Ninth Circuit: Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) Does Not Expressly Preempt State Cosmetics Labeling Laws | Practical Law

Ninth Circuit: Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) Does Not Expressly Preempt State Cosmetics Labeling Laws | Practical Law

In Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc. the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not expressly preempt state causes of action that impose state law damages for violations of federal cosmetics labeling laws.

Ninth Circuit: Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) Does Not Expressly Preempt State Cosmetics Labeling Laws

by Practical Law Commercial
Published on 15 Apr 2015 • USA (National/Federal)
In Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc. the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not expressly preempt state causes of action that impose state law damages for violations of federal cosmetics labeling laws.
On April 10, 2015, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc. that state law claims of deception and false advertising relating to cosmetic labeling requirements were not preempted by the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) because the state laws did not impose additional or different requirements than the requirements imposed by the federal law (No. 12-17596, (9th Cir. April 10, 2015)).

Background

The Hain Celestial Group (Hain) manufactures and labels lotions, deodorants, shampoos, conditioners and other cosmetics as "All Natural," "Pure Natural" or "Pure, Natural & Organic." The plaintiffs, Skye Astiana, Tamar Davis Larsen and Mary Littlehale filed a putative nationwide class action that claimed they were deceived into purchasing Hain's cosmetics due to the labels. The plaintiffs alleged that, contrary to the labels, the cosmetics contained synthetic and artificial ingredients, including benzyl alcohol and anti-freeze.
The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages under:
  • The federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
  • California's:
    • unfair competition and false advertising laws;
    • Sherman Act, which states that any cosmetic is misbranded if its labeling is false or misleading in any particular (West's Ann. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111730); and
    • common law theories of fraud and quasi-contract.
Notably, the plaintiffs did not seek injunctive relief under or cite the FDCA as a cause of action. In a motion to dismiss in the district court, Hain asserted the plaintiffs' state law claims were expressly preempted by the FDCA because:
  • The FDCA and the California's Sherman Act prohibit the same type of cosmetics labeling (21 U.S.C. § 362(a)).
  • The FDCA prohibits any state or local government from establishing any requirement for labeling or packaging of a cosmetic that is different from or in addition to, or that is otherwise not identical with federal rules (21 U.S.C. § 379(a)).
For more information on federal labeling requirements see Practice Note, Product Labeling: Warnings, Cautions and Other Requirements.
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on jurisdictional grounds. On plaintiffs' appeal, Hain asked the Court of Appeals to address its original argument that the FDCA expressly preempts the state law claims. Hain argued that the state-law based claims would create a novel state labeling requirement.
The Court of Appeals granted Hain's appeal and ruled on the issue of preemption.

Outcome

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's decision and held that the plaintiffs' state law claims were not preempted by the FDCA. Based on the FDCA statutory language and prior Supreme Court precedent, the Court of Appeals reasoned:
  • Nothing in the FDCA statutory language denies a state the right to provide traditional damages remedies for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel federal requirements.
  • The availability of state law damages for violations of federal law does not amount to an additional or different requirement, as prohibited by the preemption language in section 379(a) of the FDCA (Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 481 (1996)).
The Court of Appeals determined that the plaintiffs' state law claims sought damages for the injury related to the false advertising. Removing these allegedly misleading statements from its product labels does not run afoul of the FDCA because the changes would be incidental and identical to the federal rules.

Practical Implications

The decision makes it easier for plaintiffs to seek redress for false and deceptive advertising at the state and federal levels because state prohibitions on misleading cosmetic labeling are not preempted by the FDCA.
Companies need to be aware of the liability they may be exposed to from similar state and federal labeling and advertising regulatory regimes.