Reverse Break-up Fees and Specific Performance: A Survey of Remedies in Leveraged Public Deals (2015 Edition) | Practical Law

Reverse Break-up Fees and Specific Performance: A Survey of Remedies in Leveraged Public Deals (2015 Edition) | Practical Law

A study analyzing the remedies available to target companies in public merger agreements for a buyer's failure to close the transaction because of a breach or financing failure. The study covers all merger agreements entered into in 2014 for debt-financed acquisitions of US reporting companies (excluding REITs and debt-only issuers) with an equity value at signing of at least $100 million.

Reverse Break-up Fees and Specific Performance: A Survey of Remedies in Leveraged Public Deals (2015 Edition)

by Practical Law Corporate & Securities
Published on 11 Aug 2015USA (National/Federal)
A study analyzing the remedies available to target companies in public merger agreements for a buyer's failure to close the transaction because of a breach or financing failure. The study covers all merger agreements entered into in 2014 for debt-financed acquisitions of US reporting companies (excluding REITs and debt-only issuers) with an equity value at signing of at least $100 million.