In Raymond James Financial Services Inc. v Bishop, (4th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010), three security traders filed an arbitration demand for wrongful termination against their former employer pursuant to the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) rules, which provide for arbitration of "[a]ny controversy . . . arising out of the employment or termination of employment" of registered traders. After the arbitral tribunal awarded damages to the traders, the employer sought vacatur. The District Court was forced to remand the matter back to the arbitral panel for clarification because the panel's reasoning was unclear. After two supplemental statements by the panel, the District Court remained uncertain about the panel's reasons but had a sufficient understanding to vacate the award for excess of powers, manifest disregard of law, and failure to draw the essence of the parties' agreement. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on the ground of manifest excess of powers.

The court held that the panel "committed no mere error of law," but rather "render[ed] an award whose underlying legal basis exceeded the bounds of arbitrable employment-related disputes cognizable under [NASD rules]." The panel exceeded the NASD rules because it based damages on its finding that the employer breached its fiduciary duties to the traders by withdrawing their legal representation in an unrelated legal action, when the NASD rules limit arbitration to matters "arising out of employment."

The court declined to consider whether the panel manifestly disregarded the law. The court observed that the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) had generated considerable uncertainty among the lower federal courts as to the continuing viability of extra-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards. However, in light of its finding on excess of powers, the court found it unnecessary to consider the effect of Hall Street. As such, the viability of vacatur for manifest disregard of law remains unclear in the Fourth Circuit.