In National Ability SA v Tinna Oils & Chemicals Limited [2009] EWCA Civ 1330, the Court of Appeal held that enforcement of an arbitration award under section 26(1) of the Arbitration Act 1950 (the 1950 Act), which provides that an arbitration award may be enforced by leave of the court in the same manner as a judgment, was subject to section 7 of the Limitation Act 1980 (the 1980 Act). Section 7 provides that an action to enforce an award (unless the underlying submission is by instrument under seal) shall not be brought more than six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. Although the case concerned an application under section 26 of the 1950 Act, the decision equally applies to section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) (the provisions of both sections being essentially the same).

Awards were made against the respondents in 1998 and 1999. In July 2008, the appellants obtained an order from the English court to enforce the awards as judgments. Burton J set aside the order on various grounds. In relation to limitation, he held that the limitation period under section 7 applied, and that this period had expired. On appeal, the appellants argued that, properly analysed, a section 26 application was an application to obtain and enforce a judgment, rather than an action to enforce an award. Section 7 did not apply to actions to enforce a judgment. Further, section 24 of the 1980 Act (which applied to the enforcement of judgments) was not applicable to the "procedural machinery" of section 26 of the 1950 Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In doing so, it cited various authorities in which it had been assumed that an application under section 26 was an "action to enforce an award", within the meaning of section 7 of the 1980 Act. There was a clear distinction between an arbitration award and a judgment. An arbitration agreement was enforceable because of the implied contractual promise to pay an arbitration award and section 26 (and, by analogy, section 66 of the 1996 Act) must be viewed in this context. They were simply procedural provisions which enabled the award to be enforced. This was different to a judgment where the State, through the courts, had adjudged money to be due.

This decision confirms that the limitation period for enforcement of an award is the same, whether enforcement is sought under the statutory mechanism in section 66 of the 1996 Act, or by way of ordinary action on the award.