On July 29, 2015, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Minden Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., reversed the US District Court for the Northern District of California's dismissal of Minden Pictures, Inc.'s claims against John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Wiley), holding that Minden had standing to sue for copyright infringement based on an exclusive license agreement that gave it an ownership interest in the copyrights at issue (No. 14-15267, (9th Cir. July 29, 2015)).

Minden, a stock photography company, entered into licensing agreements ("Agency Agreements") under which photographers authorized Minden to act as their sole and exclusive licensing agent and representative, but retained for themselves:

Under the Agency Agreements, Minden licensed certain photos to textbook publisher Wiley. Minden then sued for copyright infringement, claiming Wiley substantially exceeded the scope of the licenses. Wiley moved to dismiss the complaint and for summary judgment asserting lack of standing to sue under the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 501(b)) because Minden had no copyright ownership interest in the photos it licensed. The district court ruled in Wiley's favor and Minden appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit limited its review to Minden's main argument, that the Agency Agreements conferred sufficient property rights in the copyrights to give Minden standing to sue for infringement. In agreeing with Minden, the Ninth Circuit rejected Wiley's claims that the Agency Agreements granted only a non-exclusive license, and thus no copyright ownership interest, which the Copyright Act requires for a party to sue for infringement (17 U.S.C. § 501(b)).

Wiley argued that the Agency Agreements were non-exclusive because the photographers retained some rights to issue licenses themselves. Although there is no dispute that the Agency Agreements did not transfer the copyrights and certain other rights in the photos to Minden, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with Wiley's characterization as contrary to the prevailing understanding of federal copyright law, which allows rights in a single copyrighted work to be divided between parties with each co-owner being able to sue to protect his interest. Applying this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Agency Agreements were exclusive licenses that allowed Minden to license some of those rights to others, which gave Minden standing to sue for infringement of those rights.

In doing so, the court noted its agreement with patent law precedents that hold that it is possible for a licensee to have an exclusive license subject to the residual interest of the licensor. The court also agreed with the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which has stated that the essence of an exclusive license under the Copyright Act is one wherethe copyright holder gives the licensee permission to use the material for a specific use while promising that no others will be granted the same permission (I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d. 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996)).

The Ninth Circuit clarified that both Minden and the photographers have an interest in the copyrights, along with the right to enforce them, and to conclude otherwise would be inconsistent with the Copyright Act and common sense.