ADA Causation Standard Requires Showing Employee Was Terminated on Account of Disability: Fifth Circuit | Practical Law

ADA Causation Standard Requires Showing Employee Was Terminated on Account of Disability: Fifth Circuit | Practical Law

In E.E.O.C. v. LHC Group, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment, in part, in favor of the employee in an ADA case, holding that genuine issues of material facts existed as to whether the employer terminated the employee because of her disability, and whether the employee could have been reasonably accommodated. The Fifth Circuit also clarified that to establish the causation prong in a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the plaintiff must prove that she was subjected to adverse action on account of her disability.

ADA Causation Standard Requires Showing Employee Was Terminated on Account of Disability: Fifth Circuit

by Practical Law Labor & Employment
Published on 22 Dec 2014USA (National/Federal)
In E.E.O.C. v. LHC Group, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment, in part, in favor of the employee in an ADA case, holding that genuine issues of material facts existed as to whether the employer terminated the employee because of her disability, and whether the employee could have been reasonably accommodated. The Fifth Circuit also clarified that to establish the causation prong in a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the plaintiff must prove that she was subjected to adverse action on account of her disability.
On December 11, 2014, in E.E.O.C. v. LHC Group, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment, in part, in favor of the employee in an ADA case, holding that genuine issues of material facts existed as to whether the employer terminated the employee because of her disability, and whether the employee could have been reasonably accommodated. The Fifth Circuit also clarified that to establish the causation prong in a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the plaintiff must prove that she was subjected to adverse action on account of her disability. (13-60703, (5th Cir. Dec. 11, 2014).)

Background

Kristy Sones worked as a Field Nurse for LHC from 2006 to 2009, which required her to drive a "couple of hours" a day visiting six to eight patients. In March 2009, Sones's manager decided to promote Sones to Team Leader. (During the ensuing litigation, the parties disputed whether Sones had actually been promoted or had merely been training for the Team Leader position.)
On May 26, 2009, Sones suffered a grand mal seizure while at work. Sones returned to work two days later. She discussed her medical condition with her branch manager and supervisor, who gave Sones a copy of the Team Leader job description and asked to have her doctor provide a release. Sones's doctor released her to work with limitations of no driving for one year and no working on a ladder. Sones and her managers agreed that she would get rides to work from her co-worker and next door neighbor.
Due to anti-seizure medications, Sones struggled with her memory and felt tired at work. Sones testified that she requested help with the computer-related aspects of her job, but that her manager ignored her request. Sones's manager met with her weekly to discuss her ability to perform the Team Leader duties.
On June 24, 2009, LHC terminated Sones for alleged work performance issues.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought an enforcement action under the ADA on behalf of Sones against LHC for:
  • Failing to accommodate Sones.
  • Discriminating against her on the basis of her disability.
LHC brought a summary judgment motion under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court:
  • Granted LHC's motion for summary judgment on all claims.
  • Concluded that the EEOC failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge because it failed to show that:
    • Sones was qualified to serve as a Field Nurse or a Team Leader;
    • even if Sones had made a prime facie case of disability discrimination, LHC offered a legitimate reason for terminating Sones that the EEOC could not prove was pretexual; and
    • because Sones could not prove she was qualified for either position, the EEOC failed to make a prima facie case of failure to accommodate.
    (13-60703, , at *2.)
    The EEOC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Outcome

The Fifth Circuit:
  • Affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the EEOC's failure-to-accommodate claim as to the Field Nurse position. Because the position required a significant amount of daily driving, the court held that Sones was not qualified to work as a Filed Nurse due to her driving restrictions.
  • Reversed summary judgment in part and remanded, finding that there was a genuine dispute as to the following material facts:
    • whether Sones had actually been promoted to the Team Leader position at the time of her termination, or was still a Field Nurse;
    • LHC's ability to accommodate Sones if she was a Team Leader;
    • whether LHC properly engaged in the interactive process required by the ADA; and
    • whether Sones was terminated because of her disability.
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit:
  • Resolved conflicting Fifth Circuit cases regarding the causal nexus required to establish the third prong in a prima facie discrimination claim under the ADA. After reviewing the conflicting cases, the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff in an ADA discrimination case must prove that she:
    • has a disability;
    • was qualified for the job; and
    • was subject to an adverse employment decision on account of his disability.
    (13-60703, , at *5.)
  • Concluded that there was no dispute that LHC could not provide Sones with a reasonable accommodation as to her Filed Nurse position because:
    • driving was an essential function of that position; and
    • the EEOC did not offer prima facie evidence that any of Sones's suggested accommodations were feasible daily solutions.
  • Found that there was a material issue of fact as to whether LHC could have reasonably accommodated Sones as a Team Leader. The dispute centered on:
    • whether driving was an essential function of the Team Leader position, as the record indicated that driving was not as prevalent in the Team Leader role as it was in the Field Nurse position;
    • if driving was an essential function of the Team Leader position, whether LHC could have reasonably accommodated Sones's inability to drive by restructuring some aspects of the job; and
    • whether LHC could have reasonably accommodated Sones's difficulty with computer-related and communications duties, which were essential functions of the Team Leader position.
  • Reversed the district court's evidentiary ruling that statements in Sones's EEOC charge were inadmissible hearsay. The Fifth Circuit held that the statements fell within two hearsay exemptions and could be competent evidence in support of a summary judgment motion because:
    • the statements in Sones's charge were made by LHC employees speaking on behalf of the company;
    • Sones's charge repeating the statement was not hearsay because it was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted; and
    • Sones reproduced the statements in a signed, verified document based on her personal knowledge of the conversation, in accordance with Rule 56(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Practical Implications

The Fifth Circuit's decision in EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc. clarifies the causation standard necessary to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that their termination or other adverse action was on account of their disability, and not that they were replaced by a non-disabled person or treated less favorably than non-disabled employees. This decision also reminds employers that they must engage in an interactive process with the employee, including responding to suggested accommodations and articulating why a particular accommodation would not be reasonable. As part of the interactive process, the employer may need to consider whether restructuring some of the employee's job responsibilities may be a reasonable accommodation, unless the modification would cause an undue hardship on the employer.