In Sutter v Oxford Health Plans LLC, (3d Cir. Apr. 3, 2012), a group of physicians brought a class arbitration against Oxford Health Plans for failure to make prompt and accurate reimbursement payments. The arbitrator construed the broad text of the parties' arbitration agreement to allow class arbitration. Oxford challenged the decision in court, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielsen SA v AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010) (Stolt-Nielsen) (decided after the partial final award allowing class arbitration but before the final award) required vacatur of the award allowing class arbitration because the arbitrator had exceeded his powers. The Third Circuit rejected Oxford's arguments and affirmed the district court's denial of Oxford's motion to vacate the award.

In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court held that arbitrators exceeded their authority by allowing class arbitration when the parties had not reached agreement, and stipulated that the arbitration agreement was silent, on whether class arbitration was allowed under the arbitration clause. The court explained that arbitrators can exceed their authority by ordering class arbitration when there is no basis in the arbitration clause to do so. But if the arbitrators find a basis for allowing class arbitration in the parties' arbitration agreement, then the arbitrators have the power to allow class arbitration. In explaining Stolt-Nielsen, the Third Circuit emphasised that it does not establish a bright line rule allowing class arbitration only under an arbitration agreement that expressly provides for it.

The Third Circuit rejected Oxford's argument that Stolt-Nielsen required vacating the award because the arbitration agreement was not "silent" on the issue, even if the agreement did not expressly mention class arbitration. Here, there was no stipulation between the parties about intent to not authorise class arbitration as there was in Stolt-Nielsen.

Given no express statement on class arbitration and no stipulation by the parties, the court concluded that the arbitrator appropriately performed his duty in interpreting the arbitration clause to give effect to the parties' intent. The arbitrator reasoned that the parties' very broad arbitration clause required arbitrating all conceivable civil actions, which includes class arbitration. The court noted that Oxford's subsequent representation that the clause did not contemplate class arbitration was not probative of the meaning of the clause and original intent of the parties.

This case demonstrates the availability of class arbitration after Stolt-Nielsen. It shows that where the parties' intent with respect to class arbitration is in question, the breadth of their agreement can be relevant to the arbitrator's interpretation of the arbitration clause.