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Swift Justice (Even Taylor Gets Deposed)
Practical Law Legal Update w-000-5164 (Approx. 4 pages)
Swift Justice (Even Taylor Gets Deposed)
by Practical Law Litigation
| Law stated as of 17 Aug 2015 • USA (National/Federal) |
Celebrities are not always above the law. A recent ruling in a trademark infringement case pending against pop star Taylor Swift in US District Court for the Central District of California shows that, sometimes, even celebrities cannot avoid being deposed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As a recent discovery ruling from the US District Court for the Central District of California shows, sometimes, even celebrities cannot avoid a deposition under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). In a pending trademark infringement case against pop star Taylor Swift, Swift's attorneys sought a protective order under FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) and FRCP 26(c) to prevent the plaintiffs from taking Swift's deposition (see Blue Sphere, Inc. v. Swift, No. 8:14-cv-00782-CJC-DFM (C.D. Cal. filed May 20, 2014)). The case stems from Swift's alleged sale of "Lucky 13" apparel and her team's marketing of "Lucky 13" greeting card-themed contests without permission and without securing a license from the owner of the "Lucky 13" trademark.
In support of the motion for a protective order to prevent Swift's deposition, Swift submitted an affidavit stating that she:
- Had no knowledge of the issues in the case.
- Was not involved with the type of details that the alleged activities entailed.
- Was unavailable for deposition because she is:
- promoting her 1989 album, which includes releasing singles and music videos, various interviews, and photo and video shoots; and
- currently performing around the world on her "1989 World Tour."
Swift's attorneys also argued that Swift should not be compelled to give deposition testimony because she would not be a witness at trial and because the requested deposition was a harassing apex deposition.
The plaintiffs' attorneys argued in response that plenty of evidence suggested that Swift's claims of ignorance were not credible and that they needed to question Swift about her knowledge of the plaintiffs' trademark and her image. To help support their argument, the plaintiffs' attorneys cited to articles, including some with direct quotes from Swift herself, portraying Swift as "her own manager" who "likes to do everything herself" and who makes her own decisions. The plaintiffs' attorneys also stated that they offered to accommodate Swift's tour schedule in scheduling her deposition.
In its order dated August 4, 2015, the court denied Swift's motion. Among other things, the court reasoned that:
- While the apex doctrine protects high-level corporate executives from harassing depositions, it does not foreclose depositions of those executives where they have direct personal factual information related to material issues and where the information is not available in any other source.
- It was unclear that there were other witnesses besides Swift who could provide testimony about Swift's knowledge (or lack thereof).
- Swift's schedule was not a basis for a protective order because there was no evidence in the record to show that the plaintiffs were inconsiderate of Swift's schedule or that they sandbagged Swift's deposition to coincide with her world tour.
Perhaps anticipating future disputes over Swift's deposition, the court also noted that no constraints on the scope of Swift's deposition appeared to be necessary for the time being and reiterated that the plaintiffs were permitted to obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter relevant to any party's claim or defense under FRCP 26(b)(1).
Although Swift's attorneys appeared to have tried hard to prevent her deposition, Swift's fame was clearly no match for the liberal discovery rules under the FRCP.
To learn more about the procedural issues raised by the case against Swift in federal court, see Practical Law's: