The US Supreme Court held that a decision on the merits is a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and appealable, even if there is an unresolved motion for attorneys' fees and costs pending. The result is the same regardless of whether the fees and costs are sought under a statute or a contract.

Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund of the International Union of Operating Engineers & Participating Employers involved a suit against an employer for failure to make contributions to union-affiliated benefit funds as required under ERISA and the parties' collective bargaining agreement (134 S. Ct. 773 (2014)). Following the district court's judgment on the merits on June 17, 2011 and award of attorneys' fees to the funds on July 25, 2011, the funds appealed both decisions. The employer argued that the appeal was untimely as to the June decision.

The First Circuit held that the June decision did not address the totality of the damages and was not a final decision. It reasoned that the right to recover attorneys' fees and costs stemmed from the parties' contract, which provided for the payment of attorneys' fees as an element of damages in the event of a breach. In reversing this ruling, the Supreme Court relied on its prior decision in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., and noted that fee awards do not remedy the injury giving rise to the action and are generally not treated as part of the merits judgment.

This decision resolved a conflict in the circuit courts over whether an unresolved issue of attorneys' fees based on a contract prevents a judgment on the merits from being final, thereby triggering the time to appeal.

See Legal Update, Supreme Court: Judgment on Merits Final Despite Outstanding Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs under Contract for more on this decision.

See Standard Document, Notice of Appeal (Federal) for a model notice of appeal that may be used to commence an appeal as of right in a civil action in federal district court, with explanatory notes and drafting tips.

Practitioners should be aware of a recent decision in the Ninth Circuit holding that classifications based on sexual orientation merit heightened scrutiny and that a party's peremptory strike against a potential juror based on sexual orientation violates the equal protection clause of the US Constitution.

The underlying claim in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories involved a licensing agreement between the parties and the pricing of HIV medication. During jury selection, the defendant used its first peremptory strike to eliminate the only juror who self-identified as gay. The plaintiff challenged the strike on the basis that it was impermissibly made on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Ninth Circuit found that the juror was improperly excluded and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that:

(740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).)

See Legal Update, Ninth Circuit: Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation Prohibited in Jury Selection for more on this decision.

See Legal Update, Supreme Court: DOMA Section 3 is Unconstitutional and Proposition 8 Proponents Lack Standing for more on the Windsor decision.

Practitioners should be mindful of the potential consequences of continuous discovery abuses. The Seventh Circuit recently held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering heightened sanctions and a $413 million default judgment against the defendants for their discovery violations.

In Domanus v. Lewicki, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the "drumbeat of discovery abuse" by the defendants, which included failure to produce relevant bank records, destruction of evidence and deposition-related abuses, led the district court to properly issue harsh sanctions and grant a default judgment. The Seventh Circuit found that the district judge did not abuse her discretion by holding that the magistrate judge erred in issuing more lenient sanctions, particularly given the defendants' overtly non-compliant behavior, discredited excuses and history of discovery violations.

Further, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's rejection of the defendants' argument that it was impossible to comply with the discovery orders, concluding that the defendants' efforts were neither extensive nor in good faith. (742 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2014).)

This decision demonstrates that where a magistrate judge has imposed somewhat lenient sanctions, objecting to the district court may result in heightened sanctions where the magistrate judge has clearly erred and more onerous sanctions are reasonably supported. Appellate courts, in turn, apply a great degree of deference to the district court's findings and affirm unless the defaulting party can demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

See Legal Update, Seventh Circuit Affirms $413 Million Dollar Default Judgment for Discovery Abuses for more on this decision.

See Spoliation Sanctions by US Circuit Court Chart for information on the sanctions each circuit court may impose depending on a party's culpability when relevant evidence was destroyed or lost.

The Ninth Circuit joined the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the scope of work product protection for expert materials is very narrow, applying only to draft expert reports and communications between experts and attorneys.

Both Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay and Republic of Ecuador v. Kelsh involved applications under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 seeking discovery from Chevron's expert witnesses for use in a foreign proceeding. Chevron argued that many of the documents at issue were protected from discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 26(b)(3).

The Ninth Circuit issued a joint decision affirming the district courts' rulings ordering Chevron to produce most of its withheld documents. The Ninth Circuit held that FRCP 26(b)(3) does not provide presumptive protection for all testifying expert materials as trial preparation materials. Analyzing the text and the historical context of FRCP 26(b)(3), the Ninth Circuit determined that:

(Nos. 12-15572, 12-15848, (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2014).)

See Legal Update, Ninth Circuit Joins Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in Narrowly Limiting Work Product Protection over Expert Materials for more on this decision.

See Article, Expert Q&A on the Rule 26 Amendments: Developing Case Law for more on expert discovery and the 2010 amendments to the FRCP and Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine Toolkit for a collection of resources to help counsel maneuver the various privilege and secrecy rules in the US.

The Eleventh Circuit recently held that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005's (CAFA's) $5 million amount in controversy requirement can be satisfied where the plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief.

In South Florida Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., South Florida Wellness, Inc. (Wellness) filed a putative class action in Florida state court seeking a declaration that the form language Allstate Insurance Co. (Allstate) used in the class members' personal injury protection insurance policies did not clearly and unambiguously indicate that it would limit payments to Florida's statutory fee schedule. After Allstate removed the case to federal court, Wellness moved to remand, arguing that the value of the declaratory relief was too speculative to satisfy CAFA's amount in controversy requirement.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision to remand the case. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the value of the declaratory relief must be "sufficiently measurable and certain," but absolute certainty is not required. Allstate established that the amount in controversy exceeded CAFA's $5 million threshold because:

(No. 14-10001, (11th Cir. Feb. 14, 2014).)

See Legal Update, Eleventh Circuit Holds Declaratory Judgment Action Satisfies CAFA for more on this decision.

See Practice Note, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA): Overview for more on CAFA jurisdiction.

Where a plaintiff cannot reasonably ascertain information supporting jurisdictional allegations at the pleading stage, it may be possible to make these allegations on information and belief in the Third, Seventh and Ninth Circuits. Counsel should be prepared to make at least some showing that the necessary information is within the defendants' control at the initial stages of the litigation.

In Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. v. Team Equipment, Inc., the plaintiff asserted diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as the basis for federal jurisdiction, even though it was unable to determine the citizenship of some of the defendants. As a result, the plaintiff made its jurisdictional allegations in the complaint on information and belief and did not specify the citizenship of certain defendants.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court should not have dismissed the plaintiff's original complaint without leave to amend, and held that a plaintiff may plead jurisdictional allegations on information and belief if information regarding the defendant's citizenship is not reasonably available to the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, where the plaintiff has made some showing that the necessary information was within the defendants' control, it was sufficient for the plaintiff simply to plead that the defendants were diverse to it. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the diversity issue is better addressed after the defendants have had an opportunity to respond to the complaint. (741 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2014).)

The Ninth Circuit joined the Third and Seventh Circuits in holding that a plaintiff should not necessarily be required to plead jurisdiction affirmatively based on actual knowledge at the commencement of proceedings.

See Legal Update, Ninth Circuit Holds Plaintiff May Plead Diversity Jurisdiction on Information and Belief for more on this decision.

See Standard Document, Complaint (Federal) for more on jurisdictional allegations and other considerations for drafting a federal complaint.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against McWane in 2012 in In the Matter of McWane, Inc. & Star Pipe Products, Ltd., asserting seven counts of anticompetitive conduct in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act in connection with the domestic ductile iron pipe fittings (DIPF) market. After reviewing the administrative law judge's opinion, the FTC dismissed six counts, finding in part that price signaling and other communications between McWane and its competitors were insufficient to establish a conspiracy.

Companies should not interpret the dismissal of the conspiracy claims against McWane as a green light to engage competitors in price signaling or exchanges of competitively sensitive information. The case is not a good predictor of future enforcement of competitor communications, as the two conspiracy counts against McWane resulted in a split among FTC Commissioners. When no majority vote is reached, there is no action, and the FTC dismissed the counts against McWane.

In the sole surviving claim, the FTC found that McWane had willfully excluded one of its competitors from the DIPF market. It reasoned that McWane:

Commissioner Wright dissented in a separate opinion on this issue. (No. 9351, (F.T.C. Jan. 30, 2014).)

Notably, the McWane decision ends the FTC staff's long winning streak in FTC administrative actions.

See Legal Update, After Review of ALJ Decision, FTC Issues Order in Its Case Against McWane, Inc. and Practice Note, Exclusive Dealing Arrangements for more on this decision and exclusive dealing arrangements.

See Practice Note, Competitor Collaborations in the US for more on competitor communications.

Consumers provide express consent under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) to receive telephone calls if they voluntarily provide their cell phone numbers when making online purchases, according to the US District Court for the Central District of California.

In Baird v. Sabre Inc., the plaintiff provided her cell phone number when she purchased tickets from an airline's website. Sabre, an independent contractor hired by the airline, sent the plaintiff a text message inviting her to reply "yes" to receive information regarding her flight. The plaintiff alleged that by sending her the text message, Sabre violated the TCPA, which proscribes using any automatic dialing system to call a consumer unless the consumer provides express consent.

Sabre moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff provided express consent when she voluntarily provided her telephone number to the airline. The plaintiff argued that she did not voluntarily provide her number because it was a requirement for completing the online purchase. The court granted the motion, applying the reasoning in a 1992 Federal Communications Commission ruling which held that by knowingly releasing their telephone numbers to a business, consumers provide express consent for the business to contact them at that number regarding their relationship with the business. (No. 13-999, (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014).)

Baird follows the logic and result of the majority of cases ruling on the TCPA's prior express consent provisions. It is also another example of a district court refusing to generally follow the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida's decision in Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., which rejected an implied consent exception to the TCPA where the calls to the consumer concerned the collection of a past-due debt.

See Legal Update, C.D. California: Providing Cellphone Number as Condition of Purchase Satisfies TCPA Express Consent Requirement for more on this decision.

See Article, Mobile Marketing: What Companies Need to Know for more on the TCPA's regulation of text messages and Practice Note, Direct Marketing for more on the TCPA generally.

A recent Supreme Court decision narrows and simplifies the test for a finding of general jurisdiction over a foreign parent corporation, significantly weakening the ability of plaintiffs to establish jurisdiction over a parent corporation through the actions of its subsidiary.

In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Supreme Court held that the presence of a corporation's subsidiary in California was not enough to establish personal jurisdiction over the foreign parent corporation in an action that involved conduct that took place in Argentina (134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)).

The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reliance on an agency theory to support a finding of general jurisdiction as inconsistent with the requirements of due process. Instead, the proper inquiry is made under the Supreme Court's decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, which asks whether the foreign corporation's contact with the forum state is so "continuous and systematic" as to render that corporation "at home" in the forum state.

The Supreme Court narrowed this test even further, emphasizing that the "at home" test will frequently be met only if the corporation is incorporated, or has its principal place of business, in that state. The continuous and systematic test, on its own, is appropriate only for establishing specific jurisdiction under International Shoe Co. v. Washington.

See Legal Update, Supreme Court: Presence of Subsidiary in Forum State Insufficient for General Jurisdiction over Foreign Parent Corporation for more on this decision.

See Practice Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil for more on the differences between specific and general jurisdiction for corporations.

Although the process of seeking no-action relief in a shareholder proposal dispute through court action rather than from the SEC may be more costly, a recent decision by the US District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri highlights that companies may be able to obtain a more favorable result.

In Express Scripts Holding Co. v. Chevedden, a company filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it could exclude a shareholder proposal from its proxy materials. The company alleged that the information in the supporting statement for the proposal was false and misleading. The company did not seek no-action relief from the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance. Instead, it notified the Division of Corporation Finance of its intent to exclude the proposal and filed the action in the district court.

The court determined that, when viewed in the context of soliciting votes in favor of a proposed corporate governance measure, statements in the proxy materials regarding the company's existing corporate governance practices are important to the shareholder's decision whether to vote in favor of the proposed measure. Therefore, the misstatements were material and not in compliance with SEC rules and regulations. The court concluded that the criteria for exclusion under Rules 14a-8(i)(3) and 14a-9 of the Securities Exchange Act were met. (No. 13-2520, (E.D. Mo. Feb. 18, 2014).)

This decision is notable in that the district court made a substantive determination concerning the materiality of supporting statements for shareholder proposals. The SEC has not always granted no-action relief to companies trying to exclude shareholder proposals (particularly proposals by the same proponent) on the same substantive basis.

See Legal Update, Express Scripts v. Chevedden: Missouri District Court Excludes Shareholder Proposal on Basis of Material Misstatements for more on this decision.

See Practice Note, How to Handle Shareholder Proposals for more on the exclusion of a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8(i).

Plan sponsors facing litigation in the First Circuit now have a clear accrual date for certain kinds of ERISA benefits actions. The First Circuit recently held that an ERISA claim for benefits begins to accrue when the plan denies a participant's or beneficiary's claim for a specific sum and makes that repudiation known to the individual.

In Riley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a long-term disability plan participant sued his plan sponsor for underpaid benefits. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the suit, filed seven years after the plaintiff first received and contested the allegedly underpaid amount, was time-barred.

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit. It observed that because ERISA does not provide a statute of limitations for actions to recover unpaid benefits from non-fiduciaries, it must borrow the forum state's most closely analogous statute of limitations (here, Massachusetts' six-year limitation for contract actions). The Fifth Circuit then rejected the plaintiff's attempt to analogize payments under an ERISA plan to an installment contract, under which each payment triggers a new limitations period. Joining the Second, Third and Ninth Circuits, the First Circuit held that the plaintiff's claim accrued on the date the plaintiff received and noted the first underpaid amount. (No. 13-2166, (1st Cir. Mar. 4, 2014).)

See Legal Update, First Circuit: ERISA Claims Accrue with First Clear Underpayment for more on this decision.

See Statutes of Limitation: State Q&A Tool for information on calculating statutes of limitation for a particular jurisdiction.

A decision by the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware serves as a reminder that courts can and do restrict the right to credit bid granted to secured creditors under section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code.

In In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., the court explained that courts may modify or deny credit bidding rights "for cause" (No. 13-13087, (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014)). The court held that in this case cause existed to limit the secured creditor's right to bid its claim to the amount it paid to purchase the claim because:

The court cited the Third Circuit's decision in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, which stated that a court may deny a lender the right to credit bid in the interest of any policy advanced by the Bankruptcy Code, such as to ensure the success of the reorganization or to foster a competitive bidding environment.

Fisker stands in contrast to the Supreme Court's recent decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, in which it ruled that creditors must be allowed to credit bid in a sale of collateral under a plan of reorganization. However, RadLAX did not address a court's ability to limit credit bidding rights for cause.

See Legal Update, In re Fisker Automotive: Delaware Bankruptcy Court Caps Credit Bid to Amount Paid for Claim for more on this decision.

See Practice Note, Credit Bidding in Section 363 Bankruptcy Sales for more on what may constitute cause to deny a secured creditor the ability to credit bid.

A recent Seventh Circuit decision may make it more difficult for certain corporate speech to qualify as noncommercial speech subject to full First Amendment protection, even where it does not promote a specific product and does not have an express economic purpose.

In Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that a supermarket chain's advertisement in Sports Illustrated magazine congratulating Michael Jordan on his induction into the Basketball Hall of Fame was commercial speech. This defeated the defendant's First Amendment defense and allowed Jordan to pursue his Lanham Act and state right of publicity claims. The notice prominently displayed the store's logo and slogan, which the Seventh Circuit found conveyed an implicit yet dominant message promoting the supermarket.

Applying factors set out in the Supreme Court's decision in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the Seventh Circuit concluded that the notice was, in fact, an advertisement with an unmistakable commercial function of enhancing the supermarket's brand in consumers' minds. Rejecting the supermarket's argument that the advertisement was consistent with its long-standing practice of commending local community groups' achievements, the Seventh Circuit noted that there was a qualitative difference between a notice congratulating local groups and one congratulating a famous athlete who does not need gratuitous promotion and whose identity has commercial value, and denied the supermarket's motion for summary judgment. (No. 12-1992, (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 2014).)

See Legal Update, Michael Jordan Scores in Right of Publicity Action: Seventh Circuit for more on this decision.

See Practice Note, Right of Publicity: Overview for more on the right of publicity in the US and related practice considerations.

Parties may be precluded from collaterally attacking rulings of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) that deny the registration of their proposed generic top level domain names (gTLDs).

In Del Monte International, GmbH v. Del Monte Corp., a case of first impression, the US District Court for the Central District of California granted a defendant's motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action challenging WIPO's denial of a declaratory judgment plaintiff's gTLD registration for <.delmonte >. The court held that the plaintiff failed to plead a cognizable claim under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) because the gTLD for which it sought registration was never registered, transferred or used under the ACPA. In reaching its decision, the court assumed but did not decide that gTLDs are domain names for purposes of the ACPA. (No. 13-5912, (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5. 2014).)

The precedential effect and reach of the Del Monte decision is not yet clear. In this first case to address whether gTLDs are domain names under the ACPA, the court assumed, for the sake of argument, that they are, but otherwise declined to decide the issue. Further, the court expressly left open the question of whether a WIPO determination upholding (rather than denying) the registration of a gTLD could be challenged under the ACPA.

See Legal Update, Collateral Attack on WIPO gTLD Decision Dismissed under Anticybersquatting Act: C.D. Cal. for more on this decision.

See Practice Note, Domain Names and Article, Generic Top-level Domain (gTLD) Expansion for more on domain names and brand protection.

Patent litigants should be prepared to continue to litigate claim construction both at the district court level and on appeal, following a 6-4 en banc Federal Circuit decision. While the decision confirmed the existing de novo appellate review standard for claim construction, the sharply divided opinions suggest that, absent Supreme Court guidance, the results of claim construction appeals will continue to depend on the assigned appellate panel.

The Federal Circuit in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North America Corp. sought to determine:

Noting that the de novo standard was adopted 15 years ago and has been applied in hundreds of cases, the majority stated that the principles of stare decisis operate with full force when the court is asked to overturn its own en banc precedent. While the Federal Circuit acknowledged the significant debate over Cybor's holding, it concluded that adopting a more deferential standard would likely diminish workability and add uncertainty at the trial and appellate levels.

The dissent emphasized that claim construction presents a mixed question of fact and law and that appellate courts are required to give deference to a district court's factual findings under FRCP 52(a). In response, the majority:

(No. 12-1014, (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2014).)

See Legal Update, Federal Circuit En Banc Confirms De Novo Review of Claim Construction in Divided Opinion for more on this decision, including the concurring and dissenting opinions.

See Practice Note, Patent Claim Construction: Overview for more on claim construction law.

Unionized employers can rely on collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) and clear customs of not compensating unionized employees for time they spend donning and doffing protective gear before and after work, if the vast majority of that time is spent "changing clothes." However, if the vast majority of that time is spent changing non-clothes integral to the job, all of the changing time is compensable under Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (29 U.S.C. § 203(0)).

In Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., the Supreme Court broadly interpreted language in Section 203(o) of the FLSA, which permits CBAs or employer and union customs to determine whether unionized employees are paid for time spent changing clothes or washing themselves at the beginning or end of each workday. The Supreme Court held that:

(134 S. Ct. 870 (2014).)

Unionized employers with CBAs or customs falling under Section 203(o) of the FLSA should check whether their employees spend a vast majority of their donning and doffing time "changing clothes," in light of the Supreme Court's interpretations. Unionized employers that do not have express CBA terms providing that time for changing clothes is unpaid may consider negotiating for them. However, proposing express terms may undercut assertions that customs permit employers not to pay for that time.

See Legal Update, Supreme Court: Donning and Doffing Protective Gear Is Noncompensable Time Spent "Changing Clothes" for more on this decision.

See Practice Note, Compensable Time for more on compensable time under the FLSA.

Parties that object to an arbitrator's authority to decide whether an issue is arbitrable should consistently, throughout the proceedings, object to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to prevent a finding that they clearly and unmistakably agreed to let the arbitrator determine this issue.

ConocoPhillips, Inc. v. Local 13-0555 United Steelworkers International Union involved a dispute over whether an employer and a union agreed to permit the arbitrator to decide what issues were arbitrable surrounding an employee's discharge for a failed drug test (741 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 2014)). The CBA between the parties allowed only for arbitration of issues regarding the integrity of the chain of custody for the drug test. However, the union filed a grievance and sought arbitration alleging the discharge was unjust. The union argued that the employer implicitly agreed to submit the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator.

The Fifth Circuit, affirming the district court's findings, held that the union failed to show that the employer clearly and unmistakably intended to be bound by the arbitrator's decision on arbitrability. It reasoned that the employer consistently objected to the arbitrator's determination of any issue beyond the chain of custody and, during the arbitration hearing and in post-hearing briefs, the employer's arguments were at most ambiguous about the arbitrator's authority to determine arbitrability.

The Fifth Circuit distinguished ConocoPhillips from decisions in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits that found clear and unmistakable consent where the parties failed to actively object to the arbitrator's jurisdiction to decide arbitrability. Further, those cases conflicted with the Supreme Court's decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, which held that the objecting party need not make an affirmative showing that it does not wish to be bound by the arbitrator's determinations of what issues are arbitrable.

See Legal Update, Employer Did Not Consent to Arbitration of Discharge Despite Arguing Arbitrability and Merits: Fifth Circuit for more on this decision.

See Standard Clause, Collective Bargaining Agreement: Arbitration Clause for a model arbitration clause that can be included in a CBA, with explanatory notes and drafting tips, and Practice Note, Labor Arbitration for general information on labor arbitration proceedings.

Employers granting leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) should be aware of the emerging circuit split about employees' rights and the definition of "care" under the statute.

In Ballard v. Chicago Park District, the Seventh Circuit held that the FMLA protects an employee who took leave to care for her terminally ill mother during a trip, and does not require the care to be part of an ongoing course of treatment. This holding creates a split with the First and Ninth Circuits.

The employer in Ballard argued that the FMLA did not cover the plaintiff's leave because she did not care for her mother within the meaning of the statute. In its reasoning, the Seventh Circuit examined the statutory language of the FMLA and regulations interpreting a closely-related FMLA statute, 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b)(4)(A), and noted that:

Additionally, the Seventh Circuit disregarded the employer's policy concern that this ruling will lead to abuse of FMLA leave. This decision highlights the Seventh Circuit's reliance on the text of the statute even when the result may cause policy concerns. (741 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2014).)

See Legal Update, Seventh Circuit Creates Circuit Split on FMLA Protections for more on this decision.

See Practice Note, Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) Basics for more on the FMLA.