On January 15, 2014, the US Supreme Court held in Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund of International Union of Operating Engineers and Participating Employers that a judgment on the merits was final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and appealable, even though the award of attorney's fees and costs remained to be determined (No. 12-992, (U.S. Jan. 15, 2014)). The finality of the judgment on the merits was not affected by the basis of the request for fees and costs. Because the judgment on the merits is a final decision, it triggers the time in which a party may appeal.

The International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 98 Central Pension Fund (Fund) sued Ray Haluch Gravel Co., alleging a failure to make contributions to union-affiliated benefit funds. The Fund argued that the contributions were mandated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 and the parties' collective bargaining agreement. On June 17, 2011, the district court ruled that the Fund was entitled to some of the alleged unpaid contributions. The district court also issued a monetary judgment that same day. On July 25, 2011, the district court awarded the Fund attorney's fees and costs.

The Fund appealed both decisions on August 15, 2011, and Halach argued that the appeal was untimely as to the June 17 decision on the merits. The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with the Fund, holding that because the right to recover attorney's fees and costs stemmed from the contract, the decision on the merits was not a final decision. According to the First Circuit, the decision did not address the totality of the damages, which included the recovery of attorney's fees and costs.

The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit's ruling. According the Supreme Court, the June 17 order was a final decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which affords the courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the district courts. Relying on its prior decision in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., the Supreme Court held that a pending determination of attorney's fees does not prevent judgment on the merits from being final (486 U.S. 196 (1988)). The Court found that a uniform rule is necessary to promote consistency and predictability in the application of Section 1291. A uniform rule is especially important because it may not always be clear whether a claim for fees is based in contract or statute. For example, in this case, the Fund's notice of motion cited ERISA as the basis for its fees request, but the accompanying affidavit also referenced the collective bargaining agreement. The Court noted that fee awards do not remedy the injury giving rise to the action and are generally not treated as part of the merits judgment.

In support of its holding, the Court noted that FRCP 58(e) provides that the entry of judgment may not ordinarily be delayed in order to award fees. However, in certain situations the rule may be invoked to delay the running of time to file an appeal until after a decision on the fee motion is made. That procedure was not followed in this case.

This decision resolved a conflict in the courts of appeals over whether an unresolved issue of attorney's fees based on a contract prevents a judgment on the merits from being final, thereby triggering the time to appeal.