Causal Inquiry for FMLA Interference Claim Is Distinct from Motive Inquiry for FMLA Retaliation Claim: Tenth Circuit | Practical Law

Causal Inquiry for FMLA Interference Claim Is Distinct from Motive Inquiry for FMLA Retaliation Claim: Tenth Circuit | Practical Law

In Janczak v. Tulsa Winch, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that resolving a Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) interference claim depends on whether an employee's leave was causally connected to his termination, whereas resolving a retaliation claim depends on whether the employer's explanation was mere pretext for its true, retaliatory motive. Since the showing required is different for each claim, summary judgment does not necessarily have to be granted or affirmed on both claims.

Causal Inquiry for FMLA Interference Claim Is Distinct from Motive Inquiry for FMLA Retaliation Claim: Tenth Circuit

by Practical Law Labor & Employment
Published on 05 Aug 2015 • USA (National/Federal)
In Janczak v. Tulsa Winch, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that resolving a Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) interference claim depends on whether an employee's leave was causally connected to his termination, whereas resolving a retaliation claim depends on whether the employer's explanation was mere pretext for its true, retaliatory motive. Since the showing required is different for each claim, summary judgment does not necessarily have to be granted or affirmed on both claims.
On July 30, 2015, in Janczak v. Tulsa Winch, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that resolving an FMLA interference claim involves an inquiry into whether an employee's taking of FMLA leave was causally connected to his termination, whereas resolving an FMLA retaliation claim involves an inquiry into whether the employer's explanation for terminating the employee was mere pretext for its true, retaliatory motivation. Since the showing required is different for each type of claim, it is possible that summary judgment be granted/affirmed to an employer on a retaliation claim but not on an equivalent interference claim. (No. 14-5071, (10th Cir. July 30, 2015).)

Background

Paul Janczak was employed by Tulsa Winch, Inc. (TWI) as a General Manager. On July 30, 2012, Janczak was injured and took FMLA leave between July 31, 2012 and October 1, 2012. In mid-August 2012, Janczak:
  • Forwarded his FMLA leave certification to TWI.
  • Provided TWI President Steve Oden with additional information about his medical condition.
When Janczak returned to work on October 1, 2012, he was immediately terminated. TWI told him that his function had been discontinued. Janczak sued TWI alleging interference and retaliation under the FMLA.
The district court granted TWI's motion for summary judgment, concluding that:
  • Janczak had established the first two elements of his FMLA interference claim.
  • TWI had shown, as a matter of law, that it would have discharged Janczak even if he had not exercised his FMLA rights.
  • Janczak satisfied the first two elements of a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, but that he had not shown a genuine issue of material fact as to a causal connection between his protected activity and his discharge.
(Janczak v. Tulsa Winch, Inc., No. 13-CV-0154-CVE-FHM, , at *11 (N.D. Okla. May 27, 2014) (unpublished).)
Janczak appealed to the Tenth Circuit.

Outcome

The Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Janczak's retaliation claim, but reversed and remanded on his interference claim, holding that:
  • Summary judgment was proper as to the retaliation claim but was premature as to the interference claim.
  • Resolving the interference claim involves an inquiry into whether Janczak's taking of FMLA leave was causally connected to his termination. Resolving the retaliation claim involves an inquiry into whether TWI's explanation for terminating Janczak was mere pretext for its true, retaliatory motivation. Causation and motivation frequently align, but the difference between interference and retaliation claims demonstrates that such alignment is not always necessary.
  • Tenth Circuit FMLA precedent has suggested that summary judgment in favor of the employer could be granted or affirmed on a retaliation claim but not on an equivalent interference claim. Here, Janczak offered:
    • sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that his FMLA leave played a causal role in his termination; and
    • insufficient evidence for that jury to conclude that the motivation for terminating him was retaliatory.
First, considering Janczak's FMLA interference claim under § 2615(a)(1), the court noted that:
  • The three necessary elements of an FMLA interference claim are that:
    • the employee was entitled to FMLA leave;
    • adverse action by the employer interfered with the employee's right to take FMLA leave; and
    • the employer's action was related to the exercise or attempted exercise of his FMLA rights.
    (DeFreitas v. Horizon Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 577 F.3d 1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 2009)).
  • If an employee demonstrates the first two elements, the employer bears the burden of demonstrating that the adverse action was not related to the exercise of the employee's FMLA rights (Dalpiaz v. Carbon Cnty., Utah, 760 F.3d 1126, 1132 (10th Cir. 2014)).
  • The district court concluded that TWI offered evidence that before Janczak's FMLA leave, it was contemplating eliminating his position. However, the district court incorrectly determined that evidence of contemplated but not definitive termination was sufficient to dismiss an FMLA interference claim at the summary judgment stage. On the interference claim, TWI bears the burden of demonstrating that Janczak's termination was unrelated to the exercise of his FMLA rights.
  • Where the employer's reasons unrelated to his FMLA leave are inconsistent, the court has allowed the FMLA interference claim to go to a jury. Here, there is no evidence that Janczak ever violated company policy, was deficient or was insubordinate. Further, the evidence offered by TWI is not undisputed proof that the decision to eliminate Janczak's position occurred before his FMLA leave began.
  • A reasonable jury could find in Janczak's favor on the interference claim.
Second, considering Janczak's FMLA retaliation claim under § 2615(a)(2), the court noted that:
  • It analyzes retaliation claims using the burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
  • To prove a prima facie retaliation claim, Janczak must show:
    • that he engaged in a protected activity;
    • that his employer took an action a reasonable employee would have found materially adverse; and
    • a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.
  • The temporal proximity between Janczak's leave and his firing, combined with the other evidence, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
  • TWI satisfied its burden of articulating a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for terminating Janczak. TWI terminated him as part of a general reorganization, which constitutes a nonretaliatory basis for termination.
  • Janczak failed to show that the stated reasons were pretextual. Unlike his detailed explanation of why TWI's conduct constituted interference, his argument concerning pretext was limited to temporal proximity, which is insufficient.

Practical Implications

FMLA interference claims and retaliation claims require different showings and are resolved using different standards. Under Tenth Circuit precedent, resolving FMLA claims could result in granting or affirming summary judgment for an employer on a retaliation claim but not on an equivalent interference claim.