On July 10, 2014, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Royalty Network, Inc. v. Harris ruled that the complaint verification requirement in Georgia's anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) statute (O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)) is a procedural rule that directly conflicts with FRCP 11(a), and so does not apply in diversity actions in federal court (No. 13-12460, (11th Cir. July 10, 2014)). With this ruling, the Eleventh Circuit split from other federal circuits that found other state anti-SLAPP statutes applicable in federal court.

This case arose out of a terminated business relationship between the plaintiff, a New York corporation involved in music publishing, and the defendant, a Georgia resident who recruited songwriters and music producers on behalf of the plaintiff. After the plaintiff terminated the consulting agreement between the parties, the defendant created a website that denounced the plaintiff, and also provided documents and commentary related to the litigation. The plaintiff sued in the US District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because it did not contain the verifications required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b), a state statute designed to protect Georgia citizens against burdensome litigation that could chill free speech rights. This statute requires that, for any claim relating to an act that could be construed as having been done in furtherance of the right of free speech, both the plaintiff and the plaintiff's counsel must file a written verification certifying that the claim is well-grounded in fact and not made for an improper purpose. The district court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss finding that the Georgia statute did not apply to the case, and the defendant appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the state statute's verification requirement conflicts with FRCP 11, and thus does not apply in federal cases arising under the district court's diversity jurisdiction.

After confirming its appellate jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit examined the conflict between the state statute and the FRCP. The court first noted the general rule that in a federal diversity jurisdiction case, a district court must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Regarding the procedural component, if the state and federal law occupy the same spheres and are contradictory, then the federal rule must prevail.

The court held that:

The court distinguished Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute from anti-SLAPP statutes previously held applicable in federal court in other circuits. The Eleventh Circuit found that Georgia's statute is distinct in that it seeks to implement its deterrent purpose through a verification requirement. In contrast, the state anti-SLAPP statutes considered by the First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits do not require that a complaint be verified. Therefore, the court noted, those circuits were not confronted with the same conflict between a state statute and FRCP 11 as the Eleventh Circuit was.

Further distinguishing the other circuits' holdings, the Eleventh Circuit observed that either:

Practitioners should be aware that not all state anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal diversity jurisdiction actions. In determining whether to assert an anti-SLAPP statute in federal court, attorneys may need to consider the mechanism by which the state seeks to deter litigation that could chill an individual's free speech rights.