Glass Lewis Releases 2016 Proxy Guidelines | Practical Law

Glass Lewis Releases 2016 Proxy Guidelines | Practical Law

Glass, Lewis & Co. released its 2016 proxy guidelines.

Glass Lewis Releases 2016 Proxy Guidelines

Practical Law Legal Update w-000-8227 (Approx. 5 pages)

Glass Lewis Releases 2016 Proxy Guidelines

by Practical Law Corporate & Securities
Published on 16 Nov 2015USA (National/Federal)
Glass, Lewis & Co. released its 2016 proxy guidelines.
On November 13, 2015, Glass, Lewis & Co. (Glass Lewis) released its 2016 proxy season guidelines. Noteworthy revisions, which are discussed in more detail below, relate to:
  • Conflicting management and shareholder proposals.
  • Exclusive forum provisions.
  • Environmental and social risk oversight.
  • Nominating committee performance.
  • Director overboarding policy.
  • Compensation updates.

Conflicting Management and Shareholder Proposals

Glass Lewis has identified which factors it will consider when analyzing and determining whether to support conflicting management and shareholder proposals, including:
  • The nature of the underlying issue.
  • The benefit to shareholders from implementation of the proposal.
  • The materiality of the differences between the terms of the shareholder proposal and management proposal.
  • The appropriateness of the provisions in the context of:
    • a company’s shareholder base;
    • corporate structure; and
    • other relevant circumstances.
  • A company’s overall governance profile and, specifically, its responsiveness to shareholders as evidenced by a company’s response to previous shareholder proposals and its adoption of progressive shareholder rights provisions.
For more information on shareholder proposals, see Practice Note, How to Handle Shareholder Proposals.

Exclusive Forum Provisions

Glass Lewis has replaced its policy of recommending that shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating and governance committee of companies that include exclusive forum provisions in their governance documents in connection with an initial public offering (IPO). Instead, Glass Lewis will evaluate an exclusive forum provision in an IPO company’s by-laws in conjunction with other provisions that it believes will unduly limit shareholder rights, including:
However, Glass Lewis has not revised its policy of recommending that shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating and governance committee of companies that adopt an exclusive forum provision without shareholder approval other than in connection with a spin-off, merger or IPO.

Environmental and Social Risk Oversight

Glass Lewis has:
  • Codified its policy regarding the responsibilities of directors for oversight of environmental and social issues.
  • Provided more clarity regarding circumstances when it may consider recommending that shareholders vote against directors for lapses in environmental and social risk management.
This policy is based on Glass Lewis’ belief that the identification, mitigation and management of environmental and social risks are integral components of an evaluation of a company’s overall risk exposure. More specifically, Glass Lewis believes that:
  • Boards should ensure that management conducts a complete risk (including environmental and social risks) analysis of the company.
  • Directors should monitor management’s performance in managing and mitigating the company’s environmental and social risks.
Glass Lewis will recommend that shareholders vote against directors responsible for risk oversight in situations where the board or management has failed to identify and manage environmental or social risks that could negatively affect shareholder value.

Nominating and Governance Committee Performance

Glass Lewis has revised the guidelines to clarify that it may consider recommending that shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating and governance committee where the failure of the board of directors to ensure that it has directors with relevant experience (either through periodic director assessment or board refreshment) has contributed to a company’s poor performance.
For more information on nominating and governance committees, see Practice Note, Corporate Governance Standards: Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee.

Director Overboarding Policy

In 2016, Glass Lewis may note as a concern situations in which directors serve on more than:
  • Five total boards where the director is not an executive of a public company.
  • Two total boards where the director is an executive of a public company.
In 2017, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against any director that exceeds these thresholds. Glass Lewis’ voting recommendations in 2016 will continue to be based on its existing thresholds of:
  • Six total boards for an executive who is not an executive of a public company.
  • Three total boards for a director who is an executive of a public company.

Compensation Updates

Glass Lewis provided additional information regarding:
  • Its discussion of one-time and transitional awards to highlight some of the factors it evaluates when considering these awards.
  • Its expectations regarding the relevant disclosure relating to these awards.
  • Minor clarifications regarding the quantitative and qualitative factors it uses to analyze equity compensation plans.