SIAC has had a particularly busy year, clearly demonstrating its continued efforts to develop best practices in international arbitration. Early in 2015, it issued a new practice note on the appointment of administrative secretaries in all SIAC-administered arbitrations appointed on or after 2 February 2015, which includes guidance on the consent to the appointment of secretaries, the independence, impartiality and confidentiality of secretaries, and their fees and expenses (see Legal update, SIAC issues practice note on the appointment of administrative secretaries).

In September, SIAC announced the establishment of the SIAC Users Council and amended its model arbitration clause, and its expedited procedure model clause, to include a reference to the seat of arbitration (see Legal updates, SIAC establishes users council and SIAC amends model clause). In December, it followed up with news of the formation of regional and national committees to coordinate and liaise with members of the SIAC Users Council (see Legal update, SIAC forms regional and national committees).

SIAC also formally commenced the process of reviewing its Arbitration Rules this year (see Legal update, SIAC commences revisions of its arbitration rules). Substantive changes are being considered, including rules on multiple contracts, consolidation and joinder, and improvements to the emergency arbitrator and expedited procedures. The new rules are expected to be launched at the end of May 2016 (see Practical Law Arbitration: What to expect: tracker).

On 1 January 2015, the CIETAC Arbitration Rules 2015 entered into force, including a new emergency arbitrator procedure and new provisions for Hong Kong arbitration, as well as an enhanced consolidation procedure and a new joinder provision (see Legal update, CIETAC Arbitration Rules 2015 in force). However, the real highlight of the year for CIETAC came in July, when the Supreme People's Court in China (SPC) issued a binding judicial interpretation on how lower courts are to handle various issues arising out of the CIETAC split (SPC Reply), putting an end to the uncertainty on jurisdiction issues arising from the CIETAC split (for background information on the CIETAC split, see Practice note, A guide to the CIETAC Arbitration Rules (2015)). The SPC Reply clarifies the jurisdiction of the relevant arbitration commissions where the parties have agreed to submit their disputes to the "CIETAC Shanghai sub-commission" or the "CIETAC South China sub-commission" (see Legal update, SPC clarifies jurisdiction issues arising from CIETAC split).

Following a particularly active 2014, the HKIAC has had a quieter 2015, with only two noteworthy developments. On 1 January 2015, the HKIAC launched new procedures for administering UNCITRAL cases, while in November it announced the opening of a new representative office in Shanghai (see Legal updates, HKIAC launches new procedures for administering UNCITRAL cases and A new beginning for arbitration in mainland China: HKIAC opens in Shanghai.

In January 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) and the government of the People's Republic of China signed a Host Country Agreement and related Memorandum of Administrative Arrangements, which resulted in the establishment in Hong Kong of a legal framework under which PCA-administered arbitrations can be conducted in Hong Kong on an ad hoc basis, without the need for a physical presence of the PCA in Hong Kong.

In June 2015, in an effort to facilitate the timely conduct of arbitrations under the LCIA Arbitration Rules, the LCIA issued new guidance notes for arbitrators and parties, and notes on emergency procedures (see Legal update, New LCIA guidance notes).

In November, the LCIA released data showing the average costs and duration of an LCIA arbitration (see Legal update, LCIA releases data on average costs and duration of LCIA proceedings). This came hot on the heels of the QMUL/White & Case 2015 International Arbitration Survey, which revealed a desire on the part of arbitration users for greater transparency by the institutions regarding the duration of arbitration proceedings (see further QMUL 2015 International Arbitration Survey, below). It will be interesting to see if other institutions will follow this example in the forthcoming months.

In October, the ICC Court announced that it may now give reasons for certain administrative decisions taken under the ICC Rules of Arbitration, including decisions on arbitrator challenges (see Legal update, ICC Court may give reasons for administrative decisions). The new policy, which became effective immediately in new and ongoing arbitrations where all parties to a case agree, is also aligned with the results of the QMUL/White & Case 2015 International Arbitration Survey, which highlighted a perceived need for greater transparency of institutional decision-making in the sphere of arbitrator appointments and challenges (see QMUL 2015 International Arbitration Survey below).

This year also saw the launch of the ICC new expert rules and the re-launch of the ICC UK Arbitration and ADR committee to be chaired by John Beechey, former President of the ICC Court (see Legal updates, ICC's new expert rules enter into force and ICC UK relaunches Arbitration and ADR committee).

2015 not only marked the CIArb's 100th anniversary but also an especially active year for the institute. In July, at the CIArb's London Centenary Conference, a draft of the CIArb London Centenary Principles was launched and debated. Subsequently published in August, the Principles identify the characteristics of an efficient, effective and "safe" seat of arbitration. They set out desirable standards as regards the law, the judiciary, legal expertise, education, right of representation, accessibility and safety, facilities, ethics, enforceability, and arbitrator immunity (see Legal updates, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators launches London Principles and Chartered Institute of Arbitrators publishes CIArb London Centenary Principles).

On 1 December 2015, the new CIArb Arbitration Rules 2015 came into force. Unlike their predecessor, the new rules apply to both international and domestic arbitration (rather than only applying to arbitration in England, Wales or Northern Ireland), and are based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010, with some modifications (see Legal update, CIArb launches new arbitration rules and announces collaboration with KLRCA).

The CIArb also reviewed and republished three Guidelines this year, relating to jurisdictional challenges, applications for interim measures and applications for security for costs (see Legal update, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators publishes three new Practice Guidelines).

On 16 February 2015, a new DIFC Court Practice Direction, which enables the conversion of DIFC Court judgments into DIFC-LCIA arbitral awards, entered into force. The Practice Direction, renamed "Referral of Judgment Payment Disputes to Arbitration", is recognised globally as the first of its kind (see Legal update, DIFC Practice Direction No. 2 of 2015 comes into force).

On 18 November 2015, It was announced that the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre had been restructured to address concerns raised in relation to the jurisdictional reach of DIFC-LCIA arbitrations. Under the revised structure, the centre will operate parallel to, and completely independently from, the DIFC courts and the supervision of the arbitration proceedings will remain vested in the LCIA Court (see Legal update, DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre restructures).

In EDF International S/A v YPF S/A and Endesa Lationoamérica S/A, Challenge of Enforcement of Foreign Award n. 5.782-AR, the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) refused to enforce an ICC award that had been set aside by the national courts of Argentina, the seat of the arbitration. The STJ unanimously denied enforcement holding, among other things, that recognition of the award should be refused in accordance with Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, read in conjunction with Article 38, VI of the Brazilian Arbitration Act. This decision is the first time the Brazilian courts have ruled on this issue, notably taking a different stance to the courts in Belgium, Austria and France, which have decided to recogonise and enforce arbitral awards even though they have been set aside by the court at the seat of arbitration.

For detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, Brazilian Superior Court of Justice refuses to recognise arbitral award set aside at seat of arbitration.

In Malicorp Ltd v Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and others [2015] EWHC 361(Comm), the Commercial Court set aside an order enforcing a New York Convention award. Walker J found that he was bound to treat as final and binding a previous decision of the Cairo Court of Appeal that had set the award aside, despite a pending appeal. He also found that the respondent had been unable to present its case in the arbitration, which provided a further ground for refusing enforcement.

The decision stands as a reminder that the fact that a foreign judgment is subject to a pending appeal will not, of itself, prevent the English court from recognising it as a final decision. It also includes some interesting discussion of the extent of the court's discretion to enforce and the proper approach to determining whether a respondent was able to put its case in the underlying arbitral proceedings.

For detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, Court refuses to enforce New York Convention award set aside at seat (Commercial Court).

In Trust Risk Group SpA v AmTrust Europe Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 437, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal and ruled that two connected agreements remained subject to the separate dispute resolution procedures that each contained, notwithstanding the "one-stop, one jurisdiction" presumption formulated in Fiona Trust and Holding Corporation v Primalov [2007] UKHL 40. The court was able to distinguish this case from the Fiona Trust "one-stop" presumption, as the two agreements had been entered into at different times.

Although this case is based on established principles, it demonstrates the difficulties that may arise where there are separate but related agreements between the same parties that include different dispute resolution clauses. The decision shows the limits of the Fiona Trust "one-stop, one jurisdiction" presumption, and gives helpful guidance for determining jurisdiction over complex multi-party, multi-contract arrangements. For further discussion, see Legal update, Court of Appeal decides that two connected agreements are subject to separate dispute resolution procedures.

In Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 13 May 2015, n° 13-17751, the French Cour de cassation (Supreme Court) overturned a Versailles Court of Appeal judgment ordering the discharge of attachments, obtained by a Congolese company (Commissions Import Export SA) (Commisimpex)), of a number of bank accounts held by the Republic of the Congo in France.

This latest decision in the long-running saga between Congo and Commisimpex heralds a significant change in the French courts' approach to questions of sovereign immunity. In recent years, the French courts have tended to adopt a stricter approach to waivers of immunity from execution, with the suggestion being that any waiver had to be both express and specific. However, the Supreme Court here found that "customary international law does not require a waiver of immunity from execution [that is anything] other than express", thereby appearing to abandon the requirement that the waiver be "specific", and to simply require that it be express. This represents a potentially significant development in French law in this area and may indicate the adoption of a more flexible approach to questions of sovereign immunity.

The case will now be reheard by the Paris Court of Appeal.

For detailed discussion on this case, see Legal update, French Supreme Court decision in Commisimpex dispute heralds significant change in approach to sovereign immunity.

In Cass. Civ. 1re, 8 juillet 2015 , n° 13-25.846, the Cour de Cassation (French Supreme Court) held that the enforcement of a foreign award, which involved a public procurement contract, fell within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, rather than the administrative courts.

The Paris Court of Appeal had ruled that the parties' agreements were public procurement contracts and that, therefore, the administrative courts had exclusive jurisdiction over an application for enforcement of the award. Its decision followed a ruling by the Conseil d'Etat (the highest administrative court in France), concerning the same dispute, that the administrative courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement of a foreign award involving contracts subject to French administrative law's mandatory rules.

The Supreme Court overturned the Paris Court of Appeal decision and ordered the case to be re-heard by the Versailles Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court expressly rejected the Conseil d'Etat's analysis, which means that France's highest ordinary and administrative courts have now issued conflicting decisions regarding the enforcement of foreign awards relating to certain public law contracts. This has given rise to uncertainty, including as to whether parties should seek enforcement in the ordinary or administrative courts.

For detailed discussion about the decision, see Legal update, Enforcement of foreign award involving public procurement contract falls within jurisdiction of the ordinary courts (France Supreme Court).

In January 2015, we reported on the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main decision in Docket No. 26 SchH 3/13, in which the court dismissed an application by Slovakia to have a EUR22 million arbitral award in favour of Dutch insurer, Achmea (formerly Eureko BV) (PCA Case No. 2008-13, UNCITRAL) set aside. The court confirmed its earlier decision of 10 May 2012, that the arbitration clause in the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between the Netherlands and Slovakia was valid and did not violate EU law. The court also rejected Slovakia's submission that the arbitral tribunal had violated its right to be heard when determining the amount of damages.

The saga regarding German judicial review of the so-called intra-EU jurisdictional objection continues, as Slovakia has appealed this decision to the Federal Court of Justice (see Practical Law Arbitration: What to expect: tracker: Germany: Eureko BV and the Slovak Republic).

For a detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt confirms damages award in dispute between investor and EU member state.

On 15 January 2015, in Docket No U 11140/14 Kart, the Higher Regional Court of Munich found that it is competent to decide on the claim by German ice speed skater, Claudia Pechstein, for damages of EUR4 million against the International Skating Union (ISU) in relation to her doping ban. The court found that the arbitration agreement concluded between Pechstein and the ISU was invalid because it violated mandatory anti-trust law. The court further held that the arbitral award issued by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) confirming the doping ban was not enforceable in Germany, because it was based on the arbitration agreement that was in violation of mandatory anti-trust law.

The ISU has appealed the decision to the Federal Court of Justice. If the Federal Court of Justice confirms the decision, it will have far-reaching consequences for sports arbitration and may make reform of the CAS inevitable.

For a detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, Higher Regional Court of Munich decides that arbitration agreements for athletes are invalid and CAS arbitral award is not enforceable.

In China International Fund Ltd v Dennis Lau & Ng Chun Man Architects & Engineers (HK) Ltd v Secretary for Justice (HCMP 2472/2014), the Hong Kong Court of Appeal confirmed the position on the limited right to appeal in arbitration cases. The court held that, on a proper construction of sections 81(4) and 84(3) of the Arbitration Ordinance, only the Court of First Instance (CFI) (and not the Court of Appeal) has the power to grant leave to appeal against a decision on set-aside or enforcement of arbitral awards. Although section 81(4) therefore constitutes a restriction of the power of final adjudication vested in the Court of Final Appeal under Article 82 of the Basic Law, that restriction is necessary to achieve legitimate aims.

The Court of Appeal further held that, notwithstanding the apparent finality of section 81(4), it retains a residual jurisdiction to supervise the process in the CFI in cases of refusal of leave, and to provide redress. However, this jurisdiction will only be invoked in extreme situations.

This decision is likely to be the authority on the constitutionality of the relevant statutory provisions of the Arbitration Ordinance and the Court of Appeal's residual jurisdiction in the appeal process in arbitration cases. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, Hong Kong Court of Appeal upholds Arbitration Ordinance limits on rights of appeal.

In Z v A [2015] HKEC 289, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance refused to set aside a partial award for lack of jurisdiction, where the arbitration clause provided for International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration "in China" and the ICC determined that the seat was Hong Kong.

In the face of the conflicting expert evidence on PRC law, the court concluded there is a risk that an ICC award made in mainland China may not be enforceable in mainland China. By contrast, the experts agreed that an ICC award made in Hong Kong would be enforceable both in Hong Kong and mainland China, as well as other countries that are party to the New York Convention. Given that the parties must have intended to enter into an arbitration agreement that could result in a final, binding and enforceable award, the court preferred the construction that the arbitration was to take place in Hong Kong, and held that the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute.

While the uncertainty continues, parties should avoid clauses that provide for arbitration in mainland China administered by any non-Chinese institution, and make sure that their clauses are drafted clearly and precisely, to leave no doubt as to the parties' intentions. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, Hong Kong Court considers arbitration clauses providing for ICC arbitration in China.

There have been two significant decisions regarding third party funding issues in 2015. In Muhammet Cap and another v Turkmenistan (ICSID Case No ARB/12/6), (Procedural Order No. 3), an ICSID tribunal ordered the claimants to confirm whether they had entered into a third party funding arrangement to finance their claims, and if so, to disclose the terms of the arrangement. Having previously refused to grant such an order, the tribunal was persuaded to do so on this occasion, to determine whether there were any conflicts of interest for the arbitrators caused by the existence of a third party funder and also because Turkmenistan was considering an application for security for costs. This appears to have been the first time such an order has been made in ICSID arbitration (see further Legal update, ICSID tribunal orders disclosure of third party funding arrangement).

In the second decision, EuroGas Inc and Belmont Resources Inc v Slovak Republic (ICSID Case No ARB/14/14) (Procedural Order No. 3), an ICSID tribunal refused the respondent state's application for security for costs, under Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2006 (see Legal update, Presence of third party funding does not of itself justify security for costs order (ICSID)). The decision confirms that security for costs orders are the exception, even where the claimants have third party funding. The tribunal recognised that, while third party funding has become a common practice, presence of third party funding alone does not justify security for costs. This will provide reassurance to parties and practitioners who feared that the 2014 decision in RSM Production Corporation v Saint Lucia (ICSID Case No ARB/12/10) had opened the way to security for costs being granted as a matter of course in cases where there are third party funders (see Legal update, ICSID tribunal orders security for costs for further details on RSM v St Lucia).

In November 2015, an ICSID ad hoc committee issued its long-awaited decision on Ecuador's request for annulment of the US$1.77 billion award issued against it (at the time the largest award made by an ICSID tribunal under a bilateral investment treaty(BIT)). The committee unanimously decided to partially annul the award on the ground of manifest excess of powers under Article 52(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention.

The committee annulled the part of the award on which the original tribunal had been divided, namely, the assessment of damages (see Legal update, Occidental: tribunal split on approach to assessment of quantum (ICSID)). Ecuador alleged that the damages should be reduced by 40% to reflect the fact that the claimants only owned 60% of the investment as a result of its illegal assignment of 40% of its interest to a third party without prior authorisation. Agreeing with the dissenting arbitrator, the ad hoc committee found that the tribunal had wrongly assumed jurisdiction with regard to part of the claimants' investment beneficially owned by the third party. Accordingly, it reduced the claimants' damages award by 40%, the largest reduction by an ad hoc committee. The committee rejected all the other grounds of Ecuador's application for annulment.

The decision reinforces the strict limits of ICSID's jurisdiction over parties to the relevant BIT and to the arbitration. It should also serve as a reminder to claimants to consider carefully the benefits (or otherwise) of entering into agreements with non-claimant partners to handover any percentage of damages awarded.

For detailed discussion about the annulment decision, see Legal update, Occidental v Ecuador annulment decision: full update (ICSID).

2015 saw the first two cases to apply the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-state Arbitration (Transparency Rules), which came into force in April 2014 (see Legal update, UNCITRAL Transparency Rules in force 1 April 2014). The first case was Iberdrola, SA and another v Bolivia (PCA Case No 2015-05), in which the tribunal issued the first procedural order (only available in Spanish) in August 2015 disclosing the fact that the parties to the arbitration had agreed to the application of the Transparency Rules.

This was followed in September 2015 by BSG Resources Limited v Republic of Guinea (ICSID Case No ARB/14/22) Procedural Order No 2 on Transparency (September 17, 2015), which also disclosed that the parties had agreed to the application of the Transparency Rules (see Legal update, ICSID tribunal applies UNCITRAL Transparency Rules).

The Transparency Rules can be applied to non-UNCITRAL proceedings, such as arbitrations administered by ICSID and, where not provided for in investment treaties, by agreement between the parties. The ICSID regime also permits the parties to agree to a greater level of transparency than that provided for in the ICSID Rules and the ICSID Convention. In BSG Resources, the tribunal ordered the application of the Transparency Rules subject to certain amendments requested by the parties. In both cases, it was the parties' consent to the application of the Transparency Rules that allowed the procedural orders themselves to be made public, serving as a useful guide to future users of investor state arbitration.

(See also Mauritius Convention on Transparency, above.)

It is reported that on 17 December 2015, a tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration decided it did not have jurisdiction to hear Philip Morris Asia's (PMA) challenge to Australia's Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011. PMA had brought its claim against Australia under the Hong-Kong Australia BIT and the arbitration was conducted under the UNCITRAL Rules 2010 (see PCA: Philip Morris Asia Limited (Hong Kong) v The Commonwealth of Australia). PMA argued that the legislation expropriated its investment and that it was not accorded fair and equitable treatment. Australia raised three procedural objections. Two of these were heard in an initial phase as a result of the tribunal's decision to grant Australia's request to bifurcate the proceedings. At the time of writing, the tribunal's award on jurisdiction and admissibility has not yet been published. However, we understand that it will be made available on the PCA website once the award has been redacted by the parties to comply with the confidentiality obligations in an earlier procedural order. The award deals with Australia's objections that:

In August 2015, Stans Energy and Kutisay Mining failed in their appeal of the Moscow Commercial Court's May 2015 decision setting aside an arbitral award issued under the rules of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI).

In the arbitration, the tribunal had granted the investors' claim against the Kyrgyz Republic for compensation for an expropriated investment. The Moscow Commercial Court set aside the award and found (among other things) that an earlier decision of the Economic Court of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which held that Article 11 of the Moscow Convention is insufficient to establish a state's agreement to arbitration, was binding. It also gave an interpretation of Article 235 of the Civil Procedure Code, finding that it does not require that jurisdictional orders be issued in a specific form in order for them to be appealed (see Legal update, Moscow Commercial Court sets aside arbitral award and provides interpretation of Article 11 of Moscow Convention).

The Commercial Court of the Moscow Region (Court of Cassation) found that the lower court's decision did not violate any provisions of substantive or procedural law. It upheld the reasoning of the lower court, in particular, that the appellants had brought a claim in arbitration without Kyrgyzstan's consent and there was no valid agreement to arbitrate, so the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan had sovereign immunity and could not be forced to arbitrate.

The Court of Cassation also held that the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (Convention) applied in Russia, despite the fact that Russia had not ratified it, because the Convention constitutes the "general principles of civilised nations", which are part of international law.

It is reported that the appellants appealed the Court of Cassation's decision in September 2015. However, at the time of writing the Supreme Court had not yet issued a judgment. It is also understood that in May 2015, Stans Energy brought fresh arbitral proceedings against Kyrgystan under the UNCITRAL Rules.

For detailed discussion about this decision, see Legal update, Stans Energy and Kutisay unsuccessfully challenge Commercial Court of Moscow decision.

In a landmark decision, PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK v CRW Joint Operation [2015] SGCA 30, the Singapore Court of Appeal confirmed that an interim award, enforcing a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) decision under the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Construction 1999, was final and binding as regards the need for prompt compliance with the DAB's decision. Therefore, it could be enforced as an interim or partial award under section 19 of the Singapore International Arbitration Act.

For a detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, Singapore Court of Appeal rules on enforceability of DAB decisions through international arbitration.

In Tomolugen Holdings Ltd and another v Silicia Investors Ltd [2015] SGCA 57, the Singapore Court of Appeal confirmed that disputes over minority oppression and unfairly prejudicial conduct are arbitrable. This is despite the fact that arbitrators cannot order relief that binds third parties (such as winding-up), as well as the complexities that arise from multiple proceedings involving common, but not identical, issues and parties.

In light of this decision, complications may arise where (as was the case in this dispute) shareholders who are party to an arbitration agreement, on the one hand, and directors, shareholders and other parties who are not party to the arbitration agreement, on the other hand, are embroiled in a dispute. In such cases, there is a significant risk that arbitration and court proceedings will overlap. Parties should therefore carefully consider their dispute resolution options when entering into shareholders' agreements and share purchase agreements.

For a detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, Setting the stage: selecting suitable stadia for shareholder battles (Singapore Court of Appeal).

In Decision 4A_34/2015, the Swiss Supreme Court rejected Hungary's petition to set aside an award, rendered under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), in which it was ordered to pay damages of EUR107 million to the investor.

The case raised several innovative and complex points regarding jurisdiction and public policy. In particular, the Swiss Supreme Court dismissed Hungary's argument that the arbitral tribunal had wrongly accepted jurisdiction, finding instead that the arbitral tribunal had correctly considered that the investor's claim was a "treaty claim" based on the fair and equitable treatment standard set out in the ECT, as opposed to a contract claim falling under the so-called "umbrella clause" in the ECT, for which Hungary had withheld its consent to arbitration. The Supreme Court also found that the arbitral tribunal did not breach the principle of equal treatment and Hungary's right to be heard by relying on the investor's expert report on damages, which contained underlying data to which Hungary had not had access.

The Swiss Supreme Court also dismissed Hungary's argument that the award obliged it to breach its international obligations arising under the ECT and was, as a result, contrary to the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) and, therefore, contrary to public policy.

For a detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, Swiss Supreme Court rejects Hungary's application to set aside award under Energy Charter Treaty.

In decision 4A_709/2014, the Swiss Supreme Court tackled the use of tribunal-appointed "consultants" and the role of administrative secretaries in international arbitration for the first time. It found that arbitrators are entitled, as a matter of principle, to rely on the assistance of consultants and administrative secretaries as long as they do not delegate their core decision-making functions.

While the decision is in line with international opinion, the exact scope of such "core functions" is still subject to debate. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, Swiss Supreme Court outlines permissible use of administrative secretaries and "consultants" to arbitral tribunals.

In 2015, the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) courts handed down several decisions confirming that the DIFC courts have jurisdiction to recognise and ratify domestic, onshore (non-DIFC) and foreign arbitral awards, even where there are no relevant assets within the DIFC against which to enforce an arbitral award.

In A v B (ARB002/2014), the claimants applied to the DIFC courts to recognise and ratify a Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) award, and in XX (1) X1 (2) v (1) Y1 (2) Y2, the claimants applied to the DIFC courts to recognise and enforce a London Maritime Arbitrators Association (LMAA) award. In both cases, the defendants objected on various grounds, including that they had no assets within the DIFC. Again in both cases, the court rejected the defendants' objections and held (among other things) that the absence of assets within the DIFC was no bar to enforcement.

The decisions confirmed the DIFC courts' role as a potential conduit for the enforcement of arbitral awards (both domestic and foreign) in the courts of onshore Dubai, where the award debtor's assets are located onshore. On successful recognition of an award by the DIFC courts, the award creditor can take advantage of the automatic referral for execution provisions, whereby (subject to certain formalities) the onshore Dubai courts will execute an award as ratified by the DIFC courts.

For a detailed discussion of these cases, see Article, DIFC courts' approach to enforcement: foreign and domestic arbitral awards and foreign judgments.

In In re Sussex, 781 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2015), the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took the rare step of granting a writ of mandamus and vacated the district court's decision to remove an arbitrator for conflict of interest. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that court intervention mid-arbitration should occur only in extreme cases, and that the case below was "emphatically" not an extreme case. The appellate court granted Sussex's writ of mandamus, vacating the district court's decision to remove the arbitrator for conflict of interest. It found that the district court's intervention was clearly erroneous as a matter of law because:

The Ninth Circuit's decision restricting a district court's intervention mid-arbitration to only "extreme" cases is in line with decisions in the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and DC Circuits. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, District Court Erred by Intervening Mid-Arbitration: Ninth Circuit.

In Katz v Cellco P'ship, 794 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015), the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) mandates a stay of proceedings, instead of a discretionary dismissal, when claims are referred to arbitration. In settling the question of whether district courts have the discretion to dismiss an action after claims have been referred to arbitration or whether they must stay the proceedings, the Second Circuit joined the US Courts of Appeals for the Third, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that a stay must be entered after claims are referred to arbitration. By contrast, the US Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have suggested that district courts have discretion to dismiss.

The FAA explicitly denies the right to an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that compels arbitration or stays proceedings, but the dismissal of an arbitrable matter effectively converts an otherwise unappealable interlocutory stay order into an appealable final dismissal order. The court also noted that efficient docket management is not a valid reason to trump the statutory mandate in the FAA. Finding that the FAA requires a stay of proceedings when all the claims have been referred to arbitration and a stay has been requested, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part for further proceedings in the district court.

For a detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, Federal Arbitration Act Requires a Stay of Proceedings When All Claims are Referred to Arbitration: Second Circuit.

On 14 December 2015, in DIRECTV, Inc. v Imburgia 2015 (WL 8546242 (S. Ct. Dec. 14, 2015), the US Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted the California Court of Appeal's interpretation of a class arbitration waiver.

The California Court of Appeal had found the class action waiver unenforceable despite AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). It had reasoned that, by including the terms "law of your state" in the arbitration agreement, the parties selected California law to govern the contract, even if it was invalid. Therefore, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of DIRECTV's motion to enforce the arbitration provision and the California Supreme Court denied review. However, on the same issue, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in Murphy v DirecTV, Inc, 724 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013)), and as a result, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeal's decision, focusing on whether the state decision was consistent with the FAA, not whether the court's decision was a correct statement of California law. The Court held that the California Court of Appeal's interpretation of the phrase "law of your state" did not give due regard to the federal policy favouring arbitration and was, therefore, preempted by the FAA. As such, the California Court of Appeal must enforce the class action waiver contained in the arbitration agreement.

For more detailed discussion of this case, see Legal update, Supreme Court Finds Against California State Courts' Interpretation of Class Action Waiver.