2016 Spring Oil and Gas Borrowing Base Redetermination: The Day of Reckoning? | Practical Law

2016 Spring Oil and Gas Borrowing Base Redetermination: The Day of Reckoning? | Practical Law

An analysis of the borrowing capacity of oil and gas companies under their reserve based loans (RBLs) following the spring 2016 borrowing base redetermination period. This Article examines the factors that may have impacted the lenders' redetermination decisions. This Article also examines the steps that lenders are taking to enhance their credits and minimize their exposure to the oil and gas sector.

2016 Spring Oil and Gas Borrowing Base Redetermination: The Day of Reckoning?

Practical Law Article w-002-2470 (Approx. 14 pages)

2016 Spring Oil and Gas Borrowing Base Redetermination: The Day of Reckoning?

by Practical Law Finance with Jeff Nichols, Haynes & Boone, LLP
Law stated as of 07 Jul 2016USA (National/Federal)
An analysis of the borrowing capacity of oil and gas companies under their reserve based loans (RBLs) following the spring 2016 borrowing base redetermination period. This Article examines the factors that may have impacted the lenders' redetermination decisions. This Article also examines the steps that lenders are taking to enhance their credits and minimize their exposure to the oil and gas sector.
Uncertain about the extent to which oil prices might fall and fearing the consequences of borrowing base reductions on many exploration and production (E&P) companies, lenders were generally hesitant during the Fall 2015 redetermination period to extract liquidity from the oil and gas upstream sector. As a result, they reaffirmed or increased many of these companies' borrowing bases (see Article, Reserve Based Lending: How Bad Were the Fall 2015 Borrowing Base Redeterminations?). Practical Law Finance had postulated, however, that if oil prices did not rebound, and faced with pressure from bank regulators to decrease their exposure to the oil and gas sector, lenders would not be as hesitant during the Spring 2016 redetermination period.
Practical Law Finance has examined redetermination information disclosed by 63 US public E&P borrowers between February 15, 2016 and June 15, 2016 to analyze whether this prediction materialized and the extent to which lenders revised downward their borrowing bases. While this number represents a small percentage of the reserve based loan (RBL) market, this information is nonetheless instructive as to the lenders' approach during the Spring 2016 redetermination period.
Our analysis is based on the review of:
  • Credit agreements and related amendments filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
  • Credit agreements and related amendments included in Practical Law Finance's What's Market Credit Agreements Comprehensive Deal Database.
  • Other publicly available information, including company press releases, 10Qs and 10Ks.

Summary and Notable Trends

Lenders have considerable discretion when valuing borrowers' oil and gas assets and determining the borrowing base under their RBL facilities. They can, therefore, decide to be flexible with their borrowers and allow them to retain enough borrowing capacity to sustain their exploration, drilling, and other operations. During the Fall 2015 redetermination period, many lenders elected to exercise this discretion and increased or reaffirmed the borrowing base of many oil and gas borrowers. For more information on this discretion and what it means for borrowers, see Practice Note, Reserve Based Loans: Issues and Considerations: Lenders' Discretion.
However, that was not the case this redetermination period. The significant decline in prices has undermined lenders' confidence in the ability of some borrowers to meet their obligations under their RBL facilities. Regulators' concerns about bank lenders' exposure to the oil and gas sector have also constrained their ability to work with their borrowers. As a result, lenders decreased the borrowing base of their borrowers by an average of 28% (see Chart, Borrowing Base Redetermination Data for US Public Companies).
Reducing borrowing bases is not the only action that lenders are taking to reduce the likelihood of borrower defaults and decrease their exposure to the oil and gas sector. They are also:
  • Limiting borrowers' ability to draw down on their RBL facilities.
  • Amending their credit agreements to:
    • require borrowers to pledge more collateral to secure the loans;
    • increase the margin on some loans to compensate them for the added risk of lending to borrowers in this sector; and
    • require borrowers to maintain a minimum amount of liquidity.
Our review of the borrowing base data reveals several other noteworthy trends:
  • The less reliant borrowers were on their RBL facilities to finance their operations, the more likely their borrowing capacity remained unchanged or was reduced by a relatively small amount.
  • While the borrowing base news was generally negative and lenders were less flexible during this redetermination period, some lenders were nonetheless willing to work with some borrowers by:
    • waiving certain defaults;
    • revising covenants to minimize the likelihood of default; or
    • postponing the borrowing base redetermination until later in 2016 or 2017 to give borrowers a chance to shore up their balance sheets.
  • Not surprisingly, the extent to which a borrower's borrowing base was amended depended in part on:
    • The size of the borrower.
    • The diversity of the borrower's operations (including the location of its shale plays).
    • The existence of any hedges.
    • The borrower's ability to secure other sources of capital.

Background

Most independent, non-integrated E&P companies finance their operations (for example, exploring for new reserves and drilling oil wells) with RBLs. The amount an E&P company is entitled to borrow under the RBL facility is based on the value of and is typically secured by its proven and developed oil and gas reserves, as determined from time to time. This amount, known as the borrowing base, is generally re-evaluated each spring (between February and June) and fall (between August and December) but many agreements provide for an additional re-evaluation at the election of either the borrower or lenders. Periodic redetermination of the borrowing base under the RBL facility ensures that:
  • The borrower's borrowing capacity is commensurate with the value of its oil and gas assets (mainly the borrower's "proved, developed and producing" (PDP) reserves and to a lesser extent its "proved developed non-producing" (PNDP) reserves and "proved undeveloped reserves" (PUDs)).
  • The borrower's outstanding loans do not exceed the value of its oil and gas assets.
  • The lenders are not exposed to undue repayment risk.

Market Analysis

Oil prices have risen every month since reaching a 12-year low of $31 per barrel in January 2016 and on May 27, 2016, oil prices rose above $50 per barrel for the first time since November 2015. The North Sea Brent Crude, the global benchmark, traded at $50.38 a barrel and the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) traded at $50.10 a barrel. Prices haves remained around $50 a barrel ever since. While this is an encouraging trend, these prices are well below the $112 per barrel price achieved in July 2014.
Several factors have put upward pressure on crude oil prices including:
  • Higher global oil demand.
  • A slight decline in US crude oil production. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), US crude oil production averaged about 9.1 million barrels per day (b/d) in the first quarter of 2016. By contrast, the US produced about 9.4 million b/d in 2015. This small drop on production (about 3%) has been despite drastic cuts in capital expenditures and a stark reduction in rig count. According to Baker Hughes, there were 431 rigs in operation as of July 1, 2016 compared to 862 on July 1, 2015.
  • Decreased oil production in Canada.
  • Optimism that production would fall following a tentative agreement among OPEC and non-OPEC members to freeze production (although this was temporary because the agreement never took shape).
However, industry experts do not expect oil prices to remain at this level. According to the EIA's June 2016 Short Term Energy Outlook, Brent crude oil prices are forecast to average about $43 per barrel in 2016 with the WTI expected to be slightly lower.

Bank Regulations

In addition to market pressures, borrowers must also contend with regulatory pressures that may impact banks' lending decisions. Bank regulators, including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, have warned banks that because of the decline in commodity prices and high leverage rates among their borrowers, many of the loans in their portfolios may be categorized as classified commitments or special mention. A discussion of these terms is beyond the scope of this Article. However, in simple terms, loans that fall in these categories have a higher risk of payment default. The higher the percentage of its loans that are categorized as classified or special mention, the greater the amount (known as the allowance) a bank must set aside to cover potential loan losses.

Bank Oil and Gas Sector Exposure and Loan Loss Reserves

According to their earnings reports for the first quarter of 2016, the major energy banks have about $190 billion in total exposure to the oil and gas sector.
In anticipation of more losses (defaults and borrower insolvencies), many banks increased their oil and gas loan loss reserves.
  • J.P. Morgan Chase has added about $1.3 billion to its reserves since the end of 2015 (about $800 million in the fourth quarter of 2015 and about $500 million in the first quarter of 2016).
  • Wells Fargo set aside $1.7 billion for energy loan losses ($1.2 billion at the end of 2015 and $500 million in the first quarter of 2016).
  • Bank of America added $525 million to its reserves for a total of more than $1 billion.
Citigroup has not disclosed the amount of reserves it has set aside to mitigate losses in the oil and gas sector.
Although oil prices have averaged about $44 per barrel since March 31, 2016, this increase may not be enough to forestall additional losses. While bank earnings for the second quarter are not available until July, some banks have already stated that they may need to bolster their reserves to manage more borrower defaults.

A Day of Reckoning?

The redetermination process is generally a straightforward process. However, the volatility and significant decline in oil prices since July 2014 and uncertainty surrounding the viability of many borrowers and their ability to repay their loans have made the redetermination process more complicated and a source of anxiety for many borrowers. Many highly leveraged companies that avoided a significant borrowing capacity reduction in the fall of 2015 were also concerned they may not be as fortunate this time around.
Based on the credit agreements or other records of the 63 borrowers Practical Law Finance reviewed, we found that about:
  • 75% or 47 of these borrowers had their borrowing bases reduced.
  • 24% or 15 of these borrowers had their borrowing bases reaffirmed.
Only one borrower had its borrowing base increased.
By comparison, in the fall of 2015:
  • 49% of the borrowers we reviewed had their borrowing bases reduced.
  • 18% of these borrowers had their borrowing bases increased.
  • 33% of these borrowers had their borrowing bases reaffirmed.
Of the 47 borrowers that had their borrowing bases reduced:
  • 4 or about 9% had their borrowing bases reduced by 10% or less.
  • 9 or about 19% had their borrowing bases reduced by more than 10% but less than 20%.
  • 13 or about 28% had their borrowing bases reduced by at least 20% but less than 30%.
  • 21 or about 45% had their borrowing bases reduced by at least 30%.
Of the 47 borrowers that had their borrowing bases reduced during the Spring 2016 redetermination period, the average reduction was about 28%.
As we had anticipated, lenders were not as flexible during the spring 2016 redetermination period as they had been in the fall of 2015 when they reduced borrowing bases by an average of 19% (see Article, Reserve Based Lending: How Bad Were the Fall 2015 Borrowing Base Redeterminations?).
Unlike in the fall of 2015, there were not many borrowing base increases or reaffirmations. Some of the companies that had their borrowing bases reaffirmed were able to do so because:
  • They issued equity the proceeds of which were used to pay down debt (see Equity Issuances). However, this is not a viable option for most companies.
  • They did not have significant amounts drawn on their RBL facilities (see Utilization Rates).
  • They agreed to maintain a certain amount of liquidity (see Minimum Liquidity Requirements).
Not surprisingly, small to medium-sized companies were hit harder during the redetermination process. Larger companies were able to preserve liquidity because of their more diversified operations (especially those with operations in shale plays with lower breakeven costs or that had more productive wells) and by taking actions that may not be available to smaller companies (see Borrowers' Liquidity Management Initiatives).
For more information on the borrowing base data for specific companies, see Chart, Borrowing Base Redetermination Data for US Public Companies.

Factors Affecting the Lenders' Redetermination Decisions

There are many factors lenders consider when making redetermination decisions (Practice Note, Reserve Based Loans: Issues and Considerations: Factors Impacting the Borrowing Base). However, the significant decline in oil prices coupled with pressure from regulatory agencies may have caused certain factors to achieve greater prominence.

Leverage Levels

Assuming that oil prices would remain in the $80 to $90 per barrel range, many E&P companies incurred significant debt in the highly liquid credit markets to finance their operations. High prices coupled with high production enabled these companies to generate sufficient revenue to repay or refinance these loans. Even after prices started to fall, some companies continued to incur additional debt (for example, second lien loans or high yield debt). However, with low prices expected to continue indefinitely, the balance sheets of many of these companies have come under significant pressure.
With reduced revenues many companies are financing their operations not from cash flow from their operations but with loan proceeds including their RBL facilities. As a result, some companies have drawn down a significant percentage of their RBL facility; including drawdowns made as a defensive measure (see Utilization Rates). For more information on defensive draw downs, see Loan Drawdowns.
Many E&P borrowers with high RBL utilization rates had their borrowing bases decreased including:
  • Vanguard Natural Resources (-26.4%).
  • Abraxas Petroleum (-21.2%).
  • W&T Offshore (-57.1%).
  • Legacy Reserves (-30%).
By contrast, borrowers that had little or no amounts drawn on their facilities had their borrowing bases reaffirmed or reduced by a relatively small percentage. For example:
  • Cabot Oil & Gas (-6%).
  • Callon Petroleum (reaffirmed).
  • PDC Energy (reaffirmed).
  • Range Resources (reaffirmed).
  • RSP Permian (reaffirmed).
While reducing the borrowing base for an unused facility may not seem to be harmful on its face, borrowers may prefer to retain the access to cash to ensure they have sufficient funds to acquire assets or engage in other transactions, if they deem it necessary or advisable. Some borrowers may also fear that an announcement that their borrowing base is being reduced may be perceived as a sign of financial difficulty.

Utilization Rates

Borrowers' Liquidity Management Initiatives

Borrowers have taken many steps during the past two years to manage their liquidity and finance their operations, including:
  • Reducing their capital expenditures and general and administrative expenses.
  • Cutting back on their drilling programs.
  • Monetizing their hedges.
  • Selling non-core assets.
As low oil prices have persisted, borrowers have engaged in other and more innovative methods to raise cash.

Equity Issuances

Some borrowers have decreased their leverage by issuing new equity the proceeds of which were used in part to pay down debt. The E&P companies that have issued new equity include Callon Petroleum, Parsley Energy, PDC Energy, Cabot Oil & Gas, Energen Corporation, and Matador Resources Company. For more information on these and other equity offerings, see What's Market, Oil & Gas Follow-up Equity Offerings.

Debt Swaps or Uptiering

In this structure, which emerged in 2015, noteholders exchange their unsecured notes for a lower principal amount of secured junior lien notes or term loans (plus, in some cases, cash and/or equity) which reduces the E&P borrower's overall indebtedness. While many companies were able to consummate these transactions in 2015 including Exco Resources and California Resources, these transactions were a tougher sell in 2016 (for example, Eclipse Resources and Denbury Resources cancelled debt exchange transactions). The continuing low prices have made some investors less willing to engage in these transactions.
However, despite these constraints some borrowers were able to consummate these transactions on 2016 with varying levels of success. The E&P borrowers that have engaged in these transactions include:
  • Vanguard Natural Resources which exchanged 7.875% senior notes due 2020 for 7.0% senior secured second lien notes.
  • Rex Energy Corporation which exchanged senior notes for $675 million in new senior secured second lien notes and about 10 million shares of the company's common stock.
  • PetroQuest which exchanged up to $300 million of the $350 million in outstanding debt for up $75 million of cash, $202.5 million aggregate principal amount of its newly issued 10% second lien senior secured notes and 6 million shares of its common stock.

Debt Equity Swaps

Some borrowers were also able to exchange some of their debt for equity. Chesapeake Energy Corporation issued about 37 million shares of common stock, representing approximately 5.2% of the company's outstanding common stock in exchange for about $166 million.

Loan Drawdowns

Many companies, fearing a reduction in their borrowing bases and, in many cases, shortly ahead of a bankruptcy filing, drew down fully on their RBL facilities to secure access to cash. Some of the companies that drew down on their RBL facilities include:
  • W&T Offshore, Inc., which borrowed approximately $340 million under its RBL facility on February 26, 2016. W&T Offshore has a borrowing base deficiency of about $191 million.
  • Ultra Petroleum, which borrowed $266 million on February 18, 2016 under its facility. Ultra Petroleum filed for bankruptcy protection on April 29, 2016.
  • Linn Energy, LLC, which announced on February 4, 2016 that it borrowed approximately $919 million from its credit facility for a total amount outstanding of about $3.6 billion. Linn Energy filed for bankruptcy protection on May 11, 2016.
  • Berry Petroleum Company's credit facility remains fully utilized at $900 million, including $250 million of restricted cash posted as collateral. Berry Petroleum filed for bankruptcy protection on May 11, 2016.
  • SandRidge Energy, which drew down $489 million on its facility on January 2 for a total outstanding amount of $500 million. SandRidge Energy filed for bankruptcy protection on May 16, 2016.

Lender Credit Protection Initiatives

To give them greater certainty regarding the ability of their borrowers to repay their loans or to limit their exposure to this sector, lenders are amending their credit agreements to tighten some of the covenants to which their borrowers are subject.

Minimum Liquidity Requirements

Some lenders are requiring borrowers to comply with a minimum liquidity requirement. This provision allows lenders to limit their exposure to certain companies without reducing their borrowing bases. Borrowers that are subject to this requirement include Samson Oil & Gas and Chesapeake Energy. For example, Chesapeake Energy has agreed to maintain a minimum liquidity amount of $500 million at all times.

Anti-Hoarding Provisions

To prevent borrowers from hoarding cash to create negotiating leverage with the bank group or in advance of a bankruptcy filing, lenders are including provisions in many of their loan agreements that:
  • Require borrowers to use excess cash (as defined in the agreement) to prepay amounts outstanding under the RBL facility.
  • Prevent borrowers from requesting a loan if, after giving effect to the loan, they would hold cash and cash equivalents in excess of a specified dollar amount in its bank accounts.
These provisions were added after several borrowers requested the maximum amount available under their facilities and later filed for bankruptcy (see Loan Draw Downs).

Pledge of More Proven Reserves

Before 2015 banks typically required perfected liens on reserve interests that produce 80% of the economic value of the proved reserves (which includes proved, developed and producing as well as proved and undeveloped reserves), subject to the quality, location, and concentration of these reserves. The 80% figure emerged because of the cost and time associated with perfecting liens for the last 20%, which is often substantial. For more information on these issues, see Practice Note, Reserve Based Loans: Issues and Considerations: Collateral and Security.
To mitigate repayment risk and to provide added protection if a bankruptcy occurs, some lenders are increasing the percentage of the borrower's oil and gas reserves that must be pledged. For example, the percentage of pledged reserves increased for:
  • Denbury Resources from 85% to 90%.
  • Vanguard Natural Resources from 80% to 95%.
  • Sanchez Energy Corporation from 80% to 90%.
To maintain its $4 billion borrowing base under its RBL, Chesapeake Energy must pledge substantially all of its assets, an unusual provision even in this volatile market.

Controlled Accounts

The collateral package in an RBL transaction is typically limited to the borrower's oil and gas assets (reserves and related equipment). To enhance the credits and increase the likelihood of repayment, some lenders are now requiring borrowers also pledge their bank accounts (deposit, securities and commodities) to the lenders. This provision requires the borrower and the other loan parties to:
  • Maintain one of the lenders in the loan agreement as their principal depository bank.
  • Enter into account control agreements concerning these accounts.
Borrowers that are now subject to this requirement include Approach Resources Inc., Sanchez Energy Corporation, Whiting Petroleum Corporation, and Denbury Resources Inc.

Higher Interest Rates

Some lenders have also increased the interest rates applicable to many RBL facilities as part of the redetermination process to compensate them for increased risk of lending to certain borrowers. Some of the borrowers' whose interest rates have been increased includes:
  • Northern Oil & Gas (rates increased by 50 basis points (bps)).
  • SM Energy (interest rate increased by 50 bps).
  • Contango Oil & Gas (increased the LIBOR, US prime rate, and federal funds rate margins to 2.5% to 4.0%).

Bankruptcy

While oil prices have been increasing since the beginning of 2016, this increase came too late and was not enough for many companies. As a result, many companies have filed for bankruptcy or are in restructuring discussions with their lenders. Those that are still operating must adjust to a new normal of constrained liquidity and reduced exploration and drilling activities.
Since the beginning of 2016, more than 30 oil and gas companies have filed for bankruptcy. This brings to about 80 the total number of companies that have filed for bankruptcy since the severe decline in oil prices reduced the value of many oil and gas companies' assets and constrained their liquidity. The companies that have filed for bankruptcy so far in 2016 include:
  • Antero Energy Partners, LLC, which filed on January 25, 2016.
  • New Source Energy Partners, LP, which filed on March 15, 2016.
  • Emerald Oil, Inc., which filed on March 22, 2016.
  • Energy XXI, which filed on April 14, 2016.
  • Emerald Oil, Inc., which filed on March 22, 2016.
  • Goodrich Petroleum Corporation, which filed on April 15, 2016.
  • MidStates Petroleum Co. Inc., which filed on April 30.
  • Linn Energy, which filed on May 11, 2016.
  • Berry Energy, which filed on May 11, 2016.
  • SandRidge Energy, which filed on May 16, 2016.
  • Warren Resources, which filed on June 3, 2016.
  • Hercules Offshore, which filed on June 3, 2016.
Haynes and Boone LLP tracks through its Oil Patch Bankruptcy Monitor North American oil and gas producers that have filed for bankruptcy since the beginning of 2015. As of June 30, 2016, 43 producers have filed bankruptcy, representing approximately $44 billion in cumulative secured and unsecured debt.
The uptick in oil prices is not expected to last nor is it expected to rise above the amount needed for most companies to become profitable again. As a result, more bankruptcies are likely to occur.

Borrowing Base Redetermination Data for US Public Companies

Below is a chart of the results of the borrowing base redetermination process for 63 companies.

An Expert Q&A: Analysis of the Borrowing Base Redetermination Data for Non-Public US Companies

Jeff Nichols of Haynes & Boone, LLP reviews borrowing base redetermination information for non-public oil and gas companies
Jeff Nichols of Haynes & Boone, LLP reviews borrowing base redetermination information for public and non-public oil and gas companies.
How were these borrowers' borrowing bases redetermined this spring and was it consistent with Haynes & Boone's predictions from January 2016?
The Practical Law review of actual results closely tracks the predicted results of the Haynes and Boone survey. In the January 2016 Haynes and Boone survey, lenders predicted an average of a 25% borrowing base decrease while borrowers predicted a 28% decrease. Practical Law's review showed a 28% decrease in the size of borrowing bases. As far as the scope of decreases, in the Haynes and Boone survey lenders predicted that 70% of all producers would experience a decrease and borrowers predicted that 67% would experience a decrease. Practical Law showed that 75% of these borrowers experienced a decrease.
The differences in the two surveys may reveal some insights. The Practical Law survey uses the actual results from publicly traded companies, whereas the Haynes and Boone survey is predictive and includes public and private companies. Public companies tend to be bigger with better credit capacity. Public companies may also choose to exclude some of their oil and gas properties from the borrowing base. They can, therefore, add more properties to manage the loss of value in reserves due to price swings. They may also scale their credit agreements to only include a small portion of the reserve value as collateral, whereas smaller, nonpublic companies tend to be less conservative and borrow as much as their reserves will allow.
In contrast to this past spring where the two surveys show similar results, in the fall, the Practical Law survey presented a much better picture than the predictions from the Haynes and Boone survey had indicated. This may be because of the differences in the pool of companies in the survey but also because, in our experience, many predicted borrowing base decreases never materialized. The redeterminations were delayed or bank groups simply reaffirmed borrowing bases that were way above their price decks.
Because much of the predicted decreases never came in the fall, the Haynes and Boone survey again predicted a significant decrease this past spring. The Practical Law study confirms that this decrease came, and it came to the public companies that appear to have run out of options to avoid it.
In September 2016, Haynes and Boone will publish its Fall survey. It will be interesting to see where things go from here.
What were the primary issues or factors lenders considered when making their redetermination decisions?
The traditional driver of borrowing base decisions has been the bank’s “price deck” which is the bank’s vision of the prices for the hydrocarbon products these companies produce. The reserve report shows a projection of which products are produced at which times and the banks will use the price deck to estimate what revenue the borrower will earn based on the projected price for each period. The bank will use many other factors to compute the reserve value, including:
  • An estimate of costs.
  • The positive or negative impact of hedging.
  • An adjustment from risk weighting many other factors for things such as concentration risk if all the wells are located in a similar location.
One phenomenon that is interesting to observe now and that is discussed in the Practical Law summary above is the influence of the OCC lending guidelines. One factor that weighs heavily now is the debt-to-EBITDAX ratio. This is having the effect of shifting oil and gas lending away from asset based lending towards cash flow lending. Whereas the EBITDAX is backward looking over the last twelve months, reserve reports look forward for the next several years. When prices start to recover, reserve values will grow, but companies will not be able to access the bank market to develop these reserves as they used to because the trailing twelve month EBITDAX will not pass the debt-to-EBITDAX test. Unless the lending guidelines change, the inevitable result will be that non-bank lenders will fill the gap. In fact, we are already seeing several bank facilities being refinanced by non-bank lenders.
What types of strategies are lenders employing to manage borrowers' liquidity and limit their exposure to this sector?
Many bank lenders are looking to reduce their exposure to the sector, while non-bank lenders see an opportunity to increase exposure at the perceived bottom of the cycle. To preserve liquidity, many senior bank lenders are employing tactics normally used by “stretch” and “mezzanine” lenders by tightening covenants that restrict the borrower’s range of activities.
What changes, if any, are lenders making to borrowers' covenant provisions?
Specifically, covenants regarding the purchase, sale or development of oil and gas collateral are tightening up with more bank oversight on development plans. Some banks are forced to waive or amend financial covenants to accommodate the company’s situation.
Overall their ability to tighten covenants has to be balanced against the risk of throwing the company into default or bankruptcy.
Some public companies were able to issue additional equity, do debt exchanges at a discount or incur new loans. What options are available to the non-public companies?
In recent months prices have increased slightly and all companies have reduced costs at an amazing rate. For some companies, the result is that they have a new slice of collateral value to offer debt or equity investors. There are a small number of non-bank lenders that have come in to offer refinancings. Finally, several companies have entered into restructuring support agreements and proceeded through bankruptcy to reorganize and deleverage.
Many lenders in this market are the smaller regional banks. How are the new lending guidelines and oil price volatility affecting these lenders' approach to the borrowing base redetermination?
Some regional banks were very conservative and the lending guidelines may not affect them very much at all. There are a small number of regional banks that have made headlines because they hold some loans that were very aggressive and are likely to be paid back at less than par. These loans will need to be refinanced, and the new lending guidelines mean it's less likely that a bank will provide the financing.