Reverse Break-Up Fees and Specific Performance: A Survey of Remedies for Financing and Antitrust Failure (2016 Edition)

A study analyzing the remedies available to target companies in public merger agreements for a buyer's failure to close the transaction because of a breach or financing failure. The study covers all 85 merger agreements entered into in 2015 for debt-financed acquisitions of US reporting companies (excluding REITs and debt-only issuers) with an equity value at signing of at least $100 million. The study also analyzes the remedies in 49 public and private deals that had antitrust-triggered reverse break-up fees.

Practical Law Corporate & Securities

Click here ( to download the study.

{ "siteName" : "PLC", "objType" : "PLC_Doc_C", "objID" : "1248345174082", "objName" : "ACT_OWNED - READ_ONLY - w-001-7675", "userID" : "2", "objUrl" : "", "pageType" : "Resource", "academicUserID" : "", "contentAccessed" : "true", "analyticsPermCookie" : "25e8a493e:15b0e3ac95c:6a10", "analyticsSessionCookie" : "25e8a493e:15b0e3ac95c:6a11", "statisticSensorPath" : "" }