Indirect distribution following flip-flop II scheme not taxable on recipient | Practical Law

Indirect distribution following flip-flop II scheme not taxable on recipient | Practical Law

Beneficiaries who received funds from another beneficiary, following implementation of a flip-flop II scheme, rather than direct from the trustees, were not subject to capital gains tax the First-tier Tribunal has held. (Bowring v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 366 (TC).)

Indirect distribution following flip-flop II scheme not taxable on recipient

Practical Law UK Legal Update Case Report 8-534-3065 (Approx. 6 pages)

Indirect distribution following flip-flop II scheme not taxable on recipient

by Practical Law Private Client
Published on 23 Jul 2013United Kingdom
Beneficiaries who received funds from another beneficiary, following implementation of a flip-flop II scheme, rather than direct from the trustees, were not subject to capital gains tax the First-tier Tribunal has held. (Bowring v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 366 (TC).)

Speedread

Beneficiaries who received funds from another beneficiary rather than direct from the trustee, following the implementation of a flip-flip II scheme, were not subject to capital gains tax (CGT) the First-tier Tribunal has held. The First-tier Tribunal is a tribunal of fact, so that each decision is specific to the particular circumstances being considered. However, the conclusions reached about the distribution made by one beneficiary to another outside the trust are novel. On similar facts, a beneficiary who receives a direct distribution but passes some of that distribution on to a second beneficiary may not be able to pass on some of the CGT liability associated with the distribution. This seems to be the case even where it has always been the intention that the second beneficiary should also get something from the trust. (Bowring v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 366 (TC).)

Background

Section 86: settlor charge

Section 86 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (TCGA 1992) (known as the settlor charge) imposes a capital gains tax (CGT) charge on UK resident (or, before 6 April 2013, ordinarily resident) and domiciled settlors of offshore trusts, when the offshore trust realises a capital gain. Section 86 applies where the settlor has an interest in the settlement. The purpose of the legislation is to prevent UK individuals avoiding a charge to CGT, simply by holding assets through an offshore trust (as offshore trustees are not liable to UK CGT). Paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 5 toTCGA 1992 sets out the test for whether the settlor has an interest in the settlement. Broadly, the settlor has an interest where the trust property may be paid to (or applied for the benefit of) a defined person. A defined person includes the settlor, his spouse, and the settlor's (and his spouse's) issue and their spouses. Paragraph 2(1)(c) of Schedule 5 toTCGA 1992 extends this, by stating that the settlor also has an interest where any defined person enjoys a benefit directly or indirectly from any relevant property in the trust (that is, property given to the trust by the settlor).
For information about the settlor charge, see Practice note, Taxation of offshore trusts: overview: The CGT charge on the settlor: section 86 of TCGA 1992. Throughout this update, statutory references are to TCGA 1992 unless otherwise stated.

Section 87: beneficiary charge

Section 87 (the beneficiary charge) applies when section 86 does not (where the settlor is either non-UK domiciled or non-UK resident, or where he does not have an interest in the trust). Section 87 charges CGT on beneficiaries who are resident (or, before 6 April 2013, ordinarily resident) in the UK, when capital payments they receive from the trust are matched with capital gains realised by the trustees. (Before 6 April 2008, section 87 did not apply to non-UK domiciled beneficiaries; see Practice note, Taxation of offshore trusts: overview: The CGT charge on the beneficiaries: section 87 of TCGA 1992.)

Section 90: inter-trust transfer provisions

Section 90 ensures that the beneficiary charge continues to apply where trustees of an offshore trust transfer assets to another trust and the recipient trust makes capital payments to beneficiaries. This is achieved by treating the undistributed gains of the transferor trust as having been added to the transferee trust.

Section 97: definition of "capital payment"

Section 97 includes a definition of "capital payment" for the purposes of the beneficiary charge. Section 97(5) treats any payment made by a trustee as a capital payment that is subject to the beneficiary charge where the payment is:
  • Received directly or indirectly by a beneficiary.
  • Applied directly or indirectly for the benefit of a beneficiary.
  • Received by a third person at the beneficiary's direction.

Section 91: supplemental charge for delayed distributions

Applying the general matching rules for capital payments made to UK resident beneficiaries from offshore trusts, where the gains matched are realised in the current tax year or the year preceding the matching, the usual rate of CGT will apply. Where the gains matched are from earlier tax years, an increased tax rate will be applied including an element of notional interest (section 91, TCGA 1992). The amount of notional interest depends on how long before the matching the gains were realised. It is set at 10% of the usual CGT rate for each additional tax year that has passed since the gain was realised, up to a maximum of 60% of the usual CGT rate.

Flip-flop I

Before anti-avoidance legislation was introduced by the Finance Acts 2000 and 2003, some UK domiciled settlors of offshore trusts sought to avoid a liability to CGT under sections 86 and 87, by entering into flip-flop schemes. The first version of these schemes (flip-flop I) was used where the offshore trust had assets standing at a significant capital gain, and the trustees wanted to sell those assets and realise the gain without incurring a CGT liability for the settlor or any UK resident and domiciled beneficiaries.
Broadly, the schemes worked as follows:
  • Trust A (which owned the assets standing at a gain) borrowed against the security of those assets.
  • Trust A then advanced cash (that is, the borrowings) to Trust B (which usually included the settlor of Trust A and his family as beneficiaries).
  • Trust A then irrevocably excluded the settlor (and his family) from being beneficiaries of Trust A (so that the settlor was no longer caught by section 86 in relation to Trust A).
  • After the settlor (and his family) was excluded, Trust A sold the assets and used the proceeds of sale to pay off the loan. Trust A was then left with "stockpiled" gains (and so fell within section 87), but had no assets to distribute.
  • Under this arrangement, no gains were read through to Trust B, which was instead left with "clean" cash which it could distribute to the settlor and other beneficiaries in later tax years, tax free.

Flip-flop II

From 21 March 2000 (when Schedules 4B and 4C of TCGA 1992 came into force), flip-flop I schemes no longer worked because the new legislation (introduced by Finance Act 2000) deems there to be a disposal of all trust assets where trustees of an offshore trust make either a capital distribution or a loan linked with trustee borrowing. The result is that any gains in the transferor trust are simply read through to the transferee trust (section 90). The mechanism used to block flip-flop I schemes caught capital payments from both trusts and so the anti-avoidance draftsman added an additional provision (section 90(5)) which suspended the operation of section 90 in the case of an inter-trust transfer to which the new anti-avoidance Schedule 4B (transfers linked with trustee borrowing) applied. The reason for this suspension was that it would ensure that gains were locked in the transferor settlement so that they could then be attributed to beneficiaries under the new Schedules 4B and 4C (attribution of gains to beneficiaries).This created a loophole that was quickly exploited after 21 March 2000 to create a mutation of the earlier scheme (flip-flop II).
Flip-flop II works by deliberately triggering the provisions of Schedule 4B (which brings section 90(5) into play so that the inter-trust transfer provisions in section 90 do not apply) with the ultimate effect of isolating gains that could be attributed to beneficiaries under the beneficiary charge in the transferor trust and leaving clean capital in the transferee trust that can then be distributed without a CGT charge.
For more information about the taxation of offshore trusts, see Practice note, Taxation of offshore trusts: overview.

Facts

Mr Bowring and his sister, Miss Bowring, were UK resident and UK domiciled beneficiaries of an offshore trust established by their father in 1969. By 2001 the trust had stockpiled gains of about £3 million. A UK resident trust, in similar terms was established in 2002 with Mr Bowring and his sister being principal beneficiaries. The trustees of the 1969 trust sold some trust assets at market value to Mr and Miss Bowring who had borrowed funds from another family trust to pay for them. The 1969 trustees used the cash proceeds to buy gilts. They then took out a bank loan secured on the gilts and paid an amount equivalent to the loan to the 2002 trust. The trustees of the 2002 trust made distributions to Mr and Miss Bowring. Mr and Miss Bowring used some of the distributed capital to repay their loans. The trustees of the 1969 trust subsequently sold the gilts and repaid the bank loan, leaving a balance in the trust fund of £300. Mr Bowring paid £400,000 of the funds that he had received as a distribution from the 2002 trust to two cousins who were also beneficiaries of both the 1969 and 2002 trusts. It had always been the intention that he would use part of the distribution to pay them with the purpose of avoiding any possibility of a charge to tax on the cousins.
HMRC issued closure notices amending the amount of tax payable by Mr and Miss Bowring through their self assessment tax returns on the basis that they were liable to pay CGT under the beneficiary charge on the distributions received from the 2002 trust as well as a supplemental charge under section 91. Mr and Miss Bowring appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (tribunal)

Decision

The tribunal judges, Barbara Mosedale and Richard Thomas, dismissed Mr and Miss Bowring's appeals, applying the conclusions of the Special Commissioner (Sir Stephen Oliver QC) in Herman and another v HMRC [2007] UKSPC 609. In Herman, although it was accepted that the flip-flop II planning was effective to prevent the realised gains in the original trust transferring into the new settlement, section 97(5) was said to apply very widely so that the beneficiaries who received distributions from the transferee trust were treated as receiving capital payments indirectly from the original trust. They were therefore subject to tax under sections 87 and 91.
The tribunal judges also had to determine whether the payments made by Mr Bowring to his two cousins were assessable on Mr Bowring or on the cousins as beneficiaries of both trusts. This had to be decided because, if the cousins were liable to pay the tax, HMRC would be out of time to assess them. The tribunal judges held that the two cousins were not liable as they did not receive the funds directly from the 2002 trust or indirectly from the 1969 trust. This was on the basis that the distributions made to Mr Bowring had been made with no strings attached so that Mr Bowring was not legally bound to pass on the £400,000 to the cousins. Tracing did not apply to the cousins' money because the trustees of the 2002 trust had not distributed the funds to Mr Bowring to hold on trust for the cousins. Once the funds had passed to Mr Bowring they were no longer imprinted with a trust and causation was broken. Even if the cousins could be said to have received the funds indirectly from the 2002 settlement, it was UK resident and so the section 87 beneficiary charge did not apply.

Comment

For most, this case is something of a history lesson and will only be relevant to those who implemented a flip-flop II scheme before anti-avoidance legislation was introduced to block it in the Finance Act 2003. Special Commissioners’ and First-tier tribunal decisions do not set a binding precedent, but they do indicate the approach that a tribunal properly directed in the relevant law is likely to take on the point at issue. In this case the reasoning used by the special commissioner in Herman (who in turn adopted the methodology set out in the House of Lords judgment in West v Trennery [2005] UKHL 5) was thoroughly tested from a number of angles and found to be robust. However, the conclusions reached about the distribution made by one beneficiary to another outside the trust are novel. On similar facts, a beneficiary who receives a direct distribution but passes some of that distribution on to another beneficiary will not be able to pass on some of the associated CGT liability. This seems to be the case even where it has always been the intention that the other beneficiary should also get something from the trust. This seems odd given that, in this case, there was evidence that it had always been the intention that the cousins should share in the original act of bounty effected by the 1969 and 2002 trusts and, the tribunal itself found (at paragraph 91 of its judgment) that section 97(5) was intended to catch the many different ways in which a person could obtain a benefit from a trust other than by a simple transfer of money from the offshore trustees. HMRC was not anxious to put forward a contrary argument because it would have been unable to collect the tax from the cousins.

Case

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