This article examines the merger control laws of five of the former Yugoslavian countries. Despite the region's relatively small population and developing economy, it has had a disproportionate number of merger control cases (almost as many as the European Commission) due mainly to low jurisdictional thresholds.

This article examines the substantive tests for merger control in the region; effect of the low merger thresholds on companies and the regional competition authorities; and the potential benefits of the higher number of merger control cases. This article also provides a case study to illustrate how the application of modern economic tests based on the EU model can fail when replicated in an underdeveloped economic environment; and whether and how the EU model could be applied or adapted to accommodate less developed markets.

This article is part of the PLC Competition and Cartel Leniency multi-jurisdictional guide. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg.