Supreme Court: FLSA Collective Action Properly Dismissed after Plaintiff's Individual Claims Are Rendered Moot | Practical Law

Supreme Court: FLSA Collective Action Properly Dismissed after Plaintiff's Individual Claims Are Rendered Moot | Practical Law

In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, the US Supreme Court held in a 5 to 4 decision that a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the plaintiff's individual claims became moot, leaving her with no personal interest in representing other unnamed, putative claimants in the action. The decision highlights, but does not resolve, a circuit court split on the question of whether a plaintiff's rejection of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 68 offer of judgment that fully satisfies her claims renders the claims moot.

Supreme Court: FLSA Collective Action Properly Dismissed after Plaintiff's Individual Claims Are Rendered Moot

by Practical Law Litigation
Published on 17 Apr 2013 • USA (National/Federal)
In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, the US Supreme Court held in a 5 to 4 decision that a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the plaintiff's individual claims became moot, leaving her with no personal interest in representing other unnamed, putative claimants in the action. The decision highlights, but does not resolve, a circuit court split on the question of whether a plaintiff's rejection of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 68 offer of judgment that fully satisfies her claims renders the claims moot.
On April 16, 2013, in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, the US Supreme Court held in a 5 to 4 decision that a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the plaintiff's individual claims became moot, leaving her with no personal interest in representing other unnamed, putative claimants in the action (133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013)). The decision highlights, but does not resolve, a circuit court split on the question of whether a plaintiff's rejection of an FRCP 68 offer of judgment that fully satisfies her claims renders the claims moot.
Petitioner Genesis Healthcare Corp. employed Laura Symczyk as a registered nurse. Symczyk brought a collective action on behalf of herself and those similarly situated against Genesis, alleging that Genesis violated the FLSA by automatically deducting 30 minutes of time worked per shift for meal breaks, even when employees worked during those times. Genesis served its answer together with an FRCP 68 offer of judgment in the amount of $7,500 for alleged unpaid wages Symczyk sought, as well as reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses. Symczyk did not respond to the offer, and the time for accepting the offer expired. At this point in the case, no other plaintiffs had joined in the litigation. Genesis then moved to dismiss the entire action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on the ground that Symczyk's rejection of an FRCP 68 offer that afforded her complete relief on her individual damages claims rendered the case moot.
The district court held that Symczyk's claims were moot, and dismissed plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Symczyk appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which reversed. The Third Circuit held that although Symczyk's claims were mooted by her rejection of an offer of judgment that fully satisfied her individual claims, dismissing the entire case would frustrate the goals of collective actions.
The Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed the action as moot. In the absence of any other claimants opting into Symczyk's FLSA action, the court determined that the entire suit became moot when Symczyk's individual claims became moot, because she lacked personal interest in representing others in the action. Therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. In its decision, the court:
  • Did not reach the question, or resolve the circuit split, of whether a plaintiff's rejection of an FRCP 68 offer of judgment that fully satisfies her claims is sufficient to render the claims moot, because Symczyk:
    • conceded in the district court that the offer rendered her individual claims moot;
    • made the same concession in her brief to the Third Circuit; and
    • failed to argue otherwise in her brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari.
  • Rejected Symczyk's argument that the collective action case was not moot because the cases she relied on:
    • arose in the context of FRCP 23 class actions, which are fundamentally different from FLSA collective actions; and
    • were distinguishable on the facts.
The interesting take-away points from this case are that:
  • If the claims of a lone plaintiff in a FLSA case become moot, the entire case may be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, at least when no other plaintiffs have joined.
  • In certain circuits and in certain instances, a plaintiff's rejection of an FRCP 68 offer of judgment that fully satisfies her claims may render her case moot.
  • The Supreme Court views collective actions brought under the FLSA as fundamentally different from class actions brought under FRCP 23.
Case: