The initial process of interpretation had to be conducted within the parameters of the Venezuelan legal system. However, because any conclusions reached must be applied to determine whether Venezuela granted its consent to ICSID jurisdiction under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, principles of international law should also be taken into account.

The wording of Article 22 of the LPPI was confusing and imprecise, rendering a conclusion based on a grammatical interpretation of the article impossible. It was, therefore, necessary to analyse the context of Article 22, the circumstances in which the LPPI was enacted and the goals its enactment sought to achieve.

Although there were similarities between the content of the LPPI and that of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), there was no provision either in Article 22 or any other article of the LPPI that provided for Venezuela's consent to ICSID jurisdiction.

At the time of the LPPI's enactment, Venezuela had entered into BITs with various countries. Each of those treaties contained a submission to ICSID arbitration in clear and precise language.

Although eager to attract foreign investors, it would be illogical to find that Venezuela was willing to grant a broad unilateral consent to ICSID jurisdiction to other countries by the LPPI, without any reciprocity.

Despite publicising through various websites and publications, that the LPPI favoured arbitration, that did not mean that Article 22 amounted to Venezuela's consent to ICSID jurisdiction.

The claimant had argued that Article 25 of the ICSID Convention only required consent in writing and nothing more, whereas Venezuela asserted that consent should be "manifest, clear and unequivocal". The tribunal agreed that it was self-evident that consent to ICSID jurisdiction should be expressed in a way that would leave no doubt. There was nothing in this case that would lead to a departure from the conclusions reached in Cemex and Mobil.