Cumulative pre-treaty conduct can be a breach of a fair and equitable treatment obligation | Practical Law

Cumulative pre-treaty conduct can be a breach of a fair and equitable treatment obligation | Practical Law

An update on Walter Bau AG (in Liquidation) v The Kingdom of Thailand (UNCITRAL, 1 July 2009), in which the tribunal considered claims of expropriation and breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard, some of which arose before the relevant BIT came into force.

Cumulative pre-treaty conduct can be a breach of a fair and equitable treatment obligation

Practical Law UK Legal Update Case Report 9-502-2568 (Approx. 6 pages)

Cumulative pre-treaty conduct can be a breach of a fair and equitable treatment obligation

by PLC Arbitration
Law stated as at 12 May 2010International, USA (National/Federal)
An update on Walter Bau AG (in Liquidation) v The Kingdom of Thailand (UNCITRAL, 1 July 2009), in which the tribunal considered claims of expropriation and breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard, some of which arose before the relevant BIT came into force.

Speedread

In Walter Bau AG (In Liquidation) v The Kingdom of Thailand (UNCITRAL, 1 July 2009), the tribunal awarded the claimant damages for breach of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) obligation in a 2002 investment treaty between Germany and Thailand (the 2002 Treaty). The claim arose out of a concession agreement which was signed many years before the 2002 Treaty came into force, at a time when the existing investment treaty did not contain a FET obligation and did not allow investor-state claims.
The tribunal held that it did not have jurisdiction over disputes which arose before the 2002 Treaty entered into force. However, when determining whether there had been a breach of the FET obligation under the 2002 Treaty, it could take into account acts or omissions which originated before the treaty entered into force but continued in existence after that date and crystallised into a treaty breach. Further, there might be situations where individual acts considered in isolation would not result in a breach of a treaty obligation, but could do so, once the treaty obligation had come into force, if considered as part of a series of acts leading in the same direction.
Applying this approach, and considering the claimant's legitimate expectations, the tribunal held that Thailand had breached its FET obligations under the 2002 Treaty.
The decision confirms the place of legitimate expectations as part of the FET standard and indicates that it may be possible to rely on pre-treaty conduct to establish a breach.

Background

Investment treaties between Germany and Thailand

On 13 December 1961, Thailand and the Federal Republic of Germany signed a treaty (the 1961 Treaty) which, among other things, gave protection to investors against expropriation, but did not impose an obligation on the host state to provide fair and equitable treatment (FET). Further, it did not provide for investor-state claims.
Germany and Thailand signed a further investment treaty on 24 June 2002, which came into force on 20 October 2004 (the 2002 Treaty). The 2002 Treaty contained various investor protections, including provisions addressing expropriation and requiring investors to be afforded FET. Article 8 also provided that the treaty applied to approved investments made before its entry into force. Article 10 provided that disputes should be resolved amicably if possible, but failing that, they should be referred to arbitration.
For detailed discussion on expropriation and the FET obligation, see Practice notes, Expropriation in international investment law and Fair and equitable treatment, respectively, and for information on host states' obligations under investment treaties generally, see Practice note, Investment treaty arbitration: legal issues.

Interpretation of treaties

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (the Vienna Convention) sets out the principles governing the construction and interpretation of treaties. Under Article 28, a treaty will not have retroactive effect "unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established".

Facts

The claimant was a shareholder in a joint venture company (DMT) which became the concessionaire under a concession agreement granted by the respondent (Thailand) in August 1989 for the design, build, operation and maintenance of a toll road for 25 years (the concession).
The construction project ran into difficulties and the concession agreement was varied in writing by an agreement known as MoA1 in August 1995. The concession agreement and MoA1 were then further amended by an agreement known as MoA2 in November 1996. MoA2 provided for an injection of capital into DMT by Thailand's Ministry of Finance and also the increase of toll rates. MoA2 also contained waiver clauses, extinguishing any claims pre-dating MoA2.
DMT subsequently requested an increase in tolls on a number of occasions, but no increase was forthcoming. In December 2004, the directors of DMT (four of them appointed by the Thai government) voted in favour of a toll reduction, which was announced immediately by the Thai government.
In September 2005, the claimant served a request for arbitration under the 2002 Treaty. It argued that Thailand had breached its obligations to it as a shareholder of DMT in that it had:
  • Engaged in conduct which, viewed cumulatively over the years, amounted to "creeping" expropriation of its rights as an investor.
  • Breached the FET requirements of the 2002 Treaty by acting in an arbitrary and unconscionable manner over a long period of time and frustrating its legitimate expectations.
Thailand argued that the tribunal had no jurisdiction in respect of disputes which arose before the 2002 Treaty came into force on 20 October 2004.

Decision

The tribunal held that it only had jurisdiction over disputes which arose after the 2002 Treaty entered into force. It held that Thailand was in breach of the FET requirements in the 2002 Treaty, but dismissed the claim of creeping expropriation.

Jurisdiction ratione temporis

The starting point was that the claimant was bound by the waiver of claims contained in MoA2, so it could not make a claim based on any conduct before the signing of that agreement.
The tribunal then considered whether it had jurisdiction ratione temporis to consider disputes which arose after that date, but before the 2002 Treaty came into force. It concluded that it did not have such jurisdiction. While Article 8 made it clear that the 2002 Treaty applied to investments made before its entry into force, that did not mean that investors could claim damages retrospectively for disputes that had arisen before that date. There was nothing in the 2002 Treaty which indicated that it applied retrospectively to disputes which arose pre-treaty.
While the tribunal had no jurisdiction over disputes which arose before the entry into force of the 2002 Treaty, it considered that conduct which preceded that date but which continued and crystallised into a treaty breach after that date, could be relied on by the claimant. In doing so, it endorsed the view of the tribunal in Société Générale v Dominican Republic (UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction, 18 September 2008).
Further, as in Société Générale, the tribunal took the view that there might be situations where individual acts considered in isolation would not result in a breach of a treaty obligation, but could do so, once the treaty obligation had come into force, if considered as part of a series of acts leading in the same direction.
As such, a distinction had to be drawn between breaches which crystallised before October 2004 (and were therefore covered by the 1961 Treaty) and ongoing conduct before that date which crystallised into a dispute after that date.

Creeping expropriation

After considering previous decisions on what constitutes creeping or indirect expropriation, the tribunal concluded that the claimant had not proved any such expropriation in this case. Its reasons included the following:
  • There was no expropriation of the claimant's contractual rights as a shareholder in DMT: the toll way was still operating and would continue to do so for many years to come, with DMT as the concessionaire.
  • Thailand did try (even if not very effectively) to remedy some of the alleged wrongs done to the claimant by means of amendments to the concession agreement.
  • The claimant had not been deprived of control of its investment to the degree stated in PSEG Global v Turkey (ICSID Case No ARB/02/5).

Fair and equitable treatment

The tribunal proceeded on the basis that a key component of the FET standard was the protection of legitimate expectations. In this case, the claimant's legitimate expectations had to be viewed in the context of the concession agreement and MoA2, which amended the concession agreement. Part of the claimant's legitimate expectations was a rate of return that was reasonable in the circumstances. The failure to fulfil that expectation was a breach of Thailand's FET obligations. The tribunal's conclusion was based on the "total factual matrix", including the inherent unlikelihood that an investor would contemplate entering into such a long-term investment without a legitimate expectation of reasonable return.
Although MoA2 changed the claimant's legitimate expectations significantly, the claimant was entitled to expect that MoA2 would be implemented by Thailand. Thailand had been obliged to increase tolls under MoA2. It had failed to do so, and although that failure had originated long before October 2004, when the 2002 Treaty came into force, it continued in existence after that date. The forced toll reduction in December 2004 could be seen as an addition to the composite acts which had started before, but continued after, the entry into force of the bilateral investment treaty, and as a trigger for a dispute.
Even though Société Générale concerned a claim of expropriation, the same reasoning must apply to breaches of the FET requirement.

Damages

The tribunal held that the first of the events which constituted breaches of the FET obligation had effect the minute the 2002 Treaty came into force, namely, on 20 October 2004. Therefore, damages should be calculated from that date.
The tribunal then considered the appropriate method for assessing the damages. Rejecting the methods proposed by the claimant (internal rate of return on equity) and the respondent (amount invested approach), it concluded that the only method that could accurately track value through time was the discounted cash flow (DCF) method. At any given time, the investor might have expected to hold the present value (PV) of remaining cash flows (the price received if it were to sell its interest), plus the compounded value (at the cost of equity) of dividends already received.
In the tribunal's view, the best way to assess damages was to:
  • Estimate what would have been the fair value of the claimant's shares on 3 December 2006 (the date of sale of those shares) had Thailand fulfilled its obligations under MoA2 (the but-for value).
  • Subtract the proceeds of sale of the claimant's shares.
  • Add the dividends, if any, which would have been received in 2005 and 2006 had MoA2 been applied and compound them to 3 December 2006.
The appropriate discount rate to be used was DMT's cost of equity in December 2006.
Applying that approach, the tribunal concluded that the net damages due to the claimant, after subtracting the discounted value of the claimant's shares sold on 3 December 2006, was EUR29.21 million.

Costs

Taking into account the parties' submissions and given the claimant's partial success overall, the tribunal concluded that it should order the claimant to pay half of Thailand's costs and Thailand to pay half of the claimant's costs.

Comment

The decision follows a growing list of awards holding that the claimant's legitimate expectations are a component of the fair and equitable treatment standard and have to be determined in the light of the total factual matrix, including the contractual arrangements between the parties.
The tribunal's conclusions on jurisdiction ratione temporis were interesting. Although they removed disputes which pre-dated the entry into force of the 2002 Treaty from consideration, earlier conduct could be taken into account when deciding whether the FET obligation had been breached once the treaty had come into force. This could be useful where conduct after a treaty has come into force would not, of itself, be sufficient to constitute a breach.
The tribunal's approach to assessing damages in this case is also instructive, in that it clearly endorsed the DCF method over any others.