On September 16, 2014, in Mead v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a remand order to an ERISA plan administrator is generally not a final decision because such an order usually contemplates further proceedings (No. 11-192-cv (2nd Cir. Sept. 16, 2014)). Therefore, for appellate purposes, an order remanding a matter to an administrator is not a final decision, and not immediately appealable. While the court joined the majority of circuits in holding that orders remanding matters to an ERISA plan administrator were generally not immediately appealable with this opinion, the Second Circuit noted that it declined to adopt a hard-and-fast rule that such orders were never immediately appealable.

The plaintiff, Susan Mead, sought disability benefits under the terms of a long-term disability insurance policy administered by the defendant, Reliastar Life Insurance Company. The policy provided that a beneficiary could collect benefits for up to 24 months if the beneficiary were unable to perform her "own occupation," and provided continued benefits after that if the beneficiary could show that she was unable to perform "any occupation." After requesting, and being denied for, both "own occupation" and "any occupation" benefits, Mead brought an action in the US District Court for the District of Vermont seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to disability benefits pursuant to Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)).

After years of litigation, the district court remanded the matter to Reliastar with instructions to calculate and award "own occupation" benefits to Mead, and determine whether Mead was entitled to "any occupation" benefits under the plan's provisions. The court further directed the clerk of court to close the case, but noted that it would entertain a separate motion from Mead for prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees, and costs. Reliastar appealed the district court's decision to the Second Circuit. On appeal, Mead argued that the court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, because the court's December 2010 decision does not constitute a final decision that is immediately appealable.

The Second Circuit held that the remand order at issue in this case was not an immediately appealable final decision, and granted the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that remands to ERISA plan administrators are generally not final because they typically contemplate further proceedings by the plan administrator. However, the Second Circuit refused to adopt a "hard-and-fast rule" that such orders were never immediately appealable, and that it would have to examine the substance of the remand order to determine whether it constituted a final judgment for appellate purposes. Finally, the Second Circuit held that to preserve a plan administrator's ability to appeal a nonfinal remand order, it would interpret the remand order as one where the district court retained jurisdiction over the case so that after a determination has been made by the plan administrator on remand, either party may seek to reopen the district court case to obtain a final judgment.

In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit examined the circuit split on the issue of whether an order remanding a matter to an ERISA plan administrator constitutes a final decision. In its decision, the court noted the differences among:

Practitioners should be aware of these differences among the circuits when determining whether an order remanding a matter to an ERISA plan administrator is immediately appealable.