NY Office Requirement for Nonresident Attorneys is Constitutional: Second Circuit | Practical Law

NY Office Requirement for Nonresident Attorneys is Constitutional: Second Circuit | Practical Law

In Schoenefeld v. Schneiderman, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that New York's requirement under N.Y. Judiciary Law § 470 that nonresident members of the New York bar maintain a physical office within the state for the transaction of law business does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.

NY Office Requirement for Nonresident Attorneys is Constitutional: Second Circuit

Practical Law Legal Update w-002-0368 (Approx. 3 pages)

NY Office Requirement for Nonresident Attorneys is Constitutional: Second Circuit

by Practical Law Litigation
Law stated as of 26 Apr 2016New York, USA (National/Federal)
In Schoenefeld v. Schneiderman, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that New York's requirement under N.Y. Judiciary Law § 470 that nonresident members of the New York bar maintain a physical office within the state for the transaction of law business does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
On April 22, 2016, in Schoenefeld v. Schneiderman, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that New York's requirement that nonresident members of the New York bar maintain a physical office within the state for the transaction of law business under N.Y. Judiciary Law § 470 does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause ( (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2016)).
The plaintiff, Ekaterina Schoenefeld, was a citizen and resident of New Jersey and licensed to practice law in New Jersey, New York, and California. She maintained an office in New Jersey, but not New York. Because NY Judiciary Law § 470 requires all attorneys practicing in New York to maintain an office for the transaction of law business in the state, the plaintiff asserted that she declined clients in New York state courts to avoid violating § 470. As a result, she sought a judicial declaration that the office requirement on nonresident members of the New York bar violates the US Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause by infringing on nonresidents' right to practice law in New York. The district court agreed and declared § 470 unconstitutional. The New York State Attorney General appealed.
The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals to determine the minimum requirements necessary to satisfy the mandate under § 470. The Court of Appeals held that § 470 requires nonresident attorneys to maintain a physical office in New York and that the statute could not be construed to require only a New York address or agent sufficient for the receipt of service.
In reviewing the plaintiff's constitutional challenge, the Second Circuit found that it failed on the merits. The Privilege and Immunities Clause guarantees that citizens of any other state have the same privileges and immunities in that state. However, this is not absolute and does not preclude states from distinguishing between citizens and noncitizens. Rather, courts look at whether a challenged law was enacted for a protectionist purpose (see McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1715 (2013)). Disparate effects alone are not enough to demonstrate discrimination prohibited by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Second Circuit looked at the purpose of § 470 and found that it was not enacted for the protectionist purpose of burdening nonresident attorneys in practicing in New York. Instead, it was enacted to ensure that every licensed New York attorney, whether or not a state resident, could practice in the state by providing a means for the nonresident attorney to establish a physical presence in the state in addition to having a place for service. Because every attorney admitted to the New York bar must have a physical premise in the state, the fact that a nonresident attorney has to lease an office while a resident attorney can use his home does not unduly burden the nonresident. Section 470 therefore does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The court also noted that the plaintiff did not offer any proof indicating a protectionist purpose, either on the face of the statute or inferred on its effects as applied.