On September 27, 2013, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in Abdullah v. U.S. Security Associates, Inc., affirming the district court's certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3), of a sub-class of former and current employees who worked more than six hours without a meal break and were not compensated for the meal break. The Ninth Circuit held that under California labor law, the employee's claims will fulfill the requirements of FRCP 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3) because:

Muhammed Abdullah is a former employee of USSA, a private security guard company. As a condition of employment, all USSA employees are required to sign "on-duty meal period agreements" which require them to voluntarily agree to an on-duty meal period for which they would be compensated. After five hours worked, the following waiver applies:

The employees sought to certify a class of themselves and all others similarly situated, alleging that USSA violated the California wage and hour laws, including by requiring them to work through meal periods, a violation of Section 226.7 of the California Labor Code and the applicable IWC Wage Order.

Under FRCP 23(b)(3), the district court certified the class and seven sub-classes including the meal-break sub-class, defined as former and current employees who:

The district court determined that certifying this sub-class was appropriate because of:

USSA moved for reconsideration which was denied. USSA then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, challenging the district court's certification of the meal break sub-class on the grounds that the employees did not establish:

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by certifying the meal break sub-class. The Ninth Circuit found that, under California labor law, the employee's claims will fulfill the requirements of FRCP 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3) because:

The Ninth Circuit first analyzed whether the employees had satisfied FRCP 23(a)(2), noting that this analysis would also be relevant to FRCP 23(b)(3) because there is substantial overlap between the two tests. The Ninth Circuit began its Rule 23(a)(2) analysis by looking to state law to determine whether the employee's claims, and USSA's affirmative defenses, can "yield a common answer that is apt to drive the resolution of the litigation." Meal breaks in California are regulated by Section 226.7(a) of the California Labor Code and Wage Order No. 4-2001, which guarantees certain employees a 30-minute meal break for every five hours of work. The Ninth Circuit considered the question of whether USSA can defeat class certification by invoking the "nature of the work" exception to this requirement. The Ninth Circuit first considered the substantive scope of duties that could qualify for the "nature of the work" exception. While California state courts have not addressed this exception, the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), has issued opinion letters on its applicability. The opinion letters provide guidance on what an employer must show to invoke the "nature of the work" exception, including:

Further, the DLSE opinion letters provide the following examples of situations that DLSE found to have satisfied the exception:

The Ninth Circuit clarified that the "nature of the work" exception would not apply to late-night shift managers at fast-food restaurants because other employees are on duty who could cover.

Next, the Ninth Circuit considered two recent state court decisions (Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court and Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc.) which addressed policies similar to the policy in this case, to guide its analysis of the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). In Brinker, the California Supreme Court clarified issues of significance to class actions generally and to meal and rest break class actions in particular. In Brinker, as in this case, there was a uniform meal break policy which "measured against wage order requirements, allegedly violates the law" the court held was "by its nature a common question eminently suited for class treatment."

Faulkinbury, like the immediate case, also dealt with private security guards whose employer required them to take paid, on-duty meal breaks, and to sign an agreement agreeing to such breaks. In Faulkinbury, the California Court of Appeal applied Brinker, rejected the defendant's argument that the "nature of the work" exception applied and concluded that "by requiring blanket off-duty meal break waivers in advance from all security guard employees, regardless of the working conditions at a particular station, the defendant itself treated the off-duty meal break issues on a class wide basis."

In light of the DLSE opinion letters, Brinker and Faulkinbury, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the employee's claims "will yield a common answer that will drive the resolution of the litigation." Therefore, it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that FRCP 23(a)(2) was satisfied.

Next, the Ninth Circuit considered FRCP 23(b)(3), which considers whether questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit concluded that:

Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that: