Fourth Circuit Reverses Summary Judgment on Pharma Sales Rep's ADA Accommodation Claim and Questions Whether Driving Was an Essential Job Function | Practical Law

Fourth Circuit Reverses Summary Judgment on Pharma Sales Rep's ADA Accommodation Claim and Questions Whether Driving Was an Essential Job Function | Practical Law

In Stephenson v. Pfizer, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a pharmaceutical company on an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation claim. The Fourth Circuit found that a jury should decide whether driving was an essential function of the sales representative's job under the ADA.

Fourth Circuit Reverses Summary Judgment on Pharma Sales Rep's ADA Accommodation Claim and Questions Whether Driving Was an Essential Job Function

by Practical Law Labor & Employment
Published on 09 Mar 2016 • USA (National/Federal)
In Stephenson v. Pfizer, Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a pharmaceutical company on an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation claim. The Fourth Circuit found that a jury should decide whether driving was an essential function of the sales representative's job under the ADA.
On March 2, 2016, in Stephenson v. Pfizer, Inc., US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment for Pfizer in a sales representative's ADA claim against the pharmaceutical company. The Fourth Circuit found that determining whether Pfizer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for the vision-impaired sales representative, when it refused to allow her to use a driver to reach her appointments, hinged on whether driving (or merely traveling) was an essential function of her job. The court found this to be an issue for a jury to decide. ( (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2016).)

Background

Stephenson was a top performing sales representative for Pfizer. Her job involved frequent meetings with physicians in their offices, to which she drove herself. In 2008, after more than 20 years of employment, Stephenson began encountering vision problems eventually making it impossible for her to safely operate a motor vehicle by October 2011. Stephenson requested several accommodations including:
  • A driver to take her to sales meetings.
  • Magnifying software for her computer.
  • Magnifying tools to aid her in reading documents.
Pfizer allowed Stephenson the magnifying tools and software, but refused to provide her with a driver, stating that driving to and from the meetings was an essential part of Stephenson's job and that hiring a driver would be inherently unreasonable due to risk and liability issues.
Stephenson went on disability leave in November 2011. She continued to request a driver, but was told that providing one would be an unreasonable accommodation and that there were concerns about setting a precedent for lesser employees to follow. Pfizer directed Stephenson to other non-driving positions at the company, but Stephenson declined.
The district court:
  • Awarded summary judgment to Pfizer, holding that driving was an essential function of a Pfizer sales representative position based on a balance of statutory and regulatory factors.
  • Concluded that Stephenson had the opportunity to seek reassignment and that since she did not, she failed to show Pfizer's ADA violation.

Outcome

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Pfizer and held that:
  • There was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the essential function of Stephenson's job was driving or traveling.
  • A jury should resolve the issue concerning this essential function.
The Fourth Circuit noted that:
  • The ADA:
  • A plaintiff pursuing an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim must satisfy four elements:
    • she had a disability under the ADA;
    • her employer had notice of the disability;
    • she could perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation; and
    • the employer failed to make this accommodation.
    (see Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013).)
  • The ADA identifies two factors for determining whether a particular function is essential to a position:
    • the employer's judgment of the essential functions must be considered; and
    • a written job description should be considered evidence of essential job functions.
    (See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).)
  • Applicable regulations identify many non-dispositive, non-exhaustive factors that are evidence of whether a function is essential, including:
    • that essential functions include fundamental job duties but exclude marginal functions (see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1));
    • the employer's judgment as to essential functions;
    • written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job;
    • the amount of time spent on that function;
    • consequences of not requiring that function to be performed;
    • collective bargaining agreement terms;
    • the work experience of those who previously held the job; and
    • the current work experience of those in similar jobs.
    (See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (n)(3)(i)-(vii).)
The Fourth Circuit found that:
  • Resolving the issue of what functions are essential to Stephenson's job is critical to her ADA claim because an employer must accommodate only an employee who can perform her job's essential functions with or without accommodation.
  • If driving is essential to Stephenson's sales position, then she is not qualified for the ADA and her claim fails.
  • Pfizer believed driving to be an essential function of Stephenson's job.
  • Stephenson:
    • had a written job description which did not describe driving as an essential function of her job; and
    • contended that traveling, but not driving, was essential to her job.
  • A jury should decide whether driving is essential to Stephenson's job.

Practical Implications

In Stephenson, the Fourth Circuit reversed summary judgment and let a jury decide whether a particular task was an essential function of an individual's job under the ADA. The court relied heavily on the employee's job description for the sales representative position, which did not mention driving as an essential function or require the employee to hold a valid driver's license. Given this decision, employers should recognize that if sales representatives (or any employees) are expected to have a driver's license or to drive their own cars as an essential function of their job, the employer should include those functions in its job description in the event the job's essential functions are later questioned.