Title VII Statutory Scheme Trumps Six-year Statute of Limitations for Suits against US: Third Circuit | Practical Law

Title VII Statutory Scheme Trumps Six-year Statute of Limitations for Suits against US: Third Circuit | Practical Law

In Kannikal v. Attorney General United States, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) by an employee against his former employer, the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The Third Circuit held that the six-year statute of limitations generally applicable to civil lawsuits brought against the US does not apply to claims filed under Title VII.

Title VII Statutory Scheme Trumps Six-year Statute of Limitations for Suits against US: Third Circuit

by Practical Law Labor & Employment
Published on 27 Jan 2015USA (National/Federal)
In Kannikal v. Attorney General United States, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) by an employee against his former employer, the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The Third Circuit held that the six-year statute of limitations generally applicable to civil lawsuits brought against the US does not apply to claims filed under Title VII.
On January 20, 2015, in Kannikal v. Attorney General United States, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an action brought under Title VII by an employee against his former employer, the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The Third Circuit held that the six-year statute of limitations generally applicable to civil lawsuits against the US does not apply to claims filed under Title VII. The Third Circuit’s decision in Kannikal mirrored a decision issued two weeks earlier by the DC Circuit in Howard v. Pritzker. (No. 14-1803, (3d Cir. Jan. 20, 2015).)

Background

In April 2001, Joe Kannikal, a former employee of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, filed a formal Complaint with the EEOC under Title VII. The administrative process related to Kannikal’s complaint dragged on for six years. In 2007, when the complaint was being held in abeyance by the EEOC, the Department of Justice informed Kannikal that his complaint would no longer be held in abeyance and suggested he contact the EEOC. In 2012, after the EEOC had not responded to multiple inquiries, Kannikal filed a civil action. The suit was filed eleven years after his initial EEOC filing. At the time the lawsuit was filed, the EEOC had not issued a final administrative decision or determination.
The government moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s suit based on the suit being time-barred under the general six-year statute of limitations for filing non-tort civil lawsuits against the US. (28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)). The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, applying the statute of limitations under Section 2401(a). According to the district court, Kannikal's Title VII claim had accrued in October of 2001, 180 days after he filed his EEOC charge and the statute of limitations had expired six years later. Kannikal appealed the district court’s dismissal of his complaint. Neither party argued at the district court level that a different statute of limitations should be applied.

Outcome

The Third Circuit:
  • Reversed the decision by the district court.
  • Held that the general six-year statute of limitations in lawsuits against the US under Section 2401(a) does not apply to claims filed under Title VII. Rather, the applicable limitations period was the 90-day period by which a Title VII complainant must file suit after a final administrative decision is received by the complainant.
  • Found that because a final administrative decision had not been issued in this matter:
    • the 90-day limitations period was never triggered; and
    • the plaintiff’s lawsuit was timely.
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit looked to the detailed, specific limitations period provided for under Title VII. Namely, after first pursuing administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit, Title VII provides that a plaintiff may file a lawsuit 180 days after filing the administrative complaint. The 90-day “outer limitations” period commences after the complainant receives the final agency decision.
The court framed the issue in terms of whether there is a limit on how long an individual who has filed a Title VII claim in the EEOC can await the conclusion of the administrative process before bringing a civil action. The Court answered that Title VII provides for no such limit.
The court rejected the Section 2401(a) limitations period in favor of the Title VII limitations period because:
The Third Circuit pointed out that Congress had devised the Title VII administrative and judicial scheme as the exclusive and pre-emptive method of resolving federal employment discrimination matters. The Court noted that Congress did not intend to:
  • Foreclose the administrative process or to force a complainant to forego the administrative process.
  • Penalize complainants because of EEOC delays.
  • Force complainants to choose between an administrative or judicial remedy.
Rather, Congress intended to provide the best possible means to protect a complainant’s right to obtain relief under Title VII, whether that means was administrative or judicial.
The government argued that applying Section 2401(a) would merely require a complainant to choose between the administrative and judicial forums when the administrative process in the case approaches the six-year mark. The Third Circuit rejected this argument, noting that a complainant in this position would be left with no choice at all – he would have to file the civil action.
The government further argued that Section 2401(a) should apply because it did not specifically exclude Title VII claims, but included a specific exception for another type of claim (those brought under the Contract Disputes Act). Under the government’s logic, the statute’s reference to one exception meant that there were no other exceptions. The court rejected this argument, pointing out that:
  • Other statutes of limitation have been applied in civil actions brought against the United States.
  • The six-year statute of limitations under Section 2401(a) applies when no other limitations period is present, and that this was not the case with Title VII.
The court also rejected the government's argument that Section 2401(a) was the outer limit for Title VII claims. Again, the court found the proper outer limit not in Section 2401(a), but in Title VII’s requirement that complainants file suit no later than 90 days after receiving the final agency action.
The court noted that:
  • Since the government maintains control over the Title VII administrative process and is typically the cause of delays in that process, it was not in a position to express concern over the outer limit for filing Title VII claims.
  • Since the 90-day period was “quite short,” it would be unreasonable to hold that the government’s own delays could then insulate it from Title VII suits.

Practical Implications

In Kannikal, the Third Circuit asserted, consistent with the DC Circuit’s opinion in Howard v. Pritzker issued two weeks earlier, that the specific administrative and judicial scheme of Title VII trumps Section 2401(a), the general statute of limitations for civil claims brought against the federal government. Complainants may choose to abandon the administrative process after 180 days have passed since they filed an administrative complaint, but they cannot be forced to file suit in court until the administrative process concludes. This means that administrative delays in the EEOC will not become a basis to deny Title VII complainants their right to pursue a lawsuit in court.