Impairments Limiting the Ability to Sit For Long Periods Do Not Categorically Fail to Qualify as ADA Disabilities: Second Circuit | Practical Law

Impairments Limiting the Ability to Sit For Long Periods Do Not Categorically Fail to Qualify as ADA Disabilities: Second Circuit | Practical Law

In Parada v. Banco Industrial De Venezuela, C.A., the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that impairments limiting the ability to sit for long periods of time do not categorically fail to qualify as disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), even before the 2008 amendments to the ADA.

Impairments Limiting the Ability to Sit For Long Periods Do Not Categorically Fail to Qualify as ADA Disabilities: Second Circuit

by Practical Law Labor & Employment
Published on 01 Apr 2014 • USA (National/Federal)
In Parada v. Banco Industrial De Venezuela, C.A., the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that impairments limiting the ability to sit for long periods of time do not categorically fail to qualify as disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), even before the 2008 amendments to the ADA.
On March 25, 2014, in Parada v. Banco Industrial De Venezuela, C.A., the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that impairments limiting the ability to sit for long periods of time do not categorically fail to qualify as disabilities under the ADA, even before the 2008 amendments to the ADA (12-3525-CV, (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2014)).

Background

Carmen Parada (Parada) worked for the Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A. (BIV) as a credit specialist, a largely sedentary job. In April 2007, six months into her job, Parada fell and injured her back badly enough that she was no longer able to sit for long periods of time. Parada's doctors directed her to avoid sitting for long periods of time. Parada requested an ergonomic chair, but her requests were ignored. She complained to BIV's Compliance Officer that BIV had failed to accommodate her, and then announced plans to take a leave of absence without a specific return date. As of November 2007, Parada had stopped going to work and had exhausted her paid leave. After several months of dispute, on May 1, 2008, BIV effectively terminated Parada by letter.
In August 2008, Parada filed a claim for overtime. The DOL then investigated and concluded that BIV owed Parada overtime. BIV sent Parada a check at the DOL's direction, but Parada refused to accept it.
In 2010, Parada, initially acting pro se, filed a complaint alleging that BIV had discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of the ADA and state and local anti-discrimination laws by ignoring her requests for reasonable accommodation of her injury and subsequently firing her, and for violating the FLSA's overtime requirements. BIV moved to dismiss. The district court then converted the motion into one for summary judgment and:
  • Granted it as to Parada's:
    • disability discrimination claim, concluding that the inability to sit for a prolonged period is not a disability under the ADA; and
    • retaliation claim, on the ground that Parada failed to show enough temporal proximity between her requests for an ergonomic chair and her termination to give rise to an inference of causation between the two events.
  • Dismissed Parada's FLSA overtime claim as barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to nonwillful violations of the FLSA.
  • Declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Parada's remaining claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law.
Parada appealed to the Second Circuit arguing that the district court:
  • Should not have converted BIV's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
  • Wrongly concluded that Parada's inability to sit for a prolonged period is not a disability under the ADA.

Outcome

The Second Circuit:
  • Held that impairments that limit the ability to sit for long periods do not categorically fail to qualify as disabilities under the ADA, even before the 2008 amendments to the ADA.
  • Rejected the argument that the district court should not have converted BIV's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit found that:
  • Under the ADA, even before the 2008 amendments, an impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity if the impaired person is "significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which he can perform" the activity (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (1991)).
  • The EEOC implementing regulations listed "sitting" as a major life activity (Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867 (2d Cir. 1998)).
  • The holding in Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Department can be distinguished because in Colwell, the court held that vague statements about a plaintiff's difficulties with "prolonged" sitting, without additional evidence, is not sufficient to support a finding of an ADA violation (158 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 1998)).
  • To state a categorical rule would conflict with:
    • the Second Circuit's precedent in other ADA cases in which they have rejected bright-line tests and emphasized the need to make a fact-specific inquiry; and
    • the EEOC's implementing regulations governing Parada's claim, which emphasize that the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity involves several factors.
  • The inability to sit even for a prolonged period of time may be a disability depending on the totality of the circumstances.
  • Parada's argument that BIV's letters of reprimand constituted the relevant retaliatory act instead of her termination was not argued in the district court and therefore should be forfeited.
  • The district court's dismissal of the FLSA claim on statute of limitations grounds should be affirmed because:
    • Parada does not qualify for equitable tolling based on her DOL filing since she could have filed an FLSA claim, which has no administrative exhaustion requirement, and her medical condition was physical not mental and was not severe enough to prevent her from filing the FLSA claim earlier; and
    • Parada has failed to show that BIV's mistaken classification of Parada as exempt under the FLSA was willful.

Practical Implications

Employers should note that where an employee has an impairment that limits their ability to sit or stand for periods of time, the Second Circuit does not adhere to any categorical rule regarding whether this impairment limits a major life activity. This is true even of cases arising before the 2008 amendments to the ADA. Instead, the Second Circuit will make a fact-based analysis before reaching any conclusion of an ADA violation.