Supreme Court of Florida Holds the FCRA's Ban on Sex Discrimination Includes Pregnancy Discrimination | Practical Law

Supreme Court of Florida Holds the FCRA's Ban on Sex Discrimination Includes Pregnancy Discrimination | Practical Law

In Delva v. The Continental Group, Inc., the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) implicitly prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy through its ban on sex discrimination. The court overturned the Third District Court of Appeal's dismissal of the plaintiff's pregnancy discrimination claim and approved the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Carsillo v. City of Lake Worth, resolving a split among the state appellate courts.

Supreme Court of Florida Holds the FCRA's Ban on Sex Discrimination Includes Pregnancy Discrimination

by Practical Law Labor & Employment
Published on 22 Apr 2014 • Florida
In Delva v. The Continental Group, Inc., the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) implicitly prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy through its ban on sex discrimination. The court overturned the Third District Court of Appeal's dismissal of the plaintiff's pregnancy discrimination claim and approved the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Carsillo v. City of Lake Worth, resolving a split among the state appellate courts.
On April 17, 2014, in Delva v. The Continental Group, Inc., the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) implicitly prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy through its ban on sex discrimination. The court overturned the Third District Court of Appeal's dismissal of the plaintiff's pregnancy discrimination claim and approved the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Carsillo v. City of Lake Worth (995 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 45th DCA 2008)), resolving a split among the state appellate courts. (No. SC12–2315, (Fla. Apr. 17, 2014).)

Background

The plaintiff was a front desk manager at a residential property managed by her employer, The Continental Group, Inc. The plaintiff sued her employer under Section 760.10 of the FCRA (Fla. Stat. § 760.10) alleging that, after she revealed that she was pregnant, her employer subjected her to several adverse acts, including:
  • Heightened scrutiny of her work.
  • Refusing to allow her to change shifts or work extra shifts, contrary to its policy permitting those acts.
  • Refusing to allow her to cover other workers' shifts.
  • Refusing to schedule her for work after she returned from maternity leave.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The Third District affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, holding that despite the plaintiff's sufficient discrimination claim based on her pregnancy, the FCRA does not prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.
Its decision to affirm the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim:
  • Directly contradicted the Fourth District's decision in Carsillo, which held that the FCRA prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy because the FCRA follows federal law and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) in considering pregnancy discrimination to be sex discrimination.
  • Adopted the First District's reasoning in O'Loughlin v. Pinchback, 579 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), which held that, because the Florida Legislature did not amend the FCRA after the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Company v. Gilbert (429 U.S. 125 (1976) the way that Congress amended Title VII with the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the FCRA is not meant to prohibit employment discrimination based on pregnancy.

Outcome

The Supreme Court of Florida:
  • Rejected the reasoning of the Third District Court of Appeal's dismissal of the plaintiff's pregnancy discrimination claim.
  • Approved the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision.
  • Remanded the case to reinstate the plaintiff's complaint.
The court found that although Section 760.10 of the FCRA does not specifically mention "pregnancy," it expressly prohibits discrimination based on sex.
Guided by the Florida legislature's state statutory purpose that the FCRA should be liberally construed to further its general purpose, the court held that pregnancy is a natural condition unique to women, and therefore discrimination based on pregnancy is in fact discrimination based on sex (citing Mass. Elec. Co. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 375 N.E.2d 1192, 1198 (Mass. 1978)).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Florida held that:
  • The FCRA's prohibition on sex discrimination includes a ban on pregnancy discrimination.
  • The plaintiff successfully stated a claim for discrimination based on pregnancy in violation of Section 760.10 of the FCRA.

Practical Implications

In this case, the Supreme Court of Florida resolved a split among Florida appellate courts and provided clarity on whether the FCRA's ban on sex discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy. In finding that it does, the court expanded the FCRA's protections beyond the text of the statute, and instead focused on its interpretation of the statute's legislative intent and other appellate court decisions interpreting similar statutes. Although employers subject to the FCRA are also subject to Title VII, and therefore are already prohibited from discriminating on the basis of pregnancy, employers in Florida should review their policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the increased protections for pregnant women. In addition, Florida employers should be aware that more pregnancy claims may be raised in state courts rather than federal courts.