The tribunal found that Thales' petition was timely. Thales acted within 90 days of "discovering" the grounds for revision (Art. 124(1)(d) FSFT), that is, the Order.

The tribunal confirmed that the Award was final and capable of revision, and that as a party to the underlying arbitration, Thales had standing to seek revision.

The tribunal cited established doctrine that revision petitions are admissible only if the petitioner can show an interest worthy of judicial protection, that is, a "specific and current" interest in revision, and that the revision is capable of changing the outcome of the award. Such an interest would not be found, for example, where a petition for revision was brought against an extradition order that had already been executed. Here, Thales had a specific and current interest in revision of the Award under which it was liable to pay millions to Y. However, Thales had no sufficient interest in revision of the Award as against Z, because the Award had dismissed Z's claims against Thales. Consequently, Thales' petition for revision of the Award against Z was inadmissible.

The tribunal reiterated that the lack of an explicit provision in PILA permitting revision of international arbitral awards is a lacuna that the Federal Tribunal has the power to fill (cf BGE 118 II 199, BGE 129 III 727). These prior revision decisions were based on the old Federal Statute on the Organization of the Federal Judiciary (OJ), which was abrogated upon the entry into force of the FSFT on 1 January 2007. The tribunal confirmed that in accordance with its most recent revision case in BGE 134 III 286, revision is also available under the FSFT, and confirmed that its revision jurisprudence based on old Article 137(a) OJ remains good law under the FSFT, particularly because Article 123(1) FSFT is identical to Article 137(a) OJ.

The Federal Tribunal held that before revision can be ordered, the application must establish a criminal offence that is sufficiently serious – either a "crime" or "délit" (Article 10, Swiss Penal Code), but not a "contravention" (Article 103, Swiss Penal Code) or an "infraction" under the Cantonal Penal Code. It does not matter whether the crime was committed by a party to the arbitration or by a third party. Completed criminal proceedings (distinct from the decision of which revision is sought) must demonstrate both the "objective conditions" of a criminal offence and the "influence" of the criminal offence on the relevant decision. However, as specified in Article 123(1) FSFT, the proceedings need not result in a conviction. Where they have not, it is left to the Federal Tribunal to decide if the criminal offence was committed. The fact that the criminal proceedings occur abroad is irrelevant, provided certain minimal procedural guarantees are observed (which the Federal Tribunal found was clearly the case here). The "key requirement" is that the criminal offence influenced "directly or indirectly" the outcome of the arbitration to the detriment of the party seeking revision.

Here, the Federal Tribunal found that the conditions for revision were satisfied. At the completion of its criminal investigation, the French Magistrate had found that Sirven had committed a fraud on the judgment. There was no evidence contradicting these findings. The Federal Tribunal reasoned that, because the only reason Sirven escaped a conviction was that he died during the course of the Investigation, the "objective conditions" of a crime were met. Swiss judicial precedent provides that misleading a judge to obtain a decision causing pecuniary injury to an adverse party can constitute "fraud in the procedure" (Prozessbetrug). The definition of fraud under Article 146 of the Swiss Penal Code comprises "fraud in the procedure" (cf BGE 122 IV 197), and fraud is a crime under Article 10.2 of the Swiss Penal Code.

This fraud had a direct influence on the Award. The arbitrators had based their decision to a significant extent on the false witness testimony of Sirven, L and others regarding L's alleged services alleviating China's opposition to the frigate transaction. The arbitrators had concluded that L provided valuable services under the Contract in securing China's consent and that the purpose of the Contract was not to make corrupt payments to the French Government. However, the Order had shown that the story about L's role in China was fabricated, and that the true purpose of the Contract was to assist Sirven's efforts – with the aid of and by giving directions to Y – to bribe French government officials. The Federal Tribunal reasoned that, had the arbitrators known the real purpose of the Contract, they would have held that corrupt influence peddling had rendered the Contract null and void and made inadmissible any claims for remuneration pursuant to it.

Consistent with prior jurisprudence, the Federal Tribunal held that its role was limited to examining whether the conditions for revision were met, not to retry the case. Having found that the conditions for revision were met, the Federal Tribunal rendered a judicium rescindens annulling the Award, and remanded the case to "either the arbitral tribunal that issued the Award or to a new arbitral tribunal to be constituted in accordance with the rules of the ICC."