to the Code of Consumer Protection.

 
15. Is there a right of appeal against any decision of the regulator? If so, which decisions, to which body and within which time limits? Are rights of appeal available to third parties, or only to the parties to the agreement or practice?

Rights of appeal and procedure

The anti-trust authority grants the final binding decision before the executive branch.

However, parties can eventually request:

  • Clarification on any point of the decision.

  • The review of the decision (by the same body), provided that the appeal is submitted within fifteen days of the decision's date.

The appeals must be submitted to the Report Commissioner.

The Administrative Council for Economic Defence's (CADE) decisions can also be disputed before federal courts.

Third party rights of appeal

Third parties do not take part in the procedure. Only the parties involved in the restrictive practice or agreement under investigation can appeal.

 

Monopolies and abuses of market power

Scope of rules

16. Are monopolies and abuses of market power regulated under administrative and/or criminal law? If so, what are the substantive provisions and regulatory authority?

Regulatory framework

Law 12.529/2011 regulates monopolies and abuses of market power at the administrative level, while Law 8.137/1990 disciplines these conducts at the criminal level.

Regulatory authority

The Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) is the regulatory authority.

 
17. How is dominance/market power determined?

A company or group of companies that controls at least 20% of a relevant market or is able to unilaterally or jointly alter market conditions is assumed to have a dominant position.

 
18. Are there any broad categories of behaviour that may constitute abusive conduct?

Law 12.529/2011 sets out a non-exhaustive list of conducts that can be considered abusive, such as:

  • Predatory pricing.

  • Fixing resale price.

  • Territorial and base restrictions on customers.

  • Tie-in sales.

  • Price discrimination.

Other practices such as sham litigation (especially for the abuse of intellectual property rights) and exclusivity agreements are examples of conducts that can be considered abusive.

Exemptions and exclusions

 
19. Are there any exemptions or exclusions?

Law 12.529/2011 does not provide for any exemption or exclusion. However, Law 12.529/2011 establishes that the achievement of market power as a result of a natural competitive process does not constitute an infringement of the economic order.

Notification

 
20. Is it necessary (or, if not necessary, possible/advisable) to notify the conduct to obtain clearance or (formal or informal) guidance from the regulator? If so, what is the applicable procedure?

There is no formal notification and clearance process. However, a party can obtain formal guidance concerning its conducts by filing a preliminary consultation with the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) (see Question 5).

Investigations

21. What (if any) procedural differences are there between investigations into monopolies and abuses of market power and investigations into restrictive agreements and practices?

There is no procedural difference (see Questions 6 to 9 and 11 to 12).

 
22. What are the regulator's powers of investigation?

Penalties and enforcement

23. What are the penalties for abuse of market power and what orders can the regulator make?

Under Law 12.529/2011, penalties are:

  • For the convicted company, a fine of 0.1% to 20% of gross revenue obtained in the fiscal year before the initiation of the proceedings.

  • For the manager, directly or indirectly responsible for the infraction, a fine of 1% to 20% of the fine applied to the convicted company.

  • For other individuals and non-corporate legal entities, a fine of BRL50,000 to BRL2 billion.

The Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence can also impose other penalties, such as:

  • The publication of the decision in a newspaper.

  • Prohibiting the convicted parties from entering into agreements with official financial institutions and taking part in public procurement bids for a certain period.

  • A prohibition to perform commercial activities for a certain period.

  • Divestment orders and compulsory licences of intellectual property rights.

Individuals involved in cartels are also subject to criminal prosecution. Penalties are imprisonment from two to five years and a fine. Despite the legal provisions, the criminal fine is rarely applied.

Third party damages claims

24. Can third parties claim damages for losses suffered as a result of abuse of market power? If so, what special procedures or rules (if any) apply? Are collective/class actions possible?

Third party damages

See Question 14.

Special procedures/rules

See Question 14.

Collective/class actions

See Question 14.

 

EU law

25. Are there any differences between the powers of the national regulatory authority(ies) and courts in relation to cases dealt with under Article 101 and/or Article 102 of the TFEU, and those dealt with only under national law?

Not applicable.

 

Joint ventures

26. How are joint ventures analysed under competition law?

Joint ventures can be defined as the association of two or more independent companies to form a new one, under common control.

Its constitution is subject to the Administrative Council for Economic Defence's (CADE) merger control, provided that the notification criteria are met.

 

Inter-agency co-operation

27. Does the regulatory authority in your jurisdiction co-operate with regulatory authorities in other jurisdictions in relation to infringements of competition law? If so, what is the legal basis for and extent of co-operation (in particular, in relation to the exchange of information)?

The Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) has established several agreements to co-operate with other jurisdictions, such as:

  • Argentina.

  • Canada.

  • Chile.

  • China.

  • Colombia.

  • The US.

  • Ecuador.

  • France.

  • Japan.

  • Korea.

  • Peru.

  • Portugal.

  • Russia.

  • The EU.

  • The Mercosur.

Additionally, agreements were signed with international institutions, such as:

  • The World Bank.

  • The Inter-American Development Bank.

The international co-operation agreements currently in force can be found at www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?2202020e12f033172912.

 

Recent cases

28. What are the recent developments, trends or notable recent cases concerning abuse of market power?

In May 2014, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) convicted six companies, six individuals and three organisations for participation in the so-called cement cartels that involved the biggest national cement producers, such as Votorantim Cimentos. The imposed fines collectively amount to BRL3.1 billion. Besides the fines, CADE imposed the divestment of concrete and cement manufacturing plants, a measure that was applied for the first time in cartel cases.

Recently, CADE has also convicted Raízen Combustíveis S.A. (former Shell Brasil Ltda.) for abuse of market power (price fixing) in the region of São Carlos. The fine imposed amounts to BRL31.7 million and was the second fine applied to the company in two years (the first one, in 2014, amounted to BRL26.5 million).

Another relevant recent case concerns the conclusion in July 2015 of a leniency agreement by the company Camargo Corrêa. The company recognised its participation in a cartel concerning the building of a nuclear facility in Angra 3. In August 2015, the same company was part of another leniency agreement, in which it recognised its participation in the cartel of public bids of Petrobras' contracts.

 

Proposals for reform

29. Are there any proposals for reform concerning restrictive agreements and market dominance?

Following the publication of its guidelines on gun jumping, on 9 August 2015, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) released the draft of its guidelines on anti-trust compliance. This movement reflects CADE's efforts to provide guidance to companies and other economic agents on the adoption of precautions and measures that can be implemented to avoid practices or other restrictive arrangements that may be considered anti-competitive.

Besides reputational and other benefits, the guidelines highlight that internal compliance programmes can also promote costs and contingencies reductions related to investigations, fines, and other adverse consequences of a conviction for anti-competitive practices, among other things.

Anti-trust compliance can be seen as a collection of internal measures adopted by an economic agent aimed at both:

  • Reducing or mitigating the risks of anti-competitive behaviour punishable under the anti-trust legislation.

  • Facilitating the identification of these practices when they occur.

According to the draft, an anti-trust compliance programme has the following main effects on companies:

  • Possibility of settling leniency and cease-and-desist commitments.

  • Submission of consultations to the Administrative Tribunal for Economic Defence and reduction of penalties.

The preliminary version of the guidelines is available at www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?b689996f869b70b346f3471a2e10.

 

Online resources

Council for Economic Defence (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica) (CADE)

W www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?b879bb44c847c960f354

Description. The website is in Portuguese, but includes the most relevant applicable legislation officially translated into English.

Secretary for Economic Monitoring (Secretária de Acompanhamento Econômico) (SEAE)

W www.seae.fazenda.gov.br

Description. The Secretariat for Economic Monitoring is responsible for promoting competition in government agencies and in society. SEAE's main responsibilities are set out in Article 19 of Law 12.529/2011.

Brazilian Institute for Economic Defence, Consumers and International Trade (Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos de Concorrência, Consumo e Comércio Internacional) (IBRAC)

W www.ibrac.org.br

Description. IBRAC is a non-profit private entity that aims to foster the development of research, studies and debates involving competition, consumer law issues and international trade. It maintains regular dialogue with government authorities, society and the community of professionals working with competition law in Brazil.

Brazilian System for protection of Competition (Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência) (SBDC)

W www.cade.gov.br and www.seae.fazenda.gov.br

Description. The SBDC consists of the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) and the Secretary for Economic Monitoring (SEAE) both within the Ministry of Finance.

 

The regulatory authority

Council for Economic Defence (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica) (CADE)

W www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx

Outline structure. The CADE consists of:

  • An Administrative Tribunal of Economic Defence.

  • A General Superintendence.

  • A Department of Economic Studies.

Responsibilities. The CADE is the regulatory authority responsible for the enforcement of the Brazilian Competition Law (Law No. 12.529 of 30 November 2011).

Procedure for obtaining documents. Most relevant documents, pursuant to the publicity law enforced by all government organisations, are available on CADE's website, via a special search mechanism. Legislation concerning CADE's authority are also available at the website. All documents can be accessed, with the exception of confidential documents and those related to cases subject to confidential treatment.

CADE's searching mechanism (Integrated Electronic System) (SEI) can be found at http://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/institucional/pesquisa/processo_pesquisar.php?acao_externa=protocolo_pesquisar&acao_origem_externa=protocolo_pesquisar&id_orgao_acesso_externo=0.

Secretary for Economic Monitoring (Secretaria de Acompanhamento Econômico) (SEAE)

W www.seae.fazenda.gov.br

Outline structure. The SEAE is composed of three specific divisions:

  • Sub-secretary of Economic Monitoring and Competition Law (Subsecretária de Análise Econômica e Advocacia da Concorrência) (SUCON).

  • Sub-secretary of Regulation and Infrastructure (Subsecretária de Regulação e Infra-Estrutura) (SUINFRA).

  • Sub-secretary of International Competition Law and Popular Economy Defences (Subsecretária de Concorrência Internacional e Defesa da Economia Popular) (SUDEP).

Responsibilities. The SEAE promotes competition in government agencies and in society and participates in the elaboration of norms regulating competition.

Procedure for obtaining documents. As a result of the obligations established by the Publicity Law (mainly the obligation of publicity of documents, which must be observed by government organisations), most relevant documents are available on SEAE's website (www1.seae.fazenda.gov.br/LITTERA/BuscaProcessos.aspx and www.seae.fazenda.gov.br/legislacao).



Contributor profiles

Leonardo Canabrava, Partner

Campos, Fialho, Canabrava, Borja, Andrade, Salles Advogados

T +55 31 4501 7796 / +55 11 4064-7016 / +55 31 9950-9609


E lcanabrava@camposfialho.com.br
W www.camposfialho.com.br

Professional qualifications. Brazil, lawyer

Areas of practice. Economic and competition law; arbitration; commercial contracts; project finance; infrastructure; complex litigation.

Languages. English, French

Professional associations/memberships. Member of CBar (Comitê Brasileiro de Arbitragem); member of CAMARB (Câmara de Arbitragem Empresarial); member of ICC (International Chamber of Commerce).

Lucas E.F.A. Spadano, Partner

Campos, Fialho, Canabrava, Borja, Andrade, Salles Advogados

T +55 11 4064 7013 / +55 11 99693-6253
E lspadano@camposfialho.com.br
W www.camposfialho.com.br

Professional qualifications. Brazil, lawyer

Areas of practice. Economic and competition law; mergers and acquisitions; international trade; foreign investment; intellectual property, technology and innovation.

Languages. English, Spanish

Professional associations/memberships. Member of CBar (Comitê Brasileiro de Arbitragem); member of CAMARB (Câmara de Arbitragem Empresarial); member of ICC (International Chamber of Commerce).

Bruno Herwig Rocha Augustin, Associate

Campos, Fialho, Canabrava, Borja, Andrade, Salles Advogados

T +55 31 4501-7828 / +55 31 9196-3850
E bruno.augustin@camposfialho.com.br
W www.camposfialho.com.br

Professional qualifications. Brazil, lawyer

Areas of practice. Economic and competition law; international trade.

Languages. English, German

Professional associations/memberships. Brazilian Bar.

Bruno Alves Delpupo, Associate

Campos, Fialho, Canabrava, Borja, Andrade, Salles Advogados

T +55 31 4501 785 / +55 31 7337 9996
E bruno.delpupo@camposfialho.com.br
W www.camposfialho.com.br

Professional qualifications. Brazil, lawyer

Areas of practice. Economic and competition law; international trade.

Languages. English, German

Professional associations/memberships. Brazilian Bar.


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