The key issue in Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 2 v. Silgan Containers Manufacturing Corp. was whether a union can compel arbitration of a grievance challenging the discharge of a now deceased grievant under a mandatory arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).

In February 2010, Silgan, the employer, discharged Stracener, one of its union-represented employees. The union and Silgan were parties to a CBA that included procedures for the following:

Stracener timely filed a grievance protesting his discharge that that union submitted for arbitration after it could not resolve the grievance with Silgan. In the arbitration, the union was seeking reinstatement and compensation for Stracener (presumably, back pay among other remedies). Silgan and the union mutually selected an arbitrator and scheduled an initial hearing for November 17, 2010. However, on November 12, 2010, Stracener died in a car accident.

The November 17, 2010 hearing did not occur. The union tried to reschedule the arbitration. However, Silgan refused to proceed with the hearing, arguing that Stracener's death removed the dispute from the CBA's mandatory arbitration provision. The union brought suit in a Missouri federal district court to compel arbitration under the Labor Management Relations Act. The parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. The district court found for Silgan, holding that the CBA did not mandate arbitration of grievances where the employee at issue has died, because deceased people are not included in the definition of "employee" in the CBA. The union appealed that decision to the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

In its August 28, 2012 opinion, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's holding, ruling that the arbitration provision in the CBA mandated arbitration of Stracener's grievance and the death of Stracener after he was discharged, but before arbitration of his claim, does not alter the conclusion.

In reaching its holding, the Eighth Circuit addressed two main issues:

On the first issue, the court concluded that the employer and the union did agree to arbitrate Stracener's claim. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that the CBA:

The court considered Silgan's argument that a deceased employee can be likened to retired employees, who, under Pittsburgh Plate Glass, were held not to be employees under a CBA definition. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the Supreme Court observed that retired employees:

The Eighth Circuit rejected Silgan's argument based on Pittsburgh Plate Glass, finding that there is a distinction between deceased employees and retirees. Namely, unlike retirees' interests, the interests of employees whose grievances arise in the course of their employment, but who die before those grievances are resolved, do not diverge from the interests of current employees.

The court also held that there is no other legal principle that brings Stracener's grievance outside the CBA's mandatory arbitration provision. In rejecting Silgan's argument that agency law prevented the union (as agent) from enforcing the CBA on behalf of Stracener (as principal), the court held that the union was not Stracener's agent because under this CBA (and most CBAs):

At times, grievants die before their grievances are resolved through grievance or arbitration procedures in CBAs. In most circumstances a union withdraws the grievances or demands for arbitration, for among other reasons:

In the rare circumstances that a union pursues the grievance of a deceased grievant, the union and employer generally resolve the grievance for a nuisance value or bargain to resolve it in tandem with a separate matter.

This "test case" illustrates that a federal appellate court may compel arbitration of a deceased grievant's grievance over issues that occurred during the former employee's employment with the employer. Employers should evaluate the costs and benefits of resolving or arbitrating a deceased grievant's grievance that is pursued by a union accordingly.