Donning and Doffing During Meal Period Is Not Compensable Where Meal Period Was For Benefit of Employees: Eighth Circuit | Practical Law

Donning and Doffing During Meal Period Is Not Compensable Where Meal Period Was For Benefit of Employees: Eighth Circuit | Practical Law

This wage and hour update discusses Guyton v. Tyson Foods, Inc., in which the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment of the district court, holding that donning and doffing personal protective equipment (PPE) during a meal period is not compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) where the meal period as a whole was for the benefit of the employees. The court also held that when addressing this issue, the effect of the meal period, rather than the cause, is decisive.

Donning and Doffing During Meal Period Is Not Compensable Where Meal Period Was For Benefit of Employees: Eighth Circuit

by Practical Law Labor & Employment
Published on 29 Aug 2014 • USA (National/Federal)
This wage and hour update discusses Guyton v. Tyson Foods, Inc., in which the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment of the district court, holding that donning and doffing personal protective equipment (PPE) during a meal period is not compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) where the meal period as a whole was for the benefit of the employees. The court also held that when addressing this issue, the effect of the meal period, rather than the cause, is decisive.
On August 25, 2014, in Guyton v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment of the district court, holding that donning and doffing personal protective equipment (PPE) during a meal period is not compensable under the FLSA where the meal period as a whole was for the benefit of the employees. The court also held that when addressing this issue, the effect of the meal period, rather than the cause, is decisive. (No. 13-2036, (8th Cir. Aug. 25, 2014).)

Background

A class of current and former "gang-time" employees at a Tyson meat-processing facility in Iowa sued in 2007, claiming that Tyson's "K-code" time was insufficient to cover compensable pre- and post-production line activities, violating the FLSA and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL).
Tyson compensates employees for gang time, the time when employees are working and the production line is moving, and K-code time, extra minutes added to each employee's compensable time for donning and doffing certain personal protective equipment (PPE) and clothing. Tyson classifies items of PPE and clothing as either "unique" or non-unique" to the meat-processing industry. Tyson uses K-code time to compensate for the donning and doffing of unique items. Though Tyson does not record the actual time that employees take to perform those tasks, it calculated K-code time as follows:
  • Before 2007, Tyson added four minutes per day of K-code time for each employee who used knives.
  • From February 2007 to March 2010, Tyson added several minutes per day for pre- and post-shift walking time.
  • Since March 2010, Tyson has paid 20 to 22 minutes per day to compensate for all contested activities.
The employees:
  • Claim Tyson's K-code time was not sufficient under either the FLSA or the IWPCL to compensate them for donning and doffing personal protective equipment (PPE) and clothing both pre- and post-shift and during meal periods.
  • Seek compensation for time spent transporting PPE from lockers to the production floor.
The district court:
  • Certified an FLSA collective action and an IWPCL Rule 23 class action.
  • Granted Tyson summary judgment on Tyson's position that pre- and post-production donning and doffing activities during a 35–minute meal period are not compensable.
  • Submitted the pre- and post-shift donning and doffing claims to a jury, which returned a verdict for Tyson, finding that:
    • the employees' pre- and post-shift donning and doffing is "work" within the meaning of the FLSA, but is not "integral and indispensable to a principal activity," such that it starts and ends the "continuous workday";
    • a de minimis exception did not apply;
    • the plaintiffs failed to prove damages; and
    • Tyson acted in good faith under 29 U.S.C. § 259(a).
The employees appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in:
  • Submitting the case to a jury.
  • Denying plaintiffs judgment as a matter of law.
  • Excluding documentary evidence at trial.
  • Granting Tyson summary judgment on the meal period claim.

Outcome

The Eighth Circuit:
  • Affirmed summary judgment on the meal period claim, holding that donning and doffing during the 35–minute meal period is not compensable.
  • Concluded that the district court properly denied plaintiffs a judgment as a matter of law after the jury found the pre- and post-shift donning, doffing and walking activities were not integral and indispensable class-wide.
Affirming summary judgment on the meal period claim, the Eighth Circuit found that:
  • It analyzes the meal period as a whole, using a "predominant-benefit" standard, for meal period claims under the FLSA.
  • In this case, the meal period as a whole is for the benefit of the employees because:
    • it is undisputed that the entire meal period, other than a brief time spent donning and doffing, is uninterrupted; and
    • employees can wear protective clothing in the cafeteria.
  • The employees' argument that the meal period is for Tyson's benefit because US Department of Agriculture inspectors leave during this period and the production line is sanitized is not relevant. The effect of the meal period, not the cause, is decisive. (29 C.F.R. § 785.19.)
The Eighth Circuit also agreed that the jury's finding in favor of Tyson on the pre- and post-shift donning, doffing and walking claims should not be altered, concluding that:
  • The FLSA provides that activities that constitute "work" are compensable except for two categories of activities excluded by the Portal-to-Portal Act:
    • walking, riding or traveling to or from the place where the employee performs his principal activity; and
    • activities that are preliminary or postliminary to the employee's principal activity and occur just before the principal activity begins, or just after the principal activity ends on any particular workday (29 U.S.C. § 254(a)).
  • Activities performed before or after a regular shift may still be compensable if they are an "integral and indispensable part" of the principal activity.
  • The jury's conclusions, that pre- and post-shift donning, doffing and walking activities were "work," but that those activities were excluded from compensable time by the Portal-to-Portal Act, were not inconsistent.

Practical Implications

The Eighth Circuit, when determining whether donning and doffing during a meal period is compensable, will consider whether the meal period as a whole is predominantly for the benefit of the employees. The effect of the meal period, rather than the cause, is decisive when addressing meal period claims.