Tenth Circuit: Private Party Not Entitled to Interlocutory Appeal of Court's Denial of Parker Immunity | Practical Law

Tenth Circuit: Private Party Not Entitled to Interlocutory Appeal of Court's Denial of Parker Immunity | Practical Law

In Auraria Student Housing at the Regency, LLC v. Campus Village Apartments, LLC, the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, joining an existing circuit split, held that the denial of Parker immunity, also known as state action immunity, is not immediately appealable by private parties in antitrust actions.

Tenth Circuit: Private Party Not Entitled to Interlocutory Appeal of Court's Denial of Parker Immunity

by PLC Litigation and PLC Antitrust
Published on 08 Jan 2013USA (National/Federal)
In Auraria Student Housing at the Regency, LLC v. Campus Village Apartments, LLC, the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, joining an existing circuit split, held that the denial of Parker immunity, also known as state action immunity, is not immediately appealable by private parties in antitrust actions.
The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued an opinion on January 4, 2013, in Auraria Student Housing at the Regency, LLC v. Campus Village Apartments, LLC, holding that the district court's denial of Parker immunity, or state action immunity, is not immediately appealable by a private party, as it did not constitute a final order.
Auraria Student Housing at the Regency LLC sued Campus Village alleging that an agreement between the University of Colorado, Denver and Campus Village monopolized student housing near the University in violation of the Sherman Act. Campus Village moved to dismiss arguing it was subject to Parker immunity. While Parker immunity typically shields anticompetitive activities conducted by a state, its officers or agents from the Sherman Act, courts have extended the immunity to private parties under certain circumstances. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, and Campus Village filed this interlocutory appeal. Regency moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appellate court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the district court's denial of Campus Village's motion to dismiss was not a final order. Campus Village argued that the appellate court had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.
There is a circuit split on the issue of whether the denial of Parker immunity to a state or its officers or agents can be reviewed by an appellate court in an interlocutory appeal. However, this split is less distinct when considering the specific issue presented in this case: whether the denial of Parker immunity is immediately appealable by private parties. For instance, while the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit extends interlocutory review to denials of Parker immunity, it does not do so in cases in which private parties are claiming the immunity. In this case, the court accepted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit that the justifications for affording immediate review of the denial of Parker immunity to governmental entities are inapplicable to private parties. These justifications include:
  • Protecting a state's dignitary and public interests.
  • Allowing public officials to perform their duties without fear of litigation.
Rejecting the contrary view of the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit held that immediate review of the district court's denial of Parker immunity was not available to Campus Village. Because the order denying Campus Village's motion to dismiss was not an appealable final order, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal.
Court documents: