On June 10, 2015, in Wooten v. McDonald Transit Associates, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit withdrew its previous opinion in Nishimatsu Construction Co. v. Houston National Bank, 515 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1975) and held that evidence presented at a default-judgment prove up hearing could be considered in conjunction with a plaintiff’s complaint when deciding a motion for default judgment (No. 13-11035, , (5th Cir. June 10, 2015)).

Plaintiff Eddie Wooten filed suit against his former employer, Defendant McDonald Transit Associates, Inc., under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, alleging discrimination and retaliation. McDonald Transit failed to answer or defend the suit and, upon completion of a damages hearing, the clerk entered a default judgment against them. The district court expressly designated the hearing as a one to prove up damages for a default judgment, during which Wooten elaborated on the factual allegations contained in his complaint. The district court entered a default judgment against McDonald Transit and the subsequent motion to set aside the default judgment was denied.

On appeal, the parties disagreed as to the sufficiency of Wooten’s allegations and whether the district court could consider evidence presented at the hearing in addition to allegations enumerated in the complaint in supporting default judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that, while Wooten’s complaint contained very few factual allegations, it nevertheless met the low threshold of FRCP 8 because it sufficiently alleged the essential elements of a prima facie retaliation claim under the ADEA and provided McDonald Transit with fair notice of his claims. The complaint was therefore sufficient, both on its own and in combination with the evidence presented at the prove-up hearing, to support the default judgment.

The Fifth Circuit examined the fair notice purpose of FRCP 8 and noted that the factual allegations in a complaint need only be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculation level (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Given that Wooten’s complaint itself met the minimum requirements of FRCP 8, the court held that the testimony at the prove-up hearing served the limited purpose of establishing the truth of the allegations by evidence under FRCP 55(b)(2)(C) and merely fleshed out that which was already pled in the complaint. As a result, the evidence received at the damages prove-up hearing served a permissible purpose under FRCP 55(b)(2) and could be considered in assessing the entry of default judgment.