Seventh Circuit Clarifies that "Self-serving" Evidence Can Create Triable Issues of Material Fact | Practical Law

Seventh Circuit Clarifies that "Self-serving" Evidence Can Create Triable Issues of Material Fact | Practical Law

In Hill v. Tangherlini, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit clarified that "self-serving" evidence can create triable issues of material fact and found that the district court erred by discrediting testimony and affidavits offered by a plaintiff suing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) for race and gender discrimination and retaliation. However, after considering the evidence, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer because the plaintiff still could not make out a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation.

Seventh Circuit Clarifies that "Self-serving" Evidence Can Create Triable Issues of Material Fact

by Practical Law Labor & Employment
Published on 07 Aug 2013 • USA (National/Federal)
In Hill v. Tangherlini, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit clarified that "self-serving" evidence can create triable issues of material fact and found that the district court erred by discrediting testimony and affidavits offered by a plaintiff suing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) for race and gender discrimination and retaliation. However, after considering the evidence, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer because the plaintiff still could not make out a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation.
On August 1, 2013, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion in Hill v. Tangherlini, affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment to an employer sued under Title VII for race and gender discrimination, and retaliation even though it found that the court disregarded admissible testimony and affidavits as "self-serving." The Seventh Circuit clarified that "self-serving" evidence can create triable issues of material fact and overruled 24 of its decisions to the extent they suggested otherwise.
Hill, an African American employee, had worked for the General Services Administration (GSA) since 2008. When he realized that his Master's degree entitled him to a higher rate of pay he filed a complaint with the EEOC. GSA settled the matter and paid Hill the higher rate.
Hill's coworkers complained to their supervisors about Hill's temper on the following three occasions when Hill:
  • Confronted his team leader to ask why he had not been selected for training opportunities.
  • Asked for a color copy of a receipt and was refused.
  • Complained that a white female intern had yelled at him about a file and talked to him condescendingly. The next day, a supervisor told Hill that slamming doors could be seen as threatening because he was a "pretty big guy." Hill took this as a coded racial reference.
At the end of his one-year probationary period, Hill received a letter stating that he was being fired based on these three incidents.
Hill sued GSA under Title VII, alleging:
  • Race discrimination.
  • Gender discrimination.
  • Retaliation for filing an EEOC charge.
The district court:
  • Discredited as self-serving certain testimony and affidavits intended to show that Hill had a good rapport with some colleagues.
  • Held that:
    • Hill failed to show that he was meeting the GSA's legitimate expectations, given that his behavior led three co-workers to complain about him;
    • Hill failed to show that an employee of a different race or gender was disciplined differently for similar behavior;
    • Hill failed to show that his termination was related to his filing the EEOC charge; and
    • even if Hill established a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, he did not introduce any evidence suggesting that GSA's stated reason for his discharge was pretextual.
  • Granted summary judgment to GSA.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit:
  • Noted that:
    • deposition testimony, affidavits, responses to interrogatories and other written statements by parties are by their nature self-serving (Payne v. Pauley);
    • the term "self-serving" must not be used to denigrate perfectly admissible evidence through which a party tries to present its side of the story at summary judgment (Navejar v. Iyiola); and
    • the court and district courts in the Seventh Circuit have been imprecise when discrediting potential evidence as self-serving.
  • Clarified that self-serving evidence can create triable issues of material fact.
  • Overruled 24 of its decisions to the extent they suggested that self-serving evidence could not be used to create triable issues of material fact.
  • Held that:
    • the district court erred by discrediting deposition testimony and affidavits to the extent they set out specific facts and were based on personal knowledge;
    • even after considering the discredited evidence, summary judgment was appropriate because Hill still could not make out a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation
  • Affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment on Hill's complaint.
In light of the Seventh Circuit's decision in this case, employers litigating in courts within the Seventh Circuit should:
  • Be precise when arguing that evidence offered by a plaintiff is inadmissible rather than cursorily suggesting it is immaterial because it is self-serving.
  • Avoid citing to the 24 Seventh Circuit decisions that were partially overruled for their statements that self-serving evidence can never create a material factual dispute.
Court documents: